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To Members of the Forty-seventh General Assembly: 
Under direction of House Joint Resolution No. 1023, 
1967 regular session, the Legislative Council appointed a 
committee to conduct "a study of the problem of govern-
mental civil immunity with a view toward developing compre-
hensive legislation to define and limit the areas of im-
munity and to provide procedures for compensation to those 
affected and to balance the public and private interest 
involved." The report of this committee, is submitted 
herewith. 
The committee submitted its report and draft of the 
proposed bill on September 23, 1968, at which time the 
report was accepted by the Legislative Council for trans-
mittal to the Forty-seventh General Assembly. 
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Chairman 
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Dear Mr. Chairman: 
Your committee appointed to study sovereign 
immunity in Colorado submits the accompanying re-
port, containing a draft of suggested governmental 
immunity legislation. 
The committee's report indicates that there 
is a need for legislative action to establish 
guidelines for the waiver of sovereign immunity in 
particular instances and to assure governmental en-
tities of the opportunity to prepare for the newly 
imposed liabilityo The legislation provides for 
(1) procedural safeguards, (2) limitations on judg-
ments, (3) the express enumeration of areas of lia-
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Under direction of House Joint Resolution No. 1023, 1967 
regular session,. the Legislative Council appointed a committee to 
study the problems of governmental immunity with a view toward 
developing comprehensive legislation to define and limit the 
areas of immunity and to provide procedures for compensation to 
those affected and to balance the public and private interests 
involved. The members of the committee appointed to carry out 
this assignment were: 
Senator David Hahn, Chairman 
Representative Thomas Grimshaw, 
Vice Chairman 
Senator Allegra Saunders 
Representative James Braden 
Representative Ralph A. Cole 
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To accomplish the purposes set forth in the study reso-
lution, the Legislative Council Committee on Sovereign Immunity 
held thirteen meetings from June 9, 1967 to September 19, 1968. 
To aid the committee in its deliberations, representatives of 
various departments of state government (Colorado Department of 
Highways, Department of Insurance, Attorney General's Office, 
Division of Local Government), representatives of various local 
governmental entities, and representatives of the insurance in-
dustry, were consulted by the committee. In addition, two ques-
tionnaires were used by the committee to obtain comments and 
suggestions from interested persons on the proposals the commit-
tee had under consideration. 
Assisting the committee in the study were Mr. Bob Holt and 
and Mr. Gene Cavaliere of the Legislative Drafting Office, who 
provided bill drafting services, and Mr. Earl Thaxton, senior 
research assistant for the Legislative Council, who had primary 
responsibility for the staff worko 
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COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIOOS 
1. The legal doctrine_of sovereign immunity, as it has 
historically devel~ped, expresses the idea that government is 
immune from liability for injury or damage resulting from gov-
ernmental activities, unless it consents to such liability. The 
doctrine that the sovereign cannot be sued or held liable with-
out its consent continues to be the rule, not the exception,·ln 
the great majority of states. 
2. The law of Colorado with respect to the sovereign im-
munity doctrine and the tort li'ability of governmental entities 
can be summarized generally (although in oversimplified terms) 
as follows: The state, counties, cities, and other subdivisions 
of government are deemed immune from liability for the torts com-
mitted by public employees in the performance of governmental 
functions, except to the extent that the immunity has been waived 
or judicially found to be inapplicable. 
3. The doctrine of sovereign immunity has been under 
critical scrutiny for many years· -- by legal writers and schol-
ars, jud~es, attorneys, and lay people. Most agree that the 
grounds for exempting the state and other public entities from 
suit and liability are neither logical nor practical. Nearly 
every commentator who has considered the subject vigorously as-
serts that the doctrine must be abolished, _because it is inher-
ently unsound, confusing, conflicting, archaic, "an anachronism 
without rational basis that has existed only by force of inertia", 
and has produced great injustice in the courts. The committee 
agrees that there are many inconsistencies in the present la~ on 
.the subject, thereby creating confusion and misunderstanding. 
The doctrine has created certain situations of injustice. Citi-
zens have been injured in their person and property by government 
employees and, in many of these cases, no recourse against the. 
government is possible. Where relief is available it is most 
generally granted as a matter of discretion and there is no uni-
formity in either method or approach among the various subdivi-
sions of government. This results in many instances of injustice 
and inequity. 
4. In the several states, including Colorado, .consent to 
suit and liability has been given in many cases, and in a variety 
of forms. This consent has taken the form of (1) private laws. 
enacted as a matter of legislative grace, (2) general or limited 
public legislation creating liability, (3) indirect liability 
through such means as insurance, (4) liability of governmental 
units under the court-made doctrine concerning proprietary and 
ministerial functions, and (5) judicial abrogation of the doc-
trine, in whole or in part, by the courts, All of these forms of 
assuming responsibility for governmental torts combine to support 
the conclusion of the committee that there ls a trend toward gov-. 
ernmental responsibility and away from governmental imm~nity. 
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5. Widespread dissatisfaction with the doctrine and ju-
dicial impatience with legislative inaction have led fourteen 
state courts to repudiate the doctrine in whole or in part. On 
the other hand. many courts, in considering whether or not to 
abolish the doctrine, have decided to leave the question to the 
legislatures. It appears that a majority of those who have con-
sidered the-question, both those who favor and those who oppose 
judicial abrogation of the doctrine. assume that the doctrine 
should be abolished. The main debate is over the question wheth-
er the courts or the legislatures should do the job. 
6. To date, the majority of the Supreme Court of Colora-
do has refused to completely· repudiate the .doctrine and reaf-
firmed the position tha.t any change in the rule should be a 
legislative matter. Whether or not the Supreme Court of Colora-
do will refute, change or otherwise amend the rule of government-
al immunity, is· of course, not knowno In several other states, 
the courts also intimated that the doctrine was a legislative 
matter. However, .in the light of.legislative inaction, these 
same courts subsequently concluded that the initiative had to be 
undertaken by court decision, and abolished the doctrine. A 
change in the thinking of the Colorado Supreme Cou~t as a result 
of decisions in sister stat~s, a change in the composition of 
the court itself; or impatience by the court for· action by the 
legislature, could result in a change of ~osition by the court. 
In anr event, it was agreed by the committee that to wait for 
judic al action is not a proper. solution. to the problems of sov-
ereign immunity. The committee concluded that~ statutory solu-
tion to the problem was needed to give .d~rection and bring some 
degree of consistency and uniformity to-the applicable statutory 
and common law principles.. B_ecause the de~ermination of public 
policy is particularly within the competence and experience of 
the legislature, and in an attempt.to avoid th~ chaos which has 
resulted in other states where .immunity has been abolished by 
the judiciary before the legislature had·ac.ted, the committee 
~oncluded that legislative action i~ nec~~sary and desirable. · 
7. The committ~e concluded that a~y proposed legislation 
should eliminate the pres~nt inconsistency and arbitrary.distinc-
tions that exist in the law_as it applies to the various units of 
government. Any proposed legislation. should r_ef lecl the philoso-
phy of the present trend to greatly restrict- the _doctrine of gov-
ernmental immunity. More stress should be on the principle that 
if there is fault there should be a remedy and that economic loss 
resulting from the wrongful_ acts of government should be borne by 
the community as a whole rather than imposed on one individual. 
In addition, any proposed legislation should assure governmental 
entities of the opportunity to prepare for any newly imposed lia-
bility and all liability should, be prudently managed and fiscally 
controlled by the following provisions: (1) procedural safe-
guards, (2) statutory limitations on judgments, (3) the areas of 
exposure should be expressly stated, and (4) power.should be 
granted to obtain prot~ction through insurance. 
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COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS 
The committee recommends favorable consideration of the 
"Colorado Governmental Immunity Act" included in this report. 
The general plan of the act is to reaffirm governmental immunity 
to suit and then proceed to carve out specific exceptions there-
to. The committee felt that this approach would eliminate pos-
sible confusion by restating existing law in Colorado while . 
opening up new areas of specific governmental responsibility as 
deemed appropriate by the committee to satisfy the demands of 
justice in a changing society. · 
The committee found that this approach would be the easi-
est to draft and would result in a clear, concise bill. In ad-
dition, this approach allows the most flexibility for future 
change. Most important, however, is that this approach provides 
a better basis upon which the financial burden of liability can 
be evaluated in terms of the potential cost of such liability. 
If the limits of potential liability are known, public entities 
may plan accordingly, may budget for their potential liabilities, 
and may obtain realistically priced insurance, for the risk is 
more clearly defined and lends itself to more accurate assess-
ment, which should result in lower premiums for the coverage had. 
The language of the bill was patterned after the Califor-
nia Act of 1963 (Calif. Gov't Code Ann. § 810-996.6 ,LSupp. 196§7), 
the "Utah Governmental Immunity Act" (Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 to 
34 L5upp. 196.27), other state acts, and the Federal Tort Claims 
Act. The original draft of the bill has been changed and refined 
to comply with specific recommendations as received from commit-
tee members, and to reflect unique Colorado circumstances as re-
vealed by committee discussion. In some cases actual language 
as suggested by committee members was incorporated into the bill. 
The major provisions of the act are discussed below. 
Declaration of Policy 
The bill begins with a statement of policy to the effect 
that the committee recognizes that the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity is, in some instances, an inequitable doctrine. That the 
doctrine has created many situations of injustice by treating 
governments differently than private persons is obvious. On the 
other hand, there are many situations in which the nature of gov-
ernmental activities and functions is not comparable to private 
activities and responsibilities. 
Public agencies necessarily engage in a broad spectrum of 
activities having no private counterpart, which often involve 
relatively high degrees of exposure to injury producing events, 
and which the government cannot voluntarily terminate since they 
are performed as a matter of public ·duty. Private persons and 
xvii 
corporations, on the other hand, are ordinarily free to withdraw 
from activities which entail undue risks of liability. These 
differences suggest that it may not be wise to treat RUblic and 
private entities alike for tort liability purposes. The commit-
tee has recognized this difference by declaring that the state 
and its political subdivisions should not be liable for their 
wrongs, in every instance, in the same manner as private persons 
and corporations. 
Definitions 
Public entity. The definition of "public entity" is es-
pecially important because it determines the general reach of 
the bill. This definition is intended to include every kind of 
independent political or governmental entity in the state in or-
der to avoid any questions as to whether certain units of gov-
ernment are excluded. The committee agreed that all units of 
government should be treated similarly, for it appears to be un-
just to make an individual's right to recover damages for injury 
dependent on whether it was the state or some other political 
subdivi~ion or governmental unit which was responsible. 
Public Employee. This definition specifically recognizes 
the policy decision of the committee to include in the scope of 
the bill the officers of a public entity, whether elected or ap-
pointed. This assures that elected officials are included in the 
term "public employee" as used in the act. In addition, employ-
ees and servants of the public ehtity are included under the 
definition, Whether or not compensated. 
The terms "whether or not compensated" raised difficult 
questions for the committee. For example, a non-compensated em-
ployee could include county jail prisoners working on a county 
road and welfare people engaged in public work· projects on a 
very temporary basis. There are also.many volunteer workers who 
perform duties for the public entities. The question posed was 
whether or not a political subdivision should be liable for the 
tortious acts of persons over whom it has such limited and tran-
sient control. If non-compensated individuals are not covered 
by the bill,. liability for acts or omissions while performing 
the non-compensated volunteer work would be upon them as individ-
uals. This result may deter the performance of volunteer work, 
which is essential to some types of functions. Because no sub-
stantial effect on the lawful operation of the public entity 
could be demonstrated as a result of the inclusion of non-com-
pensated persons in the definition of "public -employees", the 
committee left the definition as it presently reads. 
Injury. This definition merely defines_"injury"; it does. 
not impose liability for an injury. The standards and condi-
tions of liability for an injury are found in other provisions 
of the bill. The purpose of the definition is t~ make _clear that 
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public entities and public employees may be held liable only for 
injuries to the kind of interests that have been protected by 
the courts in actions between private persons. 
Dangerous conditiQ,!!. The definition of "dangerous condi-
tion" defines the type of property conditions for which a public 
entity may be held liable, but does not impose liability. Lia-
bility for a dangerous condition is imposed by the provisions of 
Section 60 The types of property in which a dangerous condition 
may exist inclu<;ie a npublic building 0 public hospital, jail, pub-
lic highway, road or street, public facility located in any park 
or recreation area maintained by a public entity, or public wa-
ter, gas 1. sanitation, electrical, power, or swimming facility. 0 
Those are the types of property for which immunity is waived un-
der Section 6., 
When the physical condition of these facilities or the 
use thereof constitute a risk to the public and the physical con-
dition is proximately caused by the negligence of the public en-
tity in constructing or maintaining such facility, a dangerous 
condition e;,c1sts. The risk must be known or in the exercise of 
reasonable care should have been known before a dangerous condi-
tion can exist" If it is established that the condition had ex-
isted for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature 
that, in the exercise of due care, such condition and its danger-
ous character should have been discovered, then the risk will be 
considered to have been known~ 
The committee concluded that there should be an exception 
for the discretionary act of elanning or designinge If the phys-
ical condition of a facility is inadequate in relation to its 
present use as a result of the planning or designing of the fa-
cility, a dangerous condition shall not be considered to exist. 
Thus, the exercise of discretion in designing, as distinguished 
from discretion in construction or maintenance, will" continue to 
be immune from liability. 
02eration. Sovereign immunity i~ waived in Section 6 (1) 
(c) of the bill with respect to the operation of a public hospi-
tal or jail and in Section 6 (1) (g) with respect to the opera-
tion of any water, gasp sa.nitation 9 electrical, power, or swim-
m'Iiig facility. The term "operation" is defined. to mean the 
negligence of a public entity or public employee in the exercise 
and performance of the powersp duties_ and functions vested in 
them by law with respect to the purposes of the above facilities. 
The term "operation" is not to be construed to include a 
failure to exercise or perform any powers, duties or functions 
not vested by law in a public entity or employee. The term "op-
eration" also does not include a negligent or inadequate inspec-
tion, or a failure to make an inspection, of any property, except 
property owned or leased by the public entity, to determine 
whether such property constitutes a hazard to the health or safe-
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tI of the public. Because of the extensive nature of the inspec-
t on activities of public entities, a public entity would be ex-
. posed to the risk of liability for virtually all propertr defects 
within its jurisdiction if this exclusion from the defin tion 
were not granted. 
Availability of Insurance - Waiver to Extent of Coverage 
Secti~n 4 of the bill waives sovereign immunity to the ex-
tent of insurance coverage obtained by a public entity, whether 
or not the entity would otherwise be liable or immune. If a pub-
lic entity .obtains insurance to protect against liability for in-
jury, then such public entity should be deemed to have waived the 
defense of sovereign immunity as to the particular injury or in-
juries insured against and to the extent of the amount of insur-
ance. If the defense of sovereign immunity would otherwise be 
applicable to the entity, then the amount of recovery should be 
limited to the amount Qf recovery against the insurer. 
Scope of Immunity and Liability 
Effect of prior waiver of immuniu. Section 5 of the bill 
assures that the statute shall not be construed to narrow the 
pre-sent common law on liability nor to -expand the present common 
law on immunity. The statute is not to undo the present law, 
unless otherwise specifically so stated in the billf' The sec-
tion assures that the doctrine shall not be imposed in those· 
cases where :1 t did n_ot exist before, unless the bill specifically 
so provides~ ·· · 
Determination of liability when immunity waived. Where 
sovereign immunity ls abrogated as a defense under the bill, the 
liability of t.he pub~ic entity shall be determined in the same 
manner as if the public entity were a private person. Public 
entities have all th~ defenses to an action at law that private 
persons have, except the defense of sovereign immunity when that 
defense is abr_ogated by the _bill ( see Section 7) • _ 
Sovereign immunity as a defense. The general rule of the 
bill is that sovereign immunity is ret~ined, except as w~ived by 
the bill or other p~ovisions of law. 'Thus, if sovereign immunity 
is not waived by statutory provision, sove~eign immunity shall be 
available to a.public entity as a defense to an action for injur-
ies. This general rule is provided in Section 8. 
Waiver of Immunity 
Section 6 of the bill provides that the defense of-sover-
eign immunity will not be available to a public entity in those 
areas specified. These are the general waiver provisions of the 
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bill, other than Section 4 which waives sovereign immunity when 
insurance is available. In all other cases, the defense of sov-
ereign immunity applies. Under these waiver provisions the lia-
bility of the public enti.ty will be determined as if the entity 
were a private person. 
Automobile accidents. Immunitr is waived for an action 
for damages resulting from the operat on of a motor vehicle owned 
or leased by a public entity. There is an exception for emergen- · 
cy vehicles. 
Hospitals and jails. Sovereign immunity is not available 
as a defense to injuries arising from the operation of a hospi-
tal or a jail, or a dangerous condition existing therein. · 
Public buildings. Sovereign immunity is not available as 
a defense to injuries caused by the dangerous conditions of pub-
lic buildings. 
Roads and highways. No public entity can avail itself of 
the defense of immunity with respect to injuries arising out of 
the dangerous condition of any paved highway or street. The 
present rule of liability of municipalities is extended to coun-
ties and the state. The defense of immunity will remain for 
injuries caused on unpaved roads and highways. The committee 
concluded that this distinction between paved and unpaved roads 
and highways is the most reasonable method of classifying them 
for purposes of sovereign immunity waiver. 
Public parks, recreational facilities, etc. The defense 
of immunity is waived with respect to injuries resulting from a 
dangerous condition of any public facility located in parks and 
recreation areas and maintained by a public entity. A distinc-
tion is made between (1) injuries caused by negligence in the 
construction, maintenance, failure to maintain, etc. of artifi-
cial, man-made objects (swing sets, buildings, etc.) and (2) in-
juries caused by the natural conditions of a park (the Flat Irons 
in Boulder or the Red Rocks west of Denver). In other words, 
ordinary negligence is sufficient to impose liability for injur-
ies caused by the dangerous condition of artificial objects·. For 
injuries caused by natural dangerous conditions, immunity is re-
tained. 
The committee concluded that if immunity were waived with 
respect to injuries caused by the natural condition of any unim-
proved property the burden and expense of putting such proper~y 
in a safe condition and the expense. of defending claims for in-
juries would probably cause many public entities to close such 
areas to public use. It is desirable to permit the members of 
the public to use public property in its natural condition. In 
view of the limited funds available for the acquisition and im-
provement of property for recreational purposes, the committee 
concluded that it is not unreasonable to expect persons who vol-
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untarily use unimproved property in its natural condition to as-
sume the risk of injuries arising therefrom. 
Water, sewer, trash, and other proprietary activities. 
Sovereign immunity will not be available as a defense to an ac-
tion for injuries resulting from the operation of activities 
which are proprietary in nature, or a dangerous condition exist-
ing.therein. The liability of an entity when engage3 in these 
activities will be determined as if it were a private corpora-
tion. These functions include, but are not limited to, the fol-
lowing: water, sewer, trash and waste· disposal, electric and gas 
utilities. swimming pools, etc. 
Defense of Public Employees 
Section 10 of the bill provides that a public entity is 
required to assume the defense costs of .its employees, whether 
such defense is assumed by the public entity or not, when they 
were acting within the scope of their employment and a claim is 
brought against them for alleged injuries. 
the public entity is also required to pay all judgments 
or settlements of claims against its public employees in circum-
stances where the defense of sovereign immunity is waived as to 
the public entity. The public entity, however, is not required 
to pay the judgment where it is not made a party defendant in an 
action and is not notified of the existence of the action within 
fifteen days after the commencement of the action. 
A public entity has discretion as to whether or not it 
will assume the defense of its public employee~ This is neces-
sary in order to avoid a conflict of interest situation. The 
public entity is required, where it is made a co-defendant with 
its public employee, to notify such employee whether or not it 
will assume his defense. Where the entity is not made a co-
defendant, but is notified of the existence of the action within 
fifteen days after it is commenced, it also has to notify the 
employee of its decision. 
If the public entity decides to defend the employee and 
it is determined that the employee was acting within the scope 
of his employment, the entity will be liable for the judgment. 
If it is determined by the court that·the employee was acting 
outside of the scope of his employment, the employee, subject to 
an agreement with the entity, is required to reimburse the enti-
ty for reasonable attorney's fees. In addition, the entity may 
not compromise or settle claims against its employees until it 
is established that sovereign immunity has been waived. 
When the entity fails or refuses to defend, it will be 
liable to the employee for reasonable defense costs and/or the 
&e~tlement or judgment costs if it i~ subsequently determined 
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respectively that the employee was acting within the scope of 
his employment and the claim arose out of circumstances wherein 
the defense of sovereign immunity has been waived as to the pub-
lic entity. If the court determines that the employee was not 
within the scope of employment then the entity is neither liable 
for costs of defense nor costs of the judgment or settlement. 
Election of remedies. Section 11 of the bill provides 
that any judgment against either a public entity or a public 
employee shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the 
claimant by reason of the same subject matter, against the other. 
However, nothing will prevent the joinder of the public entity 
or public employee of such public entity in the same action. 
Compromise and Settlement - Payment of Judgments - Limitations on 
Judgments - Authority to Obtain Insurance 
Compromi~ and settlement. The administrative officers 
of a public entity are vested with authority to compromise or 
settle claims (see Section 12). 
Payment of judgments. Pursuant to Section 13, a public 
entity is required to pay any judgment to the extent funds are 
available in the fiscal year in which the judgment becomes final. 
The judgment may be paid out of any funds that are available to 
the entity from (1) a self-insurance reserve fund, (2) funds that 
are unappropriated for any other purpose, and (3) funds appropri-
ated for the current fiscal year for the payment of judgments and 
not previously encumbered. 
If the judgment cannot be paid in full in the fiscal ye.ar, 
in which it becomes final, the public entity is required to pay 
the balance of the judgment in the ensuing fiscal year by levy-
ing a tax sufficient to discharge the judgment. In no event, 
however, should the levy exceed ten mills, exclusive of existing 
mill levies. The publi.c entity is required to continue to levy 
such tax, not to exceed ten mills, but in no event less than ten 
mills if such judgment will not be discharged by a lesser levy, 
until the judgment is discharged. 
Limitations on judgments. A limitation on the amount of 
recovery that may be had when there is liability is set forth in 
Section 14 of the bill. The state or other public entity may be 
liable up to the maximum amount set forth in the sect.ion. The 
maximum amounts that may be recovered are, for an injury to one 
person in any single occurrence, the sum of $100,000~ and for 
an injury to two or more persons in any single occurrence, the 
sum of $3 1000,000; except that in such instance, no p,erson may 
recover in excess of $100 10000 
The only time recovery may be had in an amount which·ex-
ceeds these maximum limits is when the public entity provides 
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insurance coverage to insure itself or a public employee against 
all or any part of its or his liability, and the insurance cov-
erage is in an amount in excess of the maximum limits set forth. 
In this instance, recovery may be had in an amount which exceeds 
the maximum limits, but the amount of recovery shall not exceed 
the limitations of the insurance coverage. 
It is expressly provided that the limitations in the sec-
tion shall not be construed to permit the recovery of damages in 
an amount in excess of the amounts specified in the Ii Wrongful 
Death Statute" for the types of action authorized under said 
statute. 
The section also provides that a public _entity is not to 
be liable fo~ punitive or exemplary damages. 
Authority to~obtain insurance. Pursuant to Sections 15 
and 16 all public entities are expressly authorized to insure 
themselves again&t liability. Likewise, all~ublic entities are 
expressly authorized to purchase insurance to cover the liabil-
ity of their officers, agents, and employees for torts committed 
in the scope of their public employment. All p~blic entities, 
in addition to being authorized to insure against any liability, 
are authorized to insure against the expense of defending claims, 
whether or not l~abili ty ·exists on such claims. 
Public entities may insure either by purchasing commercial 
liability insurance or by adopting a program of self-insurance 
through the establishment of financial reserves, or by any combi-
nation of the two methods. 
Public entities ~re authorized to purchase insurance only 
from an insurer authorized to do business in this state and 
deemed by the state purchasing agent, or the appropriate govern-
ing body of the public entity, to be responsible and financially 
sound considering the extent of the coverage required. 
The committ~e does not recommend at this time that all 
public entities, other than the state, be required to provide in-
surance cdvering their- liability or the liability of their offi-
cers, agents, and employees. The st~te, however, is required to 
provide insuranceo 
Other Provisions 
Notice - filing of claims. Under Section 9 of the bill, 
any person claiming to h.,av~ suff e7ed an inJury by ~ public ~rnti-ty or an employee thereof is required to file a written notice 
with the entity within -six months after the date the injury is 
known or should have-been known by the exerc.ise of reasonable 
diligence.· A clai-m for an injury is considered to accrue on the 
date the injury is known or should have been known by the exer-
cise of reasonable =diligence. · 
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The notice is to be presented to the attorney general when 
the claim is against the state or an employee thereof. When the 
claim is against any other public entity or an employee thereof, 
the notice is to be presented to the governing body of the public 
entity or the attorney representing the public entity. 
Execution and attachment not to issue. Neither execution 
nor attachment is to issue against a public entity in any action 
or proceeding initiated under the provisions of the bill (see 
Section 17). · 
Statute of limitations. There is a two-year statute of 
limitations with respect to tor.t actions brought pursuant to the 
provisions of the bill. An action based on tort is to be com-
menced within two years after the accrual of such action, or be 
forever barred {see Section 9 (6) of the bill). 
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Recommended Bill to Provide For 
Governmental Immunity and Liability 
in Colorado 
A BILL FOR AN ACT 
1 RELATING TO THE IMMUNITY OF THE STATE, ITS AGENCIES AND POLI-
2 TICAL SUBDIVISIONS, FROM ACTIONS AT LAW; PROVIDING EXCEP-
3 TIONS THERETO, FOR THE PAYMENT OF CLAIMS ANO JUDGMENTS, 
4 AND FOR THE PURCHASE OF LIABILITY INSURANCE. 
5 Be it enacted!?:£ the General Assembly of the State of Colorado: 
6 SECTION 1. Short title. This act shall be known and may 
7 be cited as the "Colorado Governmental Immunity Act". 
8 SECTION 2. Declaration of policy. It is recognized by 
9 the general assembly that the doctrine of sovereign immunity, 
10 whereunder the state and its political subdivisions are often 
11 immune from suit for wrongs suffered by private persons, is, 
12 in some instances, an inequitable doctrine; however, the gen-
13 eral assembly is cognizant of the fact that the state and its 
14 political subdivisions are required to perform certain services 
15 and functions, which cannot be performed by private persons or 
16 corporations, ande therefore, the state and its political sub-
17 divisions should not be liable for their wrongs in the same 
18 manner as private persons and corporations. 
19 SECTION 3. Definitions. (1) As used in this act, un-
20 less the context otherwise indicates: 
21 (2) "Public entity" means the state, county, city and 
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l county, incorporated town, school district, special improve-
2 ment district, and every other kind of district, agency, in-
3 strumentality, or political aubdivision of the state organized 
4 pursuant to law. 
5 (3) "Public employee" means an officer, employee, serv-
6 ant of the public entity~ whether or not compensated, elected, 
7 or appointed, but does not include an independent contractor. 
8 (4) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to 
9 or loss of p~operty, of whatsoever kind, and which would be 
10 actionable if inflicted by a private person. 
11 (5) (a) "Dangerous condition" means the physical condi-
12 tion of. any public building, public hospital, jall, public 
13 highway, road or street, public facility located in any park 
14 or recreation area maintained by a public entity, or public 
15 water, gas, sanitation, ~lectrical, power, or swimming facili-
16 _ty, where the physical condition of such facilities or the use 
17 thereof constitute a risk, known to exist or which in the ex-
18 ercise of reasonable care should have been known, to the health 
19 or safety of the public and which condition is proximately 
20 caused by the negligent act or omission of the public entity 
21 in constructing or maintaining such facility. For the purposes 
22 of this paragraph (5) (a), a dangerous condition should have 
23 been known if it is established that the condition had existed 
24 for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature 
25 that, in the exercise of due care, such condition and its 
26 dangerous character should have been discovered. 
27 (b) A dangerous condition shall not exist where the 
28 design of any facility set forth in paragraph (a) of this sub-
29 
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l section is inadequate in relation to its present use. 
2 (6) (a) "Oper.ation" means the act or omi.ssion of a pub-
3 lie entity or public employee in the exercise and performance 
4 of the powers, duties, and functions vested in them by law 
5 with respect to the purposes of any public hospital, jail, pub-
6 lie water, gas, sanitation, power or swimming facility. 
7 (b) (i) The term operation shall not be construed to in-
8 elude: A failure to exercise or perform any powers, duties, or 
9 functions· not vested by law in a public entity or employee with 
10 respect to the purposes of any public facility set forth in 
11 paragraph (a) of this subsection; or 
12 (ii) A negligent or inadequate inspection, or a failure 
13 to make an in~pection, of any property, except property owned 
14 or leased by the public entity, to determine whether such prop-
15 erty consitutes a hazard to the health or safety of the public. 
16 SECTION 4. Availability of insurance - effect. (1) Not-
17 withstanding any provision of law or of this act to the con-
18 trary. if a public entity provides insurance coverage to in-
19 sure itself against liability for any injury, or to insure any 
20 of its employees against his liability for any injury result-
21 ing from an act or omission by such employee acting within the 
22 scope of his employment, then such public entity shall be 
23 deemed to have waived the defense of sovereign immunity in any 
24 action for damages for any such injury insured against subject 
25 to the provisions of subsection (2) of this section. 
26 (2) If the defense of sovereign immunity would be avail-
27 able to a public entity except for the provisions of subsec-
28 tion (1) of this section, then damages shall not be recover-
29 
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l able in excess of the amount of the insurance coverage, and 
2 shall be recovered from the insurer only. The insurer shall 
3 not be named as a party defendant. 
4 SECTION 5. Prior waiver of immunity - effect. The pro-
5 visions of this act shall not be construed to make available 
6 the defense of sovereign immunity where such defense was not 
7 available prior to the effective date of this act. 
8 SECTION 6. lmmunitv waived. (1) (a) Sovereign immunity 
9 shall not be asserted by a public entity as a defense in an 
10 action for damages for injuries resulting from: 
11 (b) The operation by a public employee of a motor ve-
12 hicle owned or leased by such public entity, except emergency 
13 vehicles operating within the provisions of section 13-5-4 (2) 
14 and (3),.C.R.S. 1963, as amended: 
15 (c) The operation of any public hospital' or jail by such 
16 public ent~ty, or a dangerous condition existing therein; 
17 (d) A dangerous condition of any public building; 
18 (e) A dangerous condition of any highway, road, or street 
19 within the corporate limits of any municipality, or of any 
20 highway which is a part of the federal interstate highway sys-
21 tern, the f ede.ral primary· highway system, and any paved highway 
22 which is a part of the federal secondary highway system or any 
23 paved highway which is a part of the state highway system. 
24 (f) A dangerous condition of any public facility, except 
25 roads and highways, located in parks or recreation areas and 
26 maintained by such public entity: b~t, nothing in this para-
27 graph (f) shall be construed to prevent a public entity from 
28 asserting the defense of sovereign immunity to an injury . 
29 
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1 caused by the natural condition of any unimproved property, 
2 whether or not such property is located in a park or recrea-
3 tion area; 
4 (g) The operation of any public water facility, gas fa-
5 cility, sanitation facility, electrical facility. power facil-
6 ity, or swimming facility by such public entity, or a dangerous 
7 condition existing therein. 
8 SECTION 7. Determination of liability. Where sovereign 
9 immunity is abrogated as a defense under section 6 of this act, 
10 liability of the public entity shall be determined in the same 
11 manner as if the public entity were a private person. 
12 SECTION 8. Sovereign immunity remains a defense - when. 
13 Except as provided in sections 4 through 6 of this act, or 
14 other provision of law, sovereign immunity shall be available 
15 to a public entity as a defense to an action for injury. 
16 SECTION 9. Notice required - contents - to whom given -
17 limitations. (1) Any person claiming to have suffered an in-
18 jury by a public entity or an employee thereof shall file a 
19 written notice as provided in this section within six months 
20 after the date the injury is known or should have been known 
21 by the exercise of reasonable diligence. 
22 (2) (a) The notice shall contain the following: 
23 (b) The name and address of the claimant, and the name 
24 and address of his attorney, if any: 
25 (c) A concise statement of the basis of the claim, in-
26 eluding the date, time, place. and circumstances of the act, 
27 omission, or event complained of; 
28 (d) The name and address of any public employee in-
29 
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1 valved, if known; 
2 (e) A concise statement of the nature and the extent of 
3 the injury claimed'to have been suffered; 
4 (f) A statement of the amount of monetary damages that is 
5 being requested. 
6 (3) If the claim is against the state or an employee 
7 thereof, the notice shall be presented to the attorney general. 
8 If the claim is against any other public entity or an employee 
9 there.of, the notice shall be presented to the governing body of 
10 the public entity or the attorney representing the public en-
11 tity. 
12 · (4) When the claim is one for death by wrongful act or 
13 omission, the notice may be presented by the personal represent-
14 ative, surviving spouse, or next of kin, of the deceased. 
15 (5) For the purpose of this act, a claim for injury shall 
16 be considered to accrue on the date that the injury is known or 
17 should have been known by the exercise of reasonable diligence. 
18 (6) Any action based upon tort shall be commenced within 
19 two years after the accrual of such action, or it shall be for-
20 ever barred. 
21 SECTION 10. Defensg of eublic emploxges - paI!!!ent of 
22 judgments or settlements against public emploxeea. (1) (a) A 
23 public entity &hall be liable for: 
24 (b) The costs of the defense of any of its public em-
25 ployees, whether such defense is assumed by the public entity 
26 or not, where the claim against the public employee arises out 
27 of injuries sustained from an act or omission of such employee 
28 occurring during the performance of his duties and within the 
29 
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l scope of his employment: and 
2 (c) The payment of all judgments and settlements of 
3 claims against such employee, except where the defense of sov-
4 ereign immunity is available to the public entity. 
5 (2) The provisions of subsection (1) of this section 
6 shall not apply where a public entity is not made a party de-
7 fendant in an action and such public entity is not notified of 
8 the existence of such action in writing within fifteen days 
9 after the commencement of such action. 
10 (3) (a) It shall be within the discretion of the public 
11 entity whether it shall assume the defense of its public em-
12 ployee, or does not assume his defense. 
13 (b) (i) In the event that the public entity elects to 
14 assume the defense of its public employee, such defense shall 
15 be assumed subject to an agreement between the public entity 
16 and the public employee: 
17 (ii) That such public employee shall reimburse the pub-
18 lie entity for reasonable attorney's fees in the event that 
19 the court determines that the injuries did not arise out of an 
20 act or omission of such employee occurring during the perform-
21 ance of his duties and within the scope of his employment; and 
22 (iii) That the public entity shall not compromise or 
23 settle the claim unless and until it is established that the 
24 defense of sovereign immunity is not available to the public 
25 entity. 
26 (c) (i) In the event that the public entity elects not 




l (ii) That the injuries arose out of an act or omission 
2 of such employee during the performance of his duties and with-
3 in the scope of his employment, the public entity shall be 
4 liable to such public employee for h~s reasonable attor~ey's 
5 fees in prosecuting his own defense. and, where applicable, in 
6 bringing an action to establish that the injuries arose out of 
7 an act or omission of such employee during the performance of 
8 his duties and within the scope of his employment; and 
9 (iii) That the defense of sovereign immunity is or would 
10 have been available to the public entity,_ the public entity 
11 shall be liable to the public employee for any judgment or set-
12 tlement again$t such public employee. 
13 (4) Where the public entity is made a cio-defendant with 
14 its public employee, it shall notify such employee in Writing 
15 within fifteen days after the commencement of such action 
16 whether it will assume the defense of such employee, and where 
17 the public entity is not made a co-defendant, within ten days 
18 after receiving written notice of the existence of such action, 
19 but in no event, later than eighteen days after the commence-
20 ment of such action. 
21 SECTION 11. Judgment against public entity or public em-
22 ployee - effect. (l) Any judgment against a public entity 
23 shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant 
24 by reason of the same subject matter, against any public em-
25 ployee whose act o.r omission gave rise to the claim. 
26 (2) Any judgment against any public employee whose act 
27 or omission gave rise to the claim shall constitute a complete 
28 bar to any action by the claimant by reaso~ of the same sub-
29 
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l ject matter, against a public entity. 
2 (3) Nothing contained in the provisions of this section 
3 shall be construed as preventing the joinder of any public 
4 entity or employee of such public entity in the same action. 
5 SECTION 12. Compromise of claims - settlement of actions. 
6 (1) A claim against the state may be compromised or settled 
7 for and on behalf of the state by the attorney general, with 
8 the concurrence of the head of the affected department, agency, 
9 board, commission, institution, hospital, college, university, 
10 or-other instrumentality thereof. 
11 (2) Claims against public entities, other than the state, 
12 may be compromised or settled by the governing.body of the 
13 public entity or in such manner as the governing body may des-
14 ignate. 
15 SECTION 13. Payment of judgments. (1) A public entity 
16 or designated insurer shall pay any compromise, settlement or 
17 final judgment in the manner provided in this section, and an 
18 action pursuant to rule 106 of Colorado rules of civil proce-
19 dure shall be an appropriate remedy to compel a public entity 
20 to perform an act required under this section. 
21 (2) (a) The state and the governing body of any other 
22 public entity shall pay, to the extent funds are available in 
23 the fiscal year in which it becomes final, any judgment out of 
24 any funds to the credit of the public entity that are avail-
25 able from any or all of the following: 
26 (b) A self-insurance reserve fund; 
27 (c) Funds that are unappropriated for any other purpose 
28 unless the use of such funds is restricted by law or contract 
29 
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1 to other purposes; 
2 (d) Appropriated for the current fiscal year for the pay-
3 ment of such judgments and not previously_encumbered. 
4 (3) If a public entity is unable to pay a judgment during 
5 the fiscal year in which it becomes final because of lack of 
6 available funds, the public eniity shall levy a tax, in a 
7 separate item to cover such judgment, sufficient to discharge 
8 such judgment in the next fiscal year; but in no event shall 
9 such levy exceed ten mills, exclusive of existing, mill levies. 
10 The public entity shall continue to levy such tax, not to ex-
11 ceed ten mills, exclusive of existing mill levies, but in no 
12 event less than ten mills if such judgment will not be dis-
13 charged by a lesser levy, until such judgment is discharged. 
14 SECTION 14. Limitations on judgments. (1) (a) The maxi-
15 m~m amount that may be recovered under this act shall be: 
16 (b) for any injury to one person in any single occurrence, 
17 the sum of $100,000.00; 
18 (c) For an injury to two or more persons in any single 
19 occurrence. the sum of $3,000,000.00; except that in such in-
20 stance, no person may recover in excess of s100.ooo.oo. 
21 (2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of 
22 this section, if a public entity prov~des insurance coverage to 
23 insure itself against all or any part of its liability for any 
24 injury. or to insure a public employee acting within the scope 
25 of his employment against all or any part of his liability for 
26 injury, and the insu~ance coverage is.in an amount in excess 
27 of the limits specified in subsectio~ (1) of this section, 
28 then recovery may be had in 'an amount not to exceed the limi-. 
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l tations of insurance coverage. 
2 (3} Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit 
3 the recovery of damages for types of actions authorized under 
4 article 1 of chapter 41, C.R.S. 1963 as amended, in an amount 
5 in excess of the amounts specified in said article. 
6 (4) A public entity shall not be liable for punitive or 
7 exemplary damages under this act. 
8 SECTION 15. Authority for public entities other than the 
9 state to obtain insurance. (1) (a) A public entity, other 
10 than the state, either by itself or in conjunction with any one 
11 or more public entities may: 
12 (b) Insure against all or any part of its liability for 
13 an injury for which it might be liable under this act; 
14 (c) Insure any public employee acting within the scope 
15 of his employment against all or any part of his liability for 
16 an injury for which he might be liable under this act; 
17 (d) Insure against the expense of defending a claim 
18 against the public entity or its employees, whether or not li-
19 ability exists on such claim. 
20 (2) {a} The insurance authorized by subsection (1) of 
21 this section may be provided by: 
22 (b) Self-insurance, which may be funded by appropria-
23 tions to establish or maintain reserves for self-insurance 
24 purposes; 
25 (c) An insurance company authorized to do business in 
26 this state and deemed by the state purchasing agent, or the 
27 appropriate governing body of the governmental subdivision, to 
28 be responsible and financially sound considering the extent of 
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1 the coverage required; 
2 (d) A combination of the methods of obtaining insurance 
3 authorized in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this subsection. 
4 (3) A public entity, other than th$ state, may establish 
5 and maintain an insurance reserve fund for self-insurance. pur-
6 poses. and may include in the annual tax levy of the public 
7. entity such amounts as are determined by its governing body to 
8 be necessary for the uses and purposes of the insurance re-
9 serve fund, not to exceed ten mills. In the event that a pub-
10 lie entity has no annual tax levy, it may appropriate from any 
11 unexpended balance in the general fund such amounts as the 
12 governing body shall deem necessary for the purposes and uses 
13 of the insurance reserve fund. The fund established pursuant 
14 to this subsection (3) shall be kept separate and apart from 
15 all other funds, and shall be used only for the payment of 
16 claims against the public entity which have been settled or 
17 compromised or j~dgments rendered against the public entity 
18 for injury under the provisions of this act. 
19 SECTION 16. State required to obtain insurance. (1) (a) 
20 The state shall obtain insurance to: 
21 (b) Insure itself against all or any part of any liabil-
22 ity for an injury for which it might be liable under this act; 
23 (c) Insure any of its public employees acting within 
24 the scope of their employment against all or any part of his 
25 liability for injury for which he might be liable under this 
26 act; 
27 (d) Insure against the expense of defending a claim 
28 against the state or its public employees, whether liability 
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1 exists on such claim. 
2 (2) (a) The insurance required under subsection (1) of 
3 this section may be provided by: 
4 (b) Self-insurance, which may be funded by appropria-
5 tions to establish or maintain reserves for self-insurance 
6 purposes; 
7 (c) An insurance company authorized to do business in 
8 this state and deemed by the state purchasing agent, or the ap-
9 propriate governing body of the governmental subdivision, to 
10 be responsible and financially sound considering the extent of 
11 the coverage required; 
12 (d) A combination of the methods of obtaining insurance 
13 .authorized in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this subsection. 
14 SECTION 17. Execution and attachment not to issue. 
15 Neither execution nor attachment shall issue against a public 
16 entity in any action or proceeding initiated under the provi-
17 sions of this acte 
18 SECTION 18. 3-3-1 (18), Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, 
19 is REPEALD AND RE-ENACTED, WITH AMENDMENTS, to read: 
20 3-3-1. Division of accounts and control - controller. 
21 (18) To issue warrants for the payment of claims against the 
22 state; 
23 SECTION 19. 24··4-2 and 24-4-3, Colorado Revised Statutes 
24 1963, are amended to read: 
25 24-4-2. Evacuation drill - district liability. In the 
26 event that said school district and the respective local civil 
27 defense agency or authorities desire to perform an evacuation 
28 drill for any or all school buildings, the board of education 
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1 of said school district and its officers, employees and agents 
2 participating therein shall be relieved of all liability, EX-
3 CEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY THE "COLORADO GOVERNMENTAL IM-
4 MUNITY-ACT", with regard to the accidental injury of any pupil 
5 during $Chool hours from the time that the pupil leaves the 
6 school building until his return to the building at the conclu-
7 sion of the evacuation drill. 
8 24-4-3., Buses used .. For drill or other evacuation pur-
9 poses as described in this article, buses and such other modes 
10 of transport as are operated by the respective_ school district 
11 for the transportation of pupils may be operated by the dis-
, 
12 trict outside the boundaries of the district. w!the~t-liahil-
13 ity1-Retwith~taA~iAg-aRy-ether-etat~te-te-the-eeAtraryT 
14 SECTION 20. 29-6-4 (l),·Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, 
15 is amended to read: 
16 29-6-4. Remedy for injury by a district. (1) In case 
17 any person or public corporation, within or without any dis-
18 trict organized under this chapter, may be inj~riously affected 
19 with respect to property rights in any manner whatsoever by 
20 any act performed by any official or agent of such district, 
21 or by the execution, maintenance or operation of the official 
22 plan, and EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THE "COLORADO GOVERN-
23 MENTAL IMMUNITY ACT", AND in case no other method of relief is 
24 offered under this chapter, the remedy shall be as follows: 
25 SECTION 21. 36-2-4 (1) and 36-2-10 (1), Colorado Revised 




36-2-4. Judgment against a county, how paid - tax levy. 
When a judgment shall be given and rendered against a 
xl 
l county of this state in the name of its board of county com-
2 missioners, or against any county officer 0 in an action prose-
3 cuted by or against him in his official capacity, or name of 
4 office, when the judgment is for money, and is a lawful county 
5 charge, no execution shall issue thereon, but the same may be 
6 paid by the levy of a tax upon the taxable property of said 
7 county~ and when the tax shall be collected by the county 
8 treasurer, it shall be paid over, as fast as collected by him, 
9 to the judgment creditor, or his or her assigns, upon the ex-
10 ecution and delivery of proper voucher therefor; but nothing 
11 contained in this section shall operate to prevent the county 
12 commissioners from paying $~l-er-aAy-~a~t-ef any such judgment 
13 by a warrant 0 drawn by them upon the ordinary county fund in 
14 the county treasury. ~revisedt-that-the THE power hereby con-
15 ferred to pay such judgment by a special levy of such tax, 
16 shall be h~ld to be in addition to the taxing power given and 
17 granted to such board, to levy taxes for other county purposes. 
18 h~t-the THE board of county commissioners shall levy under this 







26 tieR-tke-eaia-hea~a-shail-ee-aeterM!fte~ SHALL BE SUFFICIENT TO 
27 DISCHARGE SUCH JUDGMENT IN THE NEXT FISCAL YEAR; BUT IN NO 
28 EVENT SHALL SUCH LEVY EXCEED TEN MILLS, EXCLUSIVE OF MILL LEVIES 
29 
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l FOR OTHER COUNTY PURPOSES. THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
2 SHALL CONTINUE TO LEVY SUCH TAXESP NOT TO EXCEED TEN MILLS, 
3 EXCWSIVE OF MILL LEVIES FOR OTHER COUNTY PURPOSES, BUT IN NO 
4 EVENT LESS THAN TEN MILLS IF SUCH JUDGMENT WILL NOT BE DIS-
5 CHARGED BY A LESSER LEVY, UNTIL SUCH JUDGMENT IS DISCHARGED. 
6 36-2-10. .£!aim& presented to board, when - how paid. 
7 (1) Ail-elaimo-aR~-demaRas ANY CLAIM OR DEMAND held by any 
8 person against a county shall MAY be presented for audit and 
9 allowance to the board of county commissioners of the proper 
10 county, in due form of law, hef8~e-aA-aetieR-iR-aRy-ee~~t-ehall 
11 he-maiRtaiRahie-the~eeRy and all claims, when allowed, shall be 
12 paid by a county warrant, or order, drawn by said b~ard on the 
13 county· treasury, upon the proper fund in the treasury, for the 
14 amount of such claim. Such warrant or order shall be signed 
15 by the chairman of the board, permanent or temporary, attested 
16 by the county clerk, and when presented to the county treasurer 
17 for registry, be countersigned by him; said warrant or order 
18 shall specify the amount and value of the claim or service for 
19 which it is issued, and be numbered and dated in the order in 
20 which it is issued. 
21 SECTION 22. 72-16-4 (1) (b) and (c), Colorado Revised 
22 Statutes 1963, are REPEALED AND RE-ENACTED, WITH AMENDMENTS, to 
23 read: 
24 72-16-4. Amount of coverage - limitations. (1) (b) For 
25 any bodily injury and property damage to one person in any 
26 single occurrence, the sum of $100,000.00; 
27 (c) For any bodily injury and property damage to two or 
28 more persons in any single occurrence, the sume of $3,000,000.00. 
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l SECTION 23. 77-10-1 (1) and (2), Colorado Revised Stat-
2 utes 1963, are amended to read: 
3 77-10-1. Levy to pay judgment against municipality -
4 procedure. (1) When a judgment for the payment of money shall 
5 be given and rendered against any municipal or quasi-municipal 
6 corporation of the state, or against any officer thereof in an 
7 action prosecuted by or against him in his official capacity 
8 or name of office. such judgment being an obligation of such 
9 municipality, and when by reason of vacancy in office or for 
10 any other cause the duly constituted tax assessing and collect-
11 ing officers fail or neglect to provide for the payment of such 
12 judgment or fail to make a tax levy to pay such judgment, the 
13 judgment creditor may file a transcript of such judgment with 
14 the board of county commissioners of the county and counties 
15 if more than one, in which such public corporation is situated. 
16 Thereupon the county commissioners shall levy a tax AS PROVIDED 
17 IN SUBSECTION (2) OF THIS SECTION upon all the taxable property 
18 within the limits of such public corporation for the purpose 
19 of making provision for the payment of such judgment. eaeh-year 
20 after-the-fiiiA~-ei-s~eh-traAseri~t-~Atii-s~eh-~~S~ffleAt-is 
21 i~liy-~aie1 which tax shall be collected by the county treasur-
22 er and when collected by the county treasurer, it shall be paid 
23 over, as fast as collected, by him, to the judgment creditor, 
24 or his assigns, upon the execution and delivery of proper 
25 vouchers therefor. 
26 (2) The power hereby conferred to pay such judgment by 
27 special levy of such tax, shall be held to be in addition to 
28 the taxing power given and granted to such public corporation 
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l to levy for other purposes. The board of county commissioners 
2 shall levy under this $8Ction eAiy such taxes as they-!A-thei~ 
3 Eliee!!'et4.eA-May-aeem- eMf}e<44.eftt-aRel-Ree esee F'f-: - -All-t,u<es--levieel 
4 ey-the-autherity-ef-this-seetieA-~hall-Aet-eweees-th~ee-~e~ 
5 eeRt-eA-the-aei!eF.-ef-eseeseea-,re~erty-iA-s~eh-~~eiie-ee~,e~a-
6 tiens-fe~-aRy-eAe-fiseai-yea~~ SHALL BE SUFFICIENT TO DISCHARGE 
7. SUCH JUDQAENT IN THE NEXT FISCAL YEAR; BUT IN NO EVENT SHALL 
8 SUCH LEVY EXCEED TEN MILLS, EXCLUSIVE OF MILL LEVIES FOR OTHER 
9 PURPOSES.. THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS SHALL CONTINUE TO 
10 LEVY SUCH TAXES, NOT TO EXCEED TEN MILLS, EXCLUSIVE OF fv\ILL 
11 LEVIES FOR OTHER PURPOSES, BUT IN NO EVENT LESS THAN TEN MILLS 
12 IF SUCH JUDGMENT WILL NOT BE DISCHARGED BY A LESSER LEVY, UN-
13 TIL SUCH JUDGMENT IS DISCHARGED. 
14 SECTION 24. 89-1-25 (1), Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, 
15 is amended to read: 
16 89··1-25. .Claims - payment - registry of warrants. (1) 
17 EXCEPT WITH RESPECT TO CLAIMS COMING WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF 
18 THE "COLORADO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT", no.claims shall be 
19 ,paid by the district treasurer until the same shall have been 
20 allowed by the board and only upon warrants signed by the 
21 president, and countersigned by the secretary, which warrants 
22 shall state the date authorized by the board and for what 
23 purposes. If the district treasurer has not sufficient money 
24 on hand to pay such warrant when it is presented for payment, 
25 he shall endorse thereon: "Not paid for want of funds; this 
26 warrant draws interest from date at six per cent per annum", 
27 and endorse thereon the date so presented over his signature. 
28 From the time of such presentation until paid such warrant 
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l shall draw interest at the rate of six per cent per annum. 
2 When there is the sum of one hundred dollars or more in the 
3 hands of the treasurer it shall be applied upon such warrant. 
4 SECTION 25. 89-14-5 (4), Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, 
5 is amended to read: 
6 89-14-5. General power- of board. (4) To sue and be 





12 SECTION 26. 89-15-6 (4), Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, 
13 is amended to read: 
14 89-15-6. Powers of the district. (4) To sue and to be 









24 SECTION 27. 99-2-9, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is 
25 amended to read: 
26 99-2-9. Liability of requesting jurisdiction. During the 
27 time that a policeman, deputy sheriff, or fireman of a town, 
28 city, city and county, county, or fire protection district is 
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l assigned to temporary duty within the jurisdiction of another 
2 town, city, city and county, county. or fire protection dis-
3 trict, as provided in sections 99-2-4 to 99-2-8, any liability 
4 whi.ch may accrue under the operation of the doctrine of :r-e-
5 spondeat superior on acc6unt of the negligent or otherwise 
6- tortious act of any sue~ police officer, deputy sheriff, or 
7 fireman while performing such duty shall be imposed upon the 
8 requesting town,. city, city and county, county, or fire protec-





14 SECTION 28. 105-7-27, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is 
15 amended to read: 
16 105-7-27. Escape - duty of sheriff - expenses~ · In case 
17 of escape of any person lawfully committed to any jail of any 
18 county in this state, it shall be the duty of the sheriff of 
19 the county where such jail is situated, to pursue and recap-





25 f~~itive-frem-;~stiee~ In case of any escape without fault or 
26 negligence on the part of the keeper of the jail, or the guards 
27 under his command, the county commissioners of the county where 
28 such jail is situated may audit and allow to the sheriff the 
29 
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l necessary expenses incurred in such recapture, if they deem it 
2 best. 
3 SECTION 29. 120-7-13, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is 
4 amended to read: 
5 120-7-13. Obligation of state and state highway depart-




10 way-a~theriees-te-ee-eeA~tr~eted-~Aaer-thie-ertiele7 -ether-thaA 
11 IT SHALL BE the obligation of the state and the STATE depart-
12 ment of highways to apply the net income derived from the oper-
13 ation of any turnpike or speedway project to the payment of the 
14 bonds authorized to be issued under this article in accordance 
15 with the resolution of the STATE department of highways author-
16 izing their issuance. 
17 SECTION 30. 124-2-17. Claims against university. EXCEPT 
18 WITH RESPECT TO CLAIMS COMING WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF THE 
19 "COLORADO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT", the board of regents 
20 shall audit all claims against the university, and the presi-
21 dent shall draw all warrants upon the treasurer for approved 
22 claims; but before payment such warrants shall be countersigned 
23 by the secretary, who shall keep a specific and complete record 
24 of all matters involving the expenditure of money, which record 
25 shall be submitted to the board of regents at each regular 
26 meeting of the same. 
27 SECTION 31. 130-10-1 and 130-10-5 (1) (a), Colorado Re-
28 vised Statutes 1963 (1965 Supp.), are amended to read: 
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1 130-10-1. J&qi9lative declaration. This article shall 
2 not be construed as a waiver er-rern,ai.atieA of the doctrine of 
3 sovereign immunity, fi!1ft¼y-eGtahiishe~-ift•the-iaw-ef-thl9-~ttr-
4 ieaietlen,-hy-the-etateMef-Gele~e~e1 -er-afty-~tate-ageftey1 -er 
5 eny-ef-ite·-~~iitlea:1-sttbc44.vieieAs, but is enacted to establish 
6 an orderly and expeditious procedure to aid the general assem-
7 bly in th~ consideration and evaluation of THOSE tort claims 
8 against the state WHEREIN THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
9 HAS NOT BEEN WAIVED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE "COLORADO GOVERN-
10 MENTAL IMMUNITY ACT", AND seme-ef which the state should in 
11 equity and good conscience assume and pay. No liability for 
12 any claim shall be imposed upon the state or any state agency 
13 by a determination of the Colorado claims commission under the 
14 provisions of this article unless the general assembly shall 
15 have enacted legislation making a specific appropriation for 
16 the payment of such claim. 
17 130-10-5. Petition for claim. (l) {a) Any person wish-
18 ing to present a claim against the state UNDER THE PROVISIONS 
19 OF THIS ARTICLE shall file such claim with the chairman of the 
20 commission in the form of a petition, in triplicate, contain-
21 ing the following information: 
22 SECTION 32. 139-35-1 (1), Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, 
23 is amended to read: 
24 139-35-1. Action - notice of injury. (1) No action for· 
25 the recovery of compensation for personal injury or death 
26 against any city of the first or second class or any town, on 
27 account of its negligence, shall be maintained unless written 
28 notice of the time, place and cause of injury is given to the 
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l clerk of the city, or recorder of the town, by the person in-
2 jured, or his agent or attorney, within niftety-eay$ SIX MONTHS 
3 and the action is commenced within two years from the eee~~-
4 ~eftee-ei-the-ae6i«eAt-eaYeiA!-the-iA~1t~y-·e~-~eatRir ACCRUAL OF 
5 SUCH ACTION. AN ACTION SHALL BE CONSIDERED TO ACCRUE ON THE 
6 DATE THAT THE INJURY OR DEATH IS KNOWN OR SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
7 KNOWN BY THE EXERCISE OF REASONABLE DILIGENCE. 
8 SECTION 33. 150-1-25, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is 
9 amended to read: 
10 150-1~ .. 25. Claims - audit - payment - financial report. 
11 EXCEPT WITH RESPECT TO CLAIMS COMING WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF THE 
12 "COLORADO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT", no claims shall be paid 
13 by the district treasurer until the same shall have been al-
14 lowed by the board, and only upon warrants signed by the presi-
15 dent, and countersigned by the secretary, which warrants shall 
16 state the date authorized by the board and for what purpose. 
17 If the district treasurer has not sufficient money on hand to 
18 pay such warrant when it is presented for payment, he shall 
19 endorse thereon "not paid for want of funds, this warrant draws 
20 interest from date at six per cent per annum," and endorse 
21 thereon the date when so presented, over his signature, and 
22 from the time of such presentation until paid such warrant shall 
23 draw interest at the rate of six per cent per annum; provided, 
24 when there is more than the sum of one hundred dollars or more 
25 in the hands of the treasurer it shall be applied upon said 
26 warranto All claims against the district shall be verified 
27 the same as required in the case of claims filed against coun-
28 ties in this state, and the secretary of the district is hereby 
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l authorized and empowered to administer oaths to the parties 
2 verifying said claimst 'the same as the county clerk or notary 
3 public might do. The district treasurer shall keep a register 
4 in which he shall enter each warrant presented for payment, 
5 showing the date and amount of such warrant, to whom payable. 
6 the date of the presentation for payment, the date of payment, 
7 and the amount paid in redemption thereof, and all warrants 
8 shall be paid in the order of their presentation for payment 
9 to the district- treasurer. All warrants shall be drawn payable 
10 to the claimant or bearer, the same as county warrants. 
11 SECTION 34n 150-2-29, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is 
12 amended to read: 
· 13 150-2-29. Warrants - interest - call. EXCEPT WITH RE-
14 SPECT TO CLAIMS COMING WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF THE "COLORADO 
15 GOVERNMENTAL !~UNITY ACT", no warrants shall be issued except 
16 upon a verified claim first audited and allowed by the board, 
17 and each warrant shall be signed by the president and counter-
18 signed by the secretary with the district seal thereto affixed; 
19 and if the district treasurer shall have insufficient money in 
20 the general fund to pay any warrant when presented for payment, 
21 he shall enter such warrant, with its number, amount, date, 
22 and the name and address of holder, in a register kept for that 
23 purpose, and shall indorse upon said warrant, •presented and 
24 not paid for want of funds" with the date of presentation. 
25 Such warrant shall draw interest at the rate of seven per cent 
26 per annum from such date of prese~tation until called for pay-
27 ment. ~hen money sufficient to pay such warrant, or suffici-
28 ent to allow a credit of not less than one hundred dollars 
29 
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l thereon shall be in the general fund, such treasurer shall 
2 mail notice thereof to the holder of record at his address of 
3 record, and interest thereon shall thereupon cease. Warrants 
4 shall be paid in the order of their presentation for payment. 
5 SECTION 35. 150-4-37, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is 
6 amended to read: 
7 l50-4-37e Claims - audit - payment. EXCEPT WITH RESPECT 
8 TO CLAIMS COMING WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF THE "COLORADO GOVERN-
9 MENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 0 , no claim shall be paid by the district 
10 treasurer until the same shall be allowed by the board, and 
11 only upon warrants signed by the president and countersigned 
12 by the secretary, which warrants shall state the date author-
13 ized by the board and for what purposes·. If the district 
14 treasurer has not sufficient money on hand to pay such warrant 
15 when it is presented for payment he shall endorse thereon "Not 
16 paid for w~nt of funds, this warrant draws interest from date 
I. h 17 at six per cent per annum," and endorse thereon the date wen 
18 so presented over his signature and from the time of such pre-
19 sentation such warrant shall draw interest at the rate of six 
20 per cent per annum. All claims against the district shall be 
21 verified the same as required in the case of claims filed 
22 against counties in this state, and th~ secretary of the dis-
23 trict is hereby authorized and empowered to administer oaths 
24 to the parties verifying the said claims, the same as the coun-
25 ty clerk or notary public might do. The district treasurer 
26 shall keep a register in which he shall enter said warrants 
27 presented for payment, showing the date and amount of such war-
28 rants, to whom payable, the date of presentation for payment, 
29 
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l the date of payment, and the amount paid in redemption thereof, 
2 and all warrants shall be paid in their order of presentation 
3 for payment to the district treasurer. All warrants shall be 
4 drawn payable to bearer the same as county warrants. 
5 SECTION 36. Repeal. Article 10 of chapter 13, 24-4-4 (2), 
6 72-16-5, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, and 123-30-11, Colo-
7 rado Revised Statutes 1963 (1965), are repealed. 
8 SECTION 37. Effective date. This-act shall take effect 
9 on July 1, 1969. 
10 SECTION 38. Safety clau§e. The general assembly hereby 
11 finds, determines, and declares that this act is necessary for 




















What Is The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity? 
The legal doctrine of soverei!n immunity. For various rea-
sons of policy there have traditiona ly been a number of classes of 
defendants upon whom the law has ctinferred immunity from liability 
to a greater or lesser extent. Perhaps the most important and sig-
nificant class of defendants upon whom the law has conferred im-
munity is government.l The legal doctrine of sovereign immunity 
thus expresses the idea that government is immune from liability 
for injury or damage resulting from governmental activities unless 
it consents to such liability.2 
Application of doctrine to all governmental entities. The 
sovereign immunity rule has been applied not only to the federal 
1. "The immunity avoids liability under all circumstances, within 
the limits of the immunity itself; it is conferred, not be-
cause of the particular facts, but because of the status or 
position of the government; it does not deny the grounds for 
suit or cause of action, but only the resulting liability. 
Such immunity does not mean that conduct which would amount to 
a cause of action on the part of other defendants is not still 
equally a cause of action in character, but merely that for 
the protection of the government it is given absolution from 
liability." Prosser, Torts,- 996 (1964). 
2. Much has been written, most of it critical, on sovereign im-
munity. The classic study is Borchard, Government Liability 
in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-25) and Government Re-
sponsibility in Tort, 36 Yale L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-27}. 
Other significant articles include: Blachly· and Oatman, Ap-
proaches to Governmental Liability in Tort: A Comparative Sur-
vey, 9 Law and Contemp. Prob. 181, 182-84 (1942); Fuller and 
Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 
437 (1941); Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporations, 4 
Ill. L. Q. 28 (1921); Jaffe Suits Against Governments and Of-
ficers, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1963); Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort 
Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1363 (1945); Price · 
and Smith, Municipal Tort Liability; A Continuing Enigma, 6 U. 
Fla. L. Rev. 330 (1953); Repko, American Legal Commentary on , 
the Doctrines of Municipal Tort Liability, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 41 
(1949); Tooke, The Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort, 
19 Va. L. Rev. 97 (1932). 
government and its agencies3 but also to the states,4 counties,5 
municipalities,6 and other local governments and specialized gov-






Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 4, 5 (1924). 
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C.A. §1346 (b) and 
related sections), the immunity of the federal government w~s 
abrogated (with certain statutory exception~) in tort actions 
for injuries caused by the negligence or wrongful act or omis-
sion of any government employee acting within the scope of his 
employment or office. See Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 
title IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1946). 
Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. 
Rev. 1363 (1945), which briefly summarizes the highlights of 
each state. For Colorado cases see: In re Constitutionality 
of Substitute for Senate Bill No. 83, 21 Colo. 69, 39 Pac. 1088 
(1895); State v. Colo. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 104 Colo. 
436, 91 P.2d 481 (1939); Mitchell v. Board of Commissioners of 
Morgan County, 112 Colo. 582, 152 P.2d 601 (1944); State v. 
Griffith's Estate, 130 Colo. 312, ·275 P.2d 945 (1954); People 
ex rel Kimball v. Crystal River Corp., 131 Colo. 163, 280 P.2d 
429 (1955); Faber v. State, 143 Colo. 240, 353 P.2d 609 (1960); 
Berger. v. Dept. of Highways, 143 Colo. 246, _353 P.2d 612 (1960); 
a.nd State v. Morison 1 148 Colo. 79, 365 P.2d 266 (1961). 81 C.J.S. States§ 130 \1953). 
20 C.J.S. Counties§§ 215-221 {1940). County not liable for 
torts in absence of statute. Board of Commissioners of El Paso 
County v. Bish, 18 Colo. 474, 33 Pac. 184 (1893); Town of Fair-
la v. Board of Commissioners of Park Count, 29 Colo. 57, 67 
ac. 5 901 ; M & M Oil Transp., Inc. v. Board of County Com-
missioners for Routt County, 143 Colo. 309, 353 P.2d 613 (1960). 
County not liable for negligence of agents.or employees in ab-
sence of statute. Board of Commissioners of Pitkin County v. 
Ball, 22 Colo. 125, 43 Pac .. 1000, 55 Am. St .• Rep. ·117 {1896); 
Board of Commissioners of Lo· an Count v. Adler, 69 Colo. 290, 
94 ac. 6 , 20 •. R. 5 2 920 ; Richardson v. Belknap, 73 
Colo. 52, 213 Pac. 335 (1923); Liber v. Flor, l43 Colo. 205, 
353 P.2d 590 (1960). 
See City of Hazard v. Duff, 287 Ky. 427, 154 S.W.2d 28 (1941); 
Merrill v. City of Wheaton, 379 Ill~ 504, 41 N.E.2d 508 (1942); 
City of Harlan v. Peareley, 224 Ky. 338, 6 S.W.2d 270 (1928); 
Wendler v. City of Great Bend, 181 Kan. 753, 316 P.2d 265 
(1957); Greenwood v. City of Lincoln, 156 Neb. 142, 55 N.W.2d 
343 (1952); City & County of Denver v. Madison, 142 Colo. 1, 
351 P.2d 826 {1960). 
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The. immunity rule was applied to the state of Colorado as 
early as 1895 in the case of In re Constitutionality of Substitute 
for Senate Bill No. 83, wherein the Colorado Supreme Court declared 
that the state could not be sued, by saying: 
We recognize the doctrine that, without 
constitutional or legislative authority, the 
state in its sovereign capacity cannot be 
sued~ No such authority exists in this state. 
This being so, no liability upon contract or 
tort, if any, can be enforced against the 
state in any of its courts.8 
Local governmental entities have been extended the state's 
sovereign immunity. Although local entities of government are, in 
a sense, agencies of local self government, to a certain degree 
they are also integral parts of state government, existing to ad-
minister state policies and programs. A state normally conducts 
most of its government through its local governmental entities 
over which, in the absence of constitutional provision stipulating 
otherwise, it has control. Local entities are thus usually con-
sidered to be agencies of the state, deriving not only their ex-
istence and all their powers from the state, but also their immu-
nity.9 
Counties, in Colorado, have been traditionally thought of 
as political subdivisions of the state for the purpose of carrying 
on some of the "governmental" functions of the state. This tra-
ditional concept of county government, however, has changed some-
what over the years, and a county is now considered by many to be 
a separate unit of local government.10 Thus the county has a dual 
7. See School Dist. No. 1 in Cit & Count of Denver v. Kenne , 
77 Coo. 429, 236 Pac. 10 2 1925; Newt O son Lumber Co. v. 
School Dist. No. 8 in Jefferson Count, 83 Colo. 272, 263 
ac. 7 3 19 8 ; School Dist. No. 28 v. Denver Pressed Brick 
Co., 91 Colo. 288, 14 P.2d 487 (1932); School Dist. No. 1 in 
GIT & Count of Denver v. Faker, 106 Colo. 356, 105 P.2d 406 
1940 ; Tesone v. Schoo Dist. No. Re-2 in Boulder Count, 
152 Colo. 59, 84 . d 8 9 
8. 21 Colo. 69, 39 Pac. 1088 (1895). 
9. See Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812); Fuller and Casner, 
supra note 2, at 438. 
10. See Governor's Local Affairs Study Commission, Local Govern-
ment in Colorado: Findings and Recommendations,4 (1966); cit-
ing John C. Banks, Colorado Law of Cities and Counties, 16 
(Denver: Sage Books, 1959). 
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character. In a legal sense it is a subdivision of the state and 
acts as part of the state government performing functions on be-
half of the state; but it is also a unit of local self government 
and is declared by statute to be a "body corporate. 11 11 
Theoretically, as arms of the state, counties are entitled 
to the same immunity from suit as the state, but there are various 
statutes (such as 36-1-1, C.R.S .. 1963 providing that each county 
shall be empowered to sue and be suedf which might seem to abolish 
county immunity. However, even though county immunity from suit 
may be abolished by statute, county immunity from tort liability 
is far from abolished in the eres of the court and counties are 
held to be immune when acting n a. governmental capacity.12 
Municipal bodies are also regarded as having a. dual charac-
ter in Colorado. On the one hand they are subdivisions of the 
state, endowed with governmental powers and charged with govern-
mental functions and responsibilities. On the other hand they are 
corporate bodies, capable of much the same acts as private corpor-
ations. Thus a municipality is at one and the same time a corpor-
ate entity and a government.13 
The courts have attempted to distinguish between the two 
functions by holding that insofar as they represent the state, in 
their "governmental" or "public" capacity! the municipalities share 
the state's immunity frorn- tort liability. 4 The factor which de-
termines the liability or nonliability of a muni-cipality in cases 





36-1-1, C.R.S. 1963. 
County Commissioners v. Bish, 18 Colo. 474, 33 Pac. 184 (1893). 
See Governor's Local Affairs Study Commission, Local Govern-
ment In Colorado: Findings and Recommendations, 23-24 (1966), 
citing Dillon, Municipal Corporations, sec. 237 (1911).; and . 
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, sec. 10.03.12 (1949}. 
See City of Golden v~ Western Lumber & Pole Co., ·60 Colo. 382, 
154 Pacd 95 (1916); Schwalk v. Connele· 116 Colo. 195, 179 
P.2d 667 (1947); Cit~ of Sterlina v. ommercial Sav. Bank of 
Sterlin§, 116 Colo.69, l8l P.2 361 (1947); Malvernia Inv. 
Co. v. ity of Trinidad, 123 Colo. 394, 229 P.2d 945 (1951); 
Cit! & County of Denver v. Austria, 136 Colo. 454, 318 P .2d 
110 (1957); Walker v. Tucker, 131 Colo. 198, 280 P.2d 649 
(1955); Williams v. City of Longmont, 109 Colo. 567, 129 P.2d 
110 (1942); Slomer v. City of Grand Junction, 144 Colo. 207, 
355 P.2d 960 1960); City & County of Denver v. Madison, 142 
Colo. 1, 351 P.2d 826 (1960). 
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the department, officer or agent of the municipality by whom the 
duty is performed. 
In the case of other political subdivisions, such as school 
districts and special districts, the distinction between "gover~-
mental" and "proprietary" functions is likewise applicable. For 
example, in School Dist. No. 28 v. Denver Pressed Brick Co., the 
court held that, 11 a school di strict, • • • is an involuntary cor-
poration created by the state in furtherance of its plan of public 
and free education. It is a subdivision of the state, required by 
statute to function as an instrument of g6vernment, and like a· 
county, in the absence of express enactment to that end, is no more 
liable for the omissions of its officers than the State. 11 15 On the 
other hand, the court in Cerise v. Fruitvale Water & Sanitation 
Districtl6 held that the district's operation of a sewer system in-
volved activities carried on by the district in its proprietary 
capacity, and thus the district was not immune from liability. 
Limitation of doctrine to tort actions. In most jurisdic-
tions the effect of the immunity rule has been limited, by statute 
and/or judicial decision,17 to tort claims against governmental 
entities; suits arising out of contract are usually permitted. A 
"tort" is a civil, as opposed to a criminal, wrong arising from an 
act other than a breach of contract and usually involves injury to 
persons or damage to property.18 _ 
In Colorado, whatever immunity existed as to breach of con-
tract actions against the state was judicially abolished in Ace 
15. 91 Colo. 288, 14 P.2d 487 (1932). 
16. 153 Colo. 31, 384 P.2d 462 (1963). 
17. "Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived as 
to any contractual obligation. 11 Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5 
(Supp. 1965); and see McCarthy v. State, 1 Utah 2d 205, 265 
P.2d 387 (1953); Campbell v. Pack, 15 Utah 2d 161, 389 P.2d 
464 (1964) (dictum). 
180 "Tort is a term applied to a miscellaneous and more or less 
unconnected group of civil wrongs other than breach of con-
tract for which a court of law will afford a remedy in the 
form of action for damages. The law of torts is concerned 
with the compensation of losses suffered by private indivi-
duals in their legally protected interests, through conduct 
of others which is regarded as socially unreasonable." Pros-
ser, Torts, 1 (1964). 
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Service Inc. v. Colo. De t. of A riculture.19 This ap-
proach has a so een app ied to suits against ocal governments 
for breach of contract, with the result that both the state and 
local governments are no longer immune to contract actions.20 
Thus the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be invoked by any 
governmental unit as a defense to any contract action, regardless 
of the type of function involved. 
Governmental ro rietar distinction. The doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, w th respect to loca governmental entities, 
is not a hard and fast rule and it is clear that there is no ab-
solute immunity from liability. The development of the law has 
been in the nature of a series of inroads creating areas in which 
local governments can be held liable for their negligent acts and 
tortious conduct. The principal limitation and first inroad to 
be made on the immunity doctrine was the court's attempt to dis-
tinguish between the "governmental" and "proprietary" acts of the 
governing entity.21 
Under the governmental-proprietary dichotomy, the first 
relevant determination in the case of negligence by a local entity 
is a characterization as to the nature of the fundamental exercise 
which gives rise to th~ to~t. In effect, this determination re-
solves the question of whether immunity exists, or conversely, 
whether liability is possible. Under this basic test, immunity 
is accorded where the function is governmental and liability is 
19. 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957). 
20. Spaur v. City of Greeley, 150 Colo. 346, 372 P~2d 730 (1962). 
21. See Antieau, The Tort Liability of American Municipalities, 
40 Ky. L.J. 131 (1952); Barnett, The Foundation of the Dis-
tinction Between Public and Private Functions, 16 Ore. L. Rev. 
250 (1937); Fuller and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Op-
eration, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 437 (1941); Smith, Municipal Tort 
Liability, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 41 ( 1949). "Apparently the pur-
pose has been to confine the protection afforded to only those 
activities which have traditionally been considered 'necessary' 
to government, and to exclude from coverage those activities 
which are merely conveniently carried on by government instead 
of by private enterprise. This nineteenth century dichotomy 
was the judicial compromise struck between complete protection 
of public funds and complete protection of individuals tor-
tiously injured by government agents. Both the basis of the 
distinction and its application which has been difficult and 
artificial, have widely been regarded as less than satisfac-
tory." Repko, American Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of 
Municipal Tort Liability, 9 Law and Contemp. Prob. 214 (1942). 
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imposed where it is proprietary. No tort liability attaches with 
respect to the exercise of governmental functions because the 
city performs such functions under powers delegat~d by the state 
and under the same immunity enjoyed by the state. 2 On the other 
hand, in the exercise of proprietary functions or the performance 
of acts for the benefit of the corporation, a city stands on the 
same footing as any private corporation as to its liability for 
torts.23 
22. In addition to the cases cited in note 6 see Ramirez v. City 
of Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67, 241 Pac. 710, 42 A.L.R. 245 (1925); 
Densmore v. Bermingham, 223 Ala. 210, 135 So. 320 (1931); 
Lambert v. New Haven, 129 Conn. 647, 30 A.2d 923 (1943); Bal-
timore v. State, 173 Md. 267, 195 Atl. 571 (1937). For coro-
rado cases see City & County of Denver v. Talarico, 99 Colo. 
178, 61 P.2d 1 (1936), determining policy and character of 
construction work to be done under legislative authority to 
improve river channel; Malverina Inv. Co. v. City of Trinidad, 
123 Colo. 394, 229 P.2d 945 (1951) and City & County of Den-
ver v. Mason, 88 Colo. 294, 295 Pac. 788 (1931), adoption of 
drainage system; Walker v. Tucker, 131 Colo. 198, 280 P.2d 
649 (1955), barricading street because it constituted hazard 
and enforcement of ordinance in nature of police regulation 
governing use of streets; Barker v. City & County of Denver, 
113 Colo. 543, 160 P.2d 363 (1945), activities of fire de-
partment; Atkinson v. Cit & Count of Denver, 118 Colo. 322, 
195 P.2d 977 1948 , abatement of nuisance pursuant to ordi-
nance; Schwalk v. Connely, 116 Colo. 195, 179 P.2d 667 (1947) 
and City & County of Denver v. Madison, 142 Colo. 1, 351 P.2d 
826 {1960), operation of hospital; Addinyton v. Town of Lit-
tleton, 50 Colo. 623, .115 Pac. 896 (1911 , failure to enact 
or enforce ordinances or regulations; McIntosh v. City & Coun-
ty of Denver, 98 Colo. 403, 55 P.2d 1337 (1936); police pro-
tection activities; City t County of Denver v. Maurer, 47 
Colo. 209, 106 Pac. 875 (1910), public health activities. 
23. One of the leading cases holding municipal corporations liable 
when performing proprietary functions is Bailey v. Mayor of 
New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842). See Maffei v. In-
corporated Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808 (1959); 
Hooton v. Burley, 70 Idaho 369, 219 P.2d 651 (1951); Perry v. 
Wichita, 174 Kan. 264, 255 P.2d 667 (1953); Bishop v. Meridan, 
223 Miss. 703, 79 So.2d 221 (1955l; Grimesland v. Washington, 
234 N.C. 117, 66 S.E.2d 794 (1951 ; Mitchell v. Meriden, 3 
Conn. Cir. 498, 217 A.2d 487 (1965); Moloney v. Columbus, 2 
Ohio St.2d 213, 208 N.E.2d 141 {1965); Lane v. Tulsa, (Okla.) 
402 P.2d 908 (1965). See Repko, supra note 21, at 221; 
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 53.23 (3rd ed. 1963). 
-7-
In the court's attempt to distinguish between these two 
functions, no precise definition or satisfactory criteria has been 
formulated to determine into which category a particular tort will 
fall.24 Most jurisdictions have, however, set up some rather 
vague general guidelines. It is generally thought that a govern-
mental function is one vested for the administration of the gener-
al laws of the state. Another interpretation is that an activity 
is governmental if it benefits society as ·a whole and cannot be 
done by other segments of society.25 Under this test, an inquiry 
is made to determine whether the entity was acting as the agent 
of the state in furthering the state policy, or whether it was 
acting primarily on behalf of the citizens of the community. Usu-
ally, activities in the area of fire protection, law enforcement, 
education, health and general government, are governmental.26 
Proprietary functions are usually thou9.ht of as those which 
are carried out in a corporate or private capacity. Other tests 
of a proprietary activity are whether it could be done in compe-
tition with a private activity, whether it is operated for profit, 
or whether benefit accrues to something less than the whole of so-
ciety.27 Public utilities, streets, sidewalks, bridges, sewers 
and drains, ~ark and recreation activities and dumps are usually 
proprietary, 8 but are governmental in some jurisdictions.29 
24. 3 Davis, Administrative Law§ 25.07 (1958); McQuillan, Munic-
ipal Corporations§ 53.24 (3rd ed. 1963). 
25. See Parker v. Hutchinson, 196 Kan. 148, 410 P.2d 347 (1966); · 
Irvine v. Montgomery County. 239 Md. 113, 210 A.2d 359 (1965); 
Gassler v. Manchester, 107 H.H. 310, 221 A.2d 242 (1966); 
Reeder v. Brigham City, 17 Utah 2d 398, 413 P.2d 300 (1966). 
26. See Banks, Colorado Law of Cities and Counties, 265 (1959), 
for an extensive citation of Colorado cases holding that en-
tities are immune from liability for the performance of "gov--
ernmental" activities. 
27. See Davis, supra, note 24; McQuillan, Municipal Corporations 
§ 53.23 (3rd ed. 1963). 
28. See Banks, Colorado Law of Cities and Counties, 265 (1959), 
for an extensive citation of Colorado cases holding that en-
tities are liable in the performance of "proprietary" activ-
ities. 
29. 63 C.J.S., Mun. Corp. §§ 873 to 877. 28 Am. Jur., Mun. Corp., 
§§ 571 to 667. The difficulty of the classification is in-
creased when proprietary or governmental characteristics of 
an activity are mixed and the confusion is multiplied many 
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Needless to say, the courts have experienced great diffi-
culty in distinguishing between the two functions, and at times 
have probably been arbitrary in the manner of making the dis-
tinction. This distinction has been severely criticized by legal 
writers.30 In addition, several jurisdictions have recognized 
times by the plurality of cases in each state and by the 
plurality of states. For annotations on a public entities' 
liability or immunity with respect to torts in connection 
with the operation of an airport, 66 A.L.R. 2d 634; tortious 
injury in or about a building which is used for a governmen-
tal or proprietary function, 64 A.L.R. 1545; for performing 
an autopsy, 83 A.L.R.2d 970; for damages in tort in operat-
ing a hospital, 25 A.L.R.2d 203; for negligence in insect or 
vermin eradication operations, 25 A.L.R.2d 1057; damages 
caused by burning from hot ashes, cinders, or other hot waste 
material in public park, 42 A.L.R.2d 947; liability for torts 
in connection with activities which pertain, or are claimed 
to pertain, to private or proprietary functions, 101 A.L.R. 
1166, A.L.R.2d 1079; liability for drowning on public prem-
ises, 8 A.L.R.2d 1254; liability insurance as affecting im-
munity from tort liability of governmental units, 68 A.L.R.2d 
1437; maintenance of auditorium, community recreational cen-
ter building, or the like, by public entity as governmental 
or proprietary function, 47 A.L.R.2d 544; damages for carry-
ing out construction or repair of sewers or drains, 61 A.L.R. 
2d 874; operation of bathing beach or swimming pool as gov-
ernmental or proprietary function, 55 A.L.R.2d 1434; opera-
tion of sewage disposal plant as governmental or proprietary 
function, 57 A.L.R.2d 1336; operation of fire department ve-
hicle, 82 A.L.R.2d 312; operation of garage for maintenance 
and repair of government vehicles as governmental function, 
26 A.L.R.2d 944; injury or death as result of nuisance cre-
ated or maintained by public entity in governmental capacity, 
56 A.L.R.2d 1424; snow removal operations as governmental op-
erations, 92 A.L.R.2d 796; state's immunity from tort lia-
bility as dependent on governmental or proprietary nature of 
function, 40 A.L.R.2d 927; liability in connection with the 
destruction of weeds and the like, 34 A.L.R.2d 1210; consti-
tutionality of statute which relieves public entity from 
liability for torts, 124 A.L.R. 350; abrogation of state's 
immunity from liability or suit as affecting immunity of pub-
lic entities, 161 A.L.R. 367. 
30. "Manifestly, the distinction was unsatisfactory. It offered 
no solid grounds for prediction, invited test litigation, 
operated in a fortuitous and erratic fashion, and had little 
relevance to either the social need for risk distribution or 
the economic feasibility of shifting from the injured individ-
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the inherent unsoundness of this distinction and have discarded 
it,31 or have abolished the distinction in the process of abro-
gating immunity for governmental functions,32 while several states 
have accomplished the same by statute.33 
Typical of court decisions across the country, Colorado 
cases are lacking in clear and well defined guidelines.34 In 
general, it can be said that an increasing number of governmental 
entity activities are being classified as proprietary in nature 
and therefore subject to tort liability.35 In addition, the tra-
ditional immunity of many governmental activities has been par-
tially waived by statute, such as the 1949 statute which subjects 
the state and its political subdivisions to liability for any in-
jury or damage caused by the tortious operation of a government-
owned motor vehicle.36 . 
Ministerial/discretionary distinction. A branch of the 
rule of nonliability of public entities for torts in connection 
with the exercise of governmental functions is the rule which dis-







ual to the public treasury losses due to serious injury." 
Van Alstyne, California Government Tort Liability § 1.17, a_t 
19 (1964}. In addition to the law review articles cited in 
note 2, supra, see Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Ob-
jection to the Governmental or Proprietary Test, 22 Va. L. 
Rev. 910 (1936); Warp, The Law and Administration of Munici-
pal Tort Liability, 28 Vao L. Rev. 630 (1942); Green, Munic-
ipal Liability for Torts, 38 Ill. L. Rev. 355 (1944); Smith, 
Municipal Tort Liability, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 41 (1949); James, 
Tort Liability of Governmental Units and their Officers, 22 
Univ. of Chi. L. Rev. 610 (1955). 
See Stone v. Arizona Hi hwa Commission, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P. 
2d 107 963 ; Irvine v. Town of Greenwood, 89 S.C. 511, 72 
S . E • 228 ( 1 911 ) . 
See Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 
N.W.2d 795 (1962); Holtz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 
115 N.W.2d 618 (1962). 
Cal. Govt. Code§ 815 (Supp. 1965); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 466.02 
(1963); Mich. Comp. Laws§ 691.1401-.1415 (1964). 
Banks, Colorado Law of Cities and Counties, 264 (1959). 
Boulder v. Burns, 135 Colo. 561, 313 P.2d 712 (1957). 
13-10-1, C.R.S. 1963. 
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and discretionary functions. This distinction is important be-
cause the rule has developed that where a governmental duty or 
function is ministerial, as distinguished from discretionary, the 
public entity is liable for damages arising because of omission 
to perform it, or for negligence in its execution.37 
Although a comprehensive definition of the terms is diffi-
cult to state, ministerial acts are considered to be those per-
formed on an operational level as opposed to discretionary acts 
which are performed on a planning level.38 For an act to be dis-
cretionary there must be .an affirmative decision to act or not to 
act rather than the negligent performanc~ of a course of action 
already decided upon; discretionary acts involve a final determin-
ation of governmental policy or action, and are those acts in 
which a public official has discretionary latitude and which acts 
require personal deliberation, decision and judgment.39 Minister-
ial acts, on the other hand, amount to an obedience to orders or. 
the performance of a duty in which the officer or employee is left 
no choice of his own; acts which are purely administrative and 
which do not involve the exercise of disc_retion.40 
Thus, neither a government entity nor an employee thereof 
is liable for the consequences of an affirmative decision made at 
the planning level in the absence of a previously set course of 
action.41 The general rule is that a public entity may be liable 
for its negligence in performing ministerial acts and the test of 
liability does not depend upon the governmental-proprietary dis-
tinction because the government may be liable for negligence at 
the ministerial or operational level, even if the function per-
formed is governmental. Ministerial acts also may give rise to 
37. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations§ 53.33 (3rd ed. 1963). 
38. Dalehite Vo United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S. Ct. 956, 97 L. 
Ed. 1427 (1953); Indian Towin Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 
61, 76 s.ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 1955; Ra onier v. United 
States, 352 U.S. 315, 77 ·s.ct. 374, 1 L.Ed.2d 354 1957 ; 
Cohen v. United States, 252 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ga. 1966. 
39. Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824 
(1965). · 
40. Cohen v. United States, 252 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ga. 1966), and 
see Prosser, torts 780-781 (1964). 
41. For an exhaustive review of modern cases holding an employee 
immune from liability for his torts resulting from the execu-
tion of discretionary power, see 3 Davis, Administrative Law 
§ 26.01 (Supp. 1965). 
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personal liability of the public employees.42 Colorado cases have 
generally followed these distinctions in the imposition of govern-
mental tort liability.43 
The discretionary immunity rule and the grounds upon which 
it is defended has been criticized.44. The Federal Tort Claims Act 
contains provisions excepting the government from liability for 
injuries arising from discretlonary ·acts,45 which provisions have 
been narrowly construed, thereby broadening the government's lia-
1
• 
bility.46 In light of the trend to abolish immtinity and grant 
redress from injuries arising out of the culpable acts of govern-
mental entities, it has been suggested that the state courts 
should follow the federal interpretati~n of the discretionary im-
munity provision. Some have even suggested that the~e appears to 
be merit in eliminating discretionary i~munity in most cases, be-
cause 11 the reasons for employee immunity for discretionary acts 
are unconvincing when such statutory innovations as indemnifica-. 
tion and limited liability are available to insulate employees 
from personal risk. The pecuniary risks to governmental entities 
are also reduced by the availability of insurance, the fact that 
relief is often afforded by legislatures in spite of immunity, and 
the trend toward spreading liability among those best able to bear 







See, e.g., Spomer v. City of Grand Junction, 144 Colo. 207, 
355 P.2d 960 (1960). For a discussion of the liability o~ 
public employees for ministerial acts, see 3 Davis, supra, at· 
§ 26.02. 
Schwalk v. Connely, 116 Colo. 195, 179 P.2d 667 (1947). The 
Colorado Claims Commission statute (130-10-1 et seq, C.R.S. 
1963, as amended) was amended by Chapter 280, 1967 Session 
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1958~ (planning and construction of canal not discretionary). 
Note, The Utah Governmental Immunity Act: 
Utah L. Rev. 136 (1967). 
An Analysis, 120 
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Nuisance exception. Another important rule that has de-
veloped in relation to the sovereign immunity doctrine is that a 
person injured as a consequence of governmental activity can re-
cover in tort, notwithstanding the immunity doctrine, if the in-
jury resulted from a nuisance. The rule is generally recognized 
that a municipality or other public entity is liable to the same 
extent as a private corporation for injuries resulting from the 
creation or maintenance of a nuisance.48 Many ordinary negligent 
torts, for which sovereign immunity would otherwise be a complete 
defense, may be found to be within the scope of a nuisance. 
Many cases have distinguished between nuisances which cause 
property damage and those causing personal injury.49 But ordinar-
ily, nuisance liability for personal injury occurs in the same 
manner as for property injuries.50 If a municipality invades pri-
vate property and creates a nuisance there, it ~ay be liable for 
maintaining a nuisance on the theory that it is a taking of prop-
erty without just compensation. Thus, the nuisance doctrine has 
been used as an auxiliary remedy where the doctrine of inverse 
condemnation is insufficient to supply complete relief.51 
In Colorado 1 it has been held that a municipality is liable 
for damages for unlawful abatement of a public nuisance.52 Unlaw-
ful abatement occurs when in fact there is no nuisance or when the 
method of abatement is excessive. Likewise, municipal officials 
have been held liable in damages for wrongful abatement of an al-
leged nuisance.53 Sovereign immunity is no defense in a damage 
suit against a municipality for wrongful abatement of an alleged 
nuisance. Where property abated by a municipality is not in fact 
a nuisance, a municipality is liable on the theory that it must 
48. Cal. Law Revision Comm'n. A Study Relating to Sovereign Immun-
ity 225 (1963); Kentucky Legislative Research Cornm'n. Govern-
mental Immunity, Research Report No. 30, p. 28 (1965); McQuil-
lin1 Municipal Corporations§§ 52013 1 53.49 (3rd ed. 1963). 
49. See cases collected in 56 A.L.R. 2d 1409, 1419 (1957). 
50. Rhyme, Municipal Law (Wash. D.C.: Nat. Institute of Municipal 
Law Officers, 1957), p. 741. 
51. Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 48, at 230. 
52. McMahon v. City of Telluride, 79 colo. 281, 244 Pac. 1017 
(1926). 
53. Houston v. Walton, 23 Colo. App. 282, 129 Pac. 263 (1912); 
Gaskin v. People, 84 Colo. 582, 272 Pac. 662 (1928). 
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grant compensation for private property that it has taken for pub-
lic use.54 The issue has arisen as _to the possible liability of~ 
municipality for failing to exercise its power to abate a public 
nuisance. The Colorado Supreme Court has generally refused to 
hold a municipality liable for its refusal to abate an alleged 
public nuisance.55. 
In these cases, in other words, the courts have employed 
the nuisance rationale as a technique for retreating from govern-
mental nonliability for negligence.56 The practical consequence 
of the development of the "nuisance exception" has been to cut 
down the area of governmental immunity. This technique has been 
criticized as introducing a substantial degree of uncertainty and 
confusion into the law,. thereby tending to invite unnecessary 
litigation. 
Intentional torts. A voluntary act which willfully harms 
another or an injury substantially certain to follow from a volun-
tary act will constitute an intentional tort. Generally there is 
a definite tendency to impose greater responsibility upon one 
whose conduct was intended to do harm. Apart from the "nuisance 
exception", it appears to be the settled law in most states that 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity extends to intentional torts 
as well as those involving negligence, and that a governmental 
agency is not liable for the wilful torts of its employees and of-
ficers.57 The governmental-proprietary distinction has been ap-
plied in this area and most public entities are usually liable for 
intentional torts of their employees when acting in the course and 
scope of proprietary activities. In their gove~nmental capacity, 
however, public entities have generally been declared immune from 
liability for injuries sustained as a consequence of intentional 
torts, such as wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, assault and 
battery, malicious prosecution, wrongful destruction of personal 






See note 52, supra. 
Luxford v. City and County of Denver, 65 Colo. 355, 176 Pac. 
833 (1918); Addin~ton v. Town of Littleton, 50 Colo. 623, 115 
Pac. 896 (1911); Cit and Count of Denver v. Rist~u, 95 Colo. 
118, 33 P.2d 387 1934. For a general discussion of the lia-
bility of municipalities for nuisances, see Nuisance Control 
in Colorado Municipalities, Colorado Municipal League (Sept. 
1966), p. 8. 
Prosser, Torts 779 (2nd ed. 1955). 
Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, A Study Relating to Sovereign Immun-
ity, p. 231 {1963). 
Ibid. 
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Several states have abrogated the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity with reference to both intentional and negligent torts,59 
and any exception thereto must be founded either upon statute or 
compelling considerations of public policy. It may be noted that 
this rule is somewhat at variance with the general trend of legis-
lative policy which has not relaxed the principle of sovereign im-
munity as to intentional torts.60 The usual legislative approach 
has generally reflected the view that the public officer or em-
ployee who commits an intentional wrong should be solely liable 
for his misconduct, and his employer should be immune.61 
In drafting legislation which waives tort immunity, there 
always exists a problem of whether the government should accept 
responsibility for the "intentional'' torts of its employees. As 
indicated above, the usual legislative approach is to maintain im-
munity for injuries from the intentional torts of officers and em-
ployees4 However, an officer charged with false imprisonment or 
wrongful arrest or other intentional tort~ is usually only perform-
ing the duties of his job .. If he exceeds the ordinary bounds of 
negligence, subjectively going a degree further, the governmental 
unit may be relieved of liability and the officer held answerable; 
or if there has been no acceptance of liability for general negli-
gence by the entity, a sympathetic court might become more inclined 
to find an intentional tort. In the exercise of the vast powers of 
government by fallible individual officers and employees. unusual 
risks of harm to private interests will inevitably result. Whether 
the risks. are characterized by "negligence" or ''intent" is, in this 
context, only one amon9 many factors which require appraisal in 




Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal. 
Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961). 
E.g., it is provided that the jurisdictio~ of
11
th~ ~olorado 
Claims Commission shall not extend to claims arising out of 
alleged assault, battery, false imprisonme~t, false arrest, 
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel o7 slander, 
mi~representation deceit, fraud, interference with contrac-
tu~l rights, or i~vasion of the right of privacy." 130-10-1 
et seqo, C~R.S. 1963, as amended. 
This approach is reflected in the Federal Tort ~l?ims Act, 28 
u.s.c. § 2680 (h), which provides that the provisions of the 
act shall not apply to "any claim arising out ?f.assault, 
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest! malicious P:osecu-
tion abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, 
deceit, or interference with contract rights." See also Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann~ § 63-30-11 (2) (Supp. 
1967), for similar provisionso 
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icy questions as to who should properly bear the loss -- the in-
jured person, the public officer or employee, or the taxpayers as 
a whole.62 
Bases for nonliabilit~ other than sovereign immunity-. The 
common law has articulated ot er theoretical grounds for nonlia--
bility of public entitiesi which may simply be corollaries to or 
hybrid forms of the immunity doctrine or may be independent of the 
doctrine. The existence of these grounds of nonliability thus de-
serve consideration in t_he development of a legislative program 
relating to sovereign immunity, so that whatever expressions of 
legislative policy emerge will take them into account. 
The common law bases for nonliability other than sovereign 
immunity axe twofold: (1) the inapplicability of the doctrine of 
respondeat superior to torts of a public officer who is acting as 
a servant of the law; and (2) the inapplicability of respondeat 
superior to torts of public employees who are acting ultra vires.63 
Each of these two lines of common law development will be dis-
cussed separately and in connection with each other. 
Public entities generally fall within the ordinary rule 
that the superior or employer must answer for the negligence of 
his agent or servant in the course of his employment. In order 
to hold a public entity liable in damages because of the tort of 
one alleged to be its servant, it must appear that-the latter was 
a servant of the public entity at the ti~e of the alleged tort.64 
An exception to this general rule has developed which holds that 




Kentucky Legislative Research Comm'n, Governmental Immunity, 
Res. Report No. 30 (1965), p. 27, citing Cal. Law Revision 
Comm'n, supra note 57, at p. 236. 
Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, A Study Relating to Sovereign Im-
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that the master is liable for wrongful injury inflicted by 
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erally applied in imposing tort liability upon municipalities. 
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§§ 30-11 (1957). 
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the public entity liable, if the tortfeasor is an officer or em-
ployee of the state, or one whose office and duty was created and 
declared by public law, since in carrying out his responsibility, 
he was acting as an agent and servant of the law rather than of 
the public entity. For their torts, such officials are personally 
liable, but the employing entity is not.65 Thus a public entity 
is not liab!g for the acts of its personnel performed as servants 
of the law. 
No precise rule has been laid down as a test to determine 
whether persons are, as a matter of fact, the agents or servants 
of the public entity, or servants of the law. The general test 
concerns the power to control. The right to control the action of 
the person doing the alleged wrong, at the time of and with refer-
ence to the matter out of which the alleged wrong sprung, which is 
the general test of the relationship of master and servant, gov-
erns, at least to some extent, in determining whether a public en-
tity is liable under the rule of respondeat superior. The right 
to discharge or terminate the relationship is also important.67 
The problem of determining who is a servant of the entity 
and who is a servant of the law has practical relevance since it 
directs attention to the somewhat unique nature of certain types 
of public employment. Today certain public officers and employ-
ees hold their positions pursuant to direct statutory authority, 
and exercise duties which are prescribed and limited almost ex-
clusively by statute. Although the entity in and for which they 
function may pay their compensation and provide the physical fa-
cilities essential to carry out their responsibilities, they 
sometimes are wholly or partially independent of control and di-
rection by the governing body of the entity. In certain in-
stances, therefore, unusually difficult questions may arise in 
attempting to identify a particular public entity as the respon-
sible employer for the purpose of applying the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior. 
65. See Meek v. City of Loveland, 85 Colo. 346, 276 Pac. 30 
(1929); City of Denver v. Peterson, 5 Colo. App. 41, 36 Pac. 
1111 (1894). Note that officers of the city are agents of 
the state when performing governmental functions and hence 
the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply. 
66. The officer in turn is not liable for the acts or omissions 
of subordinates, whether appointed by him or not, unless he, 
having the power of selection has failed to use ordinary care 
therein, or unless he has been negligent, or has directed or 
authorized the wrong. See Liber v. Flor, 143 Colo. 205, 353 
P.2d 590 (1960). 
67. McQuillin, op. cit. supra note 64, § 53.66. 
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Another continuing limitation upon the tort liability of 
public entities, outside of and separate from the sovereign immun-
ity doctrine, which must be taken into account,·is the doctrine 
of ultra vires, which is the.principle that a public entity shall 
not be liable for the torts of its employees or officers committed 
outside the scope of their authority, or for its own torts in con-
nection with an act -which is wholly beyond the scope of the power 
of the public entity.68 Ultra vires as a defense is apparently in 
full force in Colorado.69 
When the doctrine of ultra vires and the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior -are considered together, it is often necessary 
to determine whether the act in question by an.officer is within 
the scope of the officer's power and is not ultra vires. Conceiv-
ably, every unauthorized act by an officer could be classified as 
ultra vires, thus relieving the enlity of liability. Therefore, 
the courts have held that even if the act is unauthorized, if it 
is within the broad scope of the employment and authority of the. 
tortfeasor, the city is liable.70 If the act is entirely beyond 
his scope of authority, the city is not liable, and the plaintiff's 
only remedy is the personal liability of the officer involved.71 
History Of The Sovereign ·Immunity Doctrine 
"The King can do no wrong." Although modern scholars are 
not in unanimous agreement on the exact origin and meaning of the 
sovereign immunity doctrine, it is generally agreed that in west-
ern political theory the doctrine began as an outgrowth of the 
common law theory, allied with the divine right of kings, that 
"the King can do no wrong," together with a feeling that it was 
necessarily a contradiction of his sovereignty to allow him to be 
sued as of right in his own courts. Since the King was divine it 
was impossible for him to commit a tort; hence, if there was er-





McQuillin, op. cit. supra note 67, § 53.60; Cal. Law Revision 
Comm' n, op. cit. supra note 63, · at 242; Note, Sovereign Im-
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never the King himself. Consequently, the King was immune from 
suit and the torts of his inferiors could not be imputed to him.72 
Origin of sovereign immunity in the United States. The 
basis of the legal concept of sovereign immunity in the United 
States has been traced by most legal scholars and courts to the 
English case of Russell v, The Men of Devon.73 In that case an 
unincorporated county was relieved of liability for damages which 
were occasioned by the disrepair of a bridge. Several basic argu-
ments were advanced in support of the decision: (1) to allow the 
suit would lead to "an infinity of actions•• ; ( 2) there was no 
precedent for such suit; (3) only the legislative body should im-
pose liability on government; (4) the community was unincorporated 
and thus did not have funds out of which to pay for the damages; 
and (5) although there should be a remedy for every wrong, a more 
applicable rule is that "It is better that an individual should 
sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an inconven-
ience. u74 
The first case in the United States which adopted the doc-
trine of the Russell case was the Massachusetts case of Mower v. 
Inhabitants of Liecester,75 in which immunity was granted even 
though the county involved was incorporated and did have funds 
72. For an historical consideration of immunity in the United 
States, see Blachly & Oatmen, Approaches to Governmental Lia-
bility in Tort: A comparative Survey, 9 Law & Contemp. Prob. 
181, 182-96 (1942). "The maxim that 'the King can do no wrong' 
became fully developed by this time, and has since continued 
in force .. a ~ Not only can the King do no wrong, but he 
cannot authorize a wrong, since a wrongful act is regarded by 
law as the act of the one who authorized it." Id. at 183-84. 
For a reevaluation of the basis of tort immunity, see Jaffe, 
Suits Against Governments & Officers, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1 
(sovereign immunity), 209 (damage actions) (1963). 
73. 2 T. R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788). 
74. Id. at 673, 100 Eng. Rep. at 362. For an analysis and evalu-
ation of the Russell case, see Maffei v. Incorp. Town of Kem-
merer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808 (1959); Muskopf v. Corning 
Hospital Dist., 55 Cal_2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961); Stone v. 
Arizona HiAAhway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); 
S anel v.ounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 
N.W.2d 795 1962. These reasons as a justification for the 
existence of the doctrine are disparaged in Borchard~ Govern-
mental Responsibility in Tort, 36 Yale L. J. l (19261. 
75. 9 Mass. 247 (1812). 
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available to pay damages. Following the Mower decision, the rule 
of local governmental immunity eventually became established in 
nearly all states.76 The immunity doctrine was aDplied to the 
United States in the case of Cohens v, Virginia,77 wherein Chief 
Justice Marshall made his authoritative pronouncement that "The 
universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or 
prosecuted against the United States; ••• "78 
There have been several justifications for the doctririe's 
~xistence in the United States. One is.that the King (now the 
state) can do no wrong and is thus not responsible for his torts.79 
Another, attributable mainly to Mr. Justice Holmes, who was perhaps 
the chief philosophical proponent of the doctrine in modern·times, 
speaking in the case of Kawananakoa v, Polyblank, is that "A sov-
ereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception 
or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practic·al ground that 
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes 
the law on which the right depends.«80 State courts have based im-
munity on the rationale that either the legislature had been sub-
stituted for the king or on grounds of public policy, and these 
justifications have been reaffirmed by both the federal and· state 
courts. 
Regardless of what may have been the.historical origin of 
the sovereign immunity doctrine, there now ex~sts~ and has existed, 
a strong public sentiment against the policy of permitting an in-
dividual to sue a state without its consent. This sentiment is, 
of course, reflected in the eleventh amendment to the United States· 
Constitution, adopted in 1798, which forbids to an individual the 
use of the federal judicial process to sue a state. Alexander 
Hamilton, speaking of the state's sovereign immunity in Number 81 
of the Federalist said• "It is inherent in the nature of sover-
eignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without . 
its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice 
of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sover-
eignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every state in the 
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v. Arkansas,81 said: "It is an established principle of jurispru-
dence in all civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued 
in its own courts, or in any other, without its consent and per-
mission.1182 
There was one abortive attempt to change the rule when the 
question of a state's immunity from suit came before the United 
States Supreme Court a few years after the ratification of the 
Constitution in the case of Chisholm v. Georgia.83 The Supreme 
Court held that a state might, without its consent, be made a de-
fendant in a suit in a federal court brought by a citizen of 
another state. The result of this decision was a clamor by the 
several states for an immediate amendment to the Constitution to 
assure the states their sovereign immunity. The result was the 
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution which re-
moved any doubt as to the right of a private person to sue a state 
in the federal courts by providing that, "The Judicial power of 
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in 
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of 
any Foreign State." 
Later, the prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment was ex-
tended by interpretation to include suits brought by a citizen 
against his own staten Thus the Eleventh Amendment has in effect 
given states immunity against suit by all individuals in the fed-
eral courts. Suits against state officials based on acts in 
excess of their authority,84 and acts in pursuance of an unconsti-
tutional statute,85 are suits against the officer in his individ-
ual capacity and are thus not prohibited by the Amendment. But if 
the state is the real party in interest when suit is brought 
against the officer, then there is immunity. Of course. the state 
can always waive immunity and voluntarily submit to suit. 
Origin of sovereign immunity in Colorado. As early as 1875 
the Colorado Supreme Court had held that a municipality was immune 
from tort liability for its acts or omissions and/or the acts or 
omissions of its employees or officers.86 Counties in Colorado 
81. 20 Howo (61 U.S.) 527 (1857). 
82. Id. at 529. 
83. 2 U.W. (2 Dall.) 419, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793). 
84. Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1891). 
85. Osborn v~ Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824). 
86. Daniels v. City of Denver, 2 Colo. 669 (1875). 
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had been held immune in ·1893 •. 87 The doct.rine of sovereign immun-
ity for the state, that the state cannot be sued without its con-
sent, was the rule adopted in 1895.88 School districts and other 
special districts have been held to be immune when acting in a, 
governmental manner.89 The present status of the doctrine with 
respect to the governmental entities in Colorado will be examined 
in more detail later in this report.90 It is sufficient to say, 
however, that the doctrine has become firmly established in Colo-
rado law, except in certain situations where specific statutory 
waiver of immunity has been made,91 or where a court has deter-
mined that the entity was acting in a proprietary r~ther than a 
governmental capacity and thus was subject to liability.92 
Criticism of the doctrineo Despite its medieval origins,93 
and notwithstanding the fact that the doctrine had rather unstable 
beginnings, the doctrine became firmly established both in the. 
common law·of the country,94 and in the statutes of-the·several 
states.95 Today most legal writers and scholars agree that the 
stated grounds for exempting the state and other public entities 
from suit and liability are neither logical nor practical.96 
Nearly every commentator who has considered the subject vigorously 
asserts that the doctrine must go.97 Nevertheless, sovereign im-
munity continues to be the rule, not the exception. However, 1n 
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lesser extent, and in a variety of forms.98 In addition, there 
now appears to be a trend toward judicial abrogation of the doc-
trine in the state courts.99 In view of this trend, state legis-
latures are beginning to formulate legislation to deal with the 
problems of sovereign immunity.100 
98. See notes 191-229, infra, and related discussion in text. 
99. See notes 317-342, infra, and related discussion in text. 
100. See notes 295-310, infra, and related discussion in text. 
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PRESENT STATUS OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
AND LIABILITY IN COLORADO --
PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING CLAIMS 
The Common Law in Colorado 
The stateft Colorado~ unlike many states, has no constitu-
tional provision prohibiting suit against the state. However, the 
common law rule that the state cannot be sued was adopted by the 
Colorado Supreme Court as the general rule in Colorado in the 
first and leading case of !fl re Constitutionality of Substitute 
for Senate Bill No, 83, generally known as the Benedictine Sisters 
case.IOI 
Most cases dealing with state immunity are understandably 
based on tort actions. But presumably the doctrine of immunity 
was in force in Colorado as to both tort and contract claims 
against the state when Ace Flaing Serv, Inc, v. Colo, Department 
of Agriculture,102 was decide. In that case the court abolished 
whatever immunity existed as to breach of contract actions against 
the state and the case is generallr recognized as a judicial abro-
gation of sovereign immunity in Co orado with respect to contracts 
to which the state is a partr• On the heel of the Ace Flyin~ c·ase 
1 came Colorado Racing Commiss on v, Brush Racin~ Association, 03 
which was an action against the Racing Commlss on for refund of 
breakage. The suit was allowed, the court saying that "In Colo-
rado 'sovereign immunity' may be a proper subject for discussion 
by students of mythology but finds no haven or refuge in this 
court."104 This language suggests a complete judicial abrogation 
of the doctrine in Colorado, but as will be seen later, this lan-
guage was meant to apply only to contract actions, not tort ac-
tions.105 
Io1. 21 Colo. 69, 39 Pac. 1088 (1895). 
102. 136 Coloo 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957). 
103. 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582 (1957). 
104. Id. at 284, 316 P.2d at 585. 
10~. For a general discussion of the immunity and liability of 
the state of Colorado under the sovereign immunity doctrine, 
see Note, Sovereign Immunity in Colorado, and the Feasibil-
ity of Judicial Abrogation, 35 U. of Colo. L. Rev. 531 (1963). 
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Due to the fact that the state cannot be sued, much liti-
gation has involved the question of whether the suit was against 
the state, or was actually against some other entity or depart-
ment. In Alfred v~ Esser,106 the plaintiff1 sued members of the 
state board of stock inspection for conversion of plaintiff's 
cattle. The court held that the action was not a claim against 
the state and was proper. But in Parry v. Colo. Board of Correc-
tions,107 the court disallowed a garnishment action under an ex-
ecution of a judgment against the board, finding it to be a claim 
against the state.108 
There is no positive way to prognosticate whether the court 
will invoke immunity when suit is against a state department. The 
statutes sometimes provide a starting point, however. For example, 
120-7-13, C.R.S. 1963, which refers to the State Highway Depart-
ment, states that 11 No liability shall attach, either to the state, 
the department of highways, or the individual members of said de-
partment of highways by virtue of the construction, reconstruction, 
maintenance, improvement or operation of any turnpike or speedway 
authorized to be constructed under this article .. ~"109 In Mitchell 
v. Board of County Commissioners,110 the court cited section 1 of 
article VIII of the Colorado constitution, which provides for the 
establishment of state institutions, and said that it applied to 
the highway department, finding the department to be an agency of 
the state. The implication seems to be that all agencies created 
under the authority of this section of the constitution are immune, 






9l Colo. 466, 15 P.2o 714 (1932). 
93 Colo. 589 0 28 P.2d 251 {1933). 
Claims such as this of the architects are claims against the 
state. They can only be paid by legislative appropriation, 
and a suit to force their collection otherwise be the nomi-
nal defendants who they may, is in fact a suit against the 
state which is the real party in interest •.•• 
No statute authorizes such an action as this against either 
the state or the board. It is suggested that a legislative 
appropriation has been made to pay this claim •••• We fail 
to find it ..•. Id. at 592, 28 P.2d at 252. 
See Mitchell v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 112 Colo. 582, 152 P. 
2d 601 (1944), where the court said, "Clearly the highway de-
partment is nothing more than an agency of the state and as 
to actions against it stands in the·state's shoes." 
Ibid. For additional cases upholding the doctrine that no 
liability attaches in tort actions for injuries sustained by 
plaintiff which are proximately caused by the negligence of 
servants of the state or its agencies, see Faber v. State of 
Colo., 353 P.2d 609 (1960), and Berger v. Department of High-· 
ways, 353 P~2d 613 {1960). 
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In State v. Colorado Postal Tel.-Cable Co.,111 plaintiff 
sued for consequential damages suffered when the state made cer-
tain improvements to the physical plant of the state hospital. 
The court first·held that section 15 of article II of the Colorado 
constitution (taking property without just compensation) did not 
apply, as it was applicable only in eminent domain proceedings. 
The court then referred to Board of County Comm'rs v. Adler,Il2 
in which it was held that a county was liable under similar cir-
cumstances. But the court in Colorado Postal refused to allow the 
suit against the state because in the Adler case a statute allowed 
the suit against the county and the oniy question there was lia-
bility, whereas here, no consent by the state to be sued was shown. 
"Read in the light of its facts the Adler case is authority for 
the proposition that liability on the part of th~ state in the in-
stant case exists; but it is not authority for the proposition 
that the state can be sued to enforce its liability."113 Thus the 
wierd circumstance has developed of the defendant being found li-
able, but the court denying recovery because the plaintiff cannot 
sue. 
The injustice of the above rule has apparently been recog-
nized by the court, for it has subsequently allowed recovery in 
particular circumstances. In Boxberger v, State Highway Depart-
ment.,114 which involved an action against the state to rescind a 
deed transferred by the plaintiff to th~ state, the court allowed 
recovery, basing its decision on section 15 of article II of the 
Colorado constitution. The injustice of a holding for the depart-
ment must have prompted the court to state: 
The rights of a citizen remain the same 
whether they collide with an individual or 
the government, and judicial tribunals were 
wisely established to correct such matters 
without the individual being relegated to 
the position of no other remedy except to 
appeal to a legislature, maybe to no avail, 
as all the people, or the citizens, are, in 
fact, the sovereign under our desi~able form 
of government.115 
111. 164 Colo. 436, 91 P.2d 481 (1939). 
112. 69 Colo. 290, 194 Pac. 621 (1920). 
113. State v. Colo. Postal Tel.-Cable Co,, 104 Colo. 436, 444, 91 
P.2a 481, 484 (1939). 
114. 126 Colo. 438, 250 P.2d 1007 (1952). 
115. Id. at 441, 250 P.2d at 1008-09. 
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The limitation of the Boxberger case comes from the lan-
guage, "This is not an action in tort, nor is it one to impose 
liability upon the state, nor for the recovery of money that would 
finally come from the funds of the state treasure •••• "116 This 
language suggests or implies that the court will approach the im-
munity problem differently where there is· a possibility of a bur-
den being cast upon the funds of the state. The court's concern 
for state funds was later borne out by State-Highway Department v. 
Dawson.117 In Dawson, the court allowed recovery of an agreed 
price for gravel taken from lands of the plaintiff over a plea of 
sovereign immunity by the department, saying that since funds had 
been ear-marked and set aside, no additional burdens would be 
cast on the funds of the state.118 
A discussion of immunity as applied to suits against the 
state or its departments leaves one with the feeling that the 
court· is striving to achieve some judicial abrogation of the doc-
trine. The trend appears to be to limit immunity whenever possi-
ble, to deal with the problem on a case-by-case basis, and yet not 
to say "the doctrine of sovereign immunity is hereby abolished. 11 119 
The counties. Theoretically, as arms of the state, coun-
ties are entitled to the same immunity from suit as is the state. 
But Colorado Revised Statutes§ 36-1-1 (1) (b) (1963) provides 
that each county shall be empowered to sue and be sued, seemingly 
abolishing any county immunity by statute.120 However, county 






Id. at 440, 250 P.2d at 1008. 
126 Colo. 490, 253 P.2d 593 (1952). 
Distinguishing the case of Mitchell v. Bd. of Count Comm'rs, 
112 Colo. 582, 152 P.2d 601 1944 , which was re ied on by 
the defendant. In Mitchell, an action brought by a landown-
er against the highway department, the court denied recovery 
because any judgment would have to be satisfied from the 
funds of the department, thus creating an additional burden. 
Note, Sovereign Immunity in Colorado, and the Feasibility of 
Judicial Abrogation, 35 U. of Colo. L. Rev. 536 (1963). 
But see Count Comm'rs v. Cit of Colorado S rin s, 66 Colo. 
111, 180 Pac. 30 919 . See a so § 36- -4, C •• s. 1963, 
which provides that when there is a judgment against a coun-
ty, no execution shall issue, but it is to be paid by levy 
of a tax on the taxable property of the county;§ 13-10-1, 
C.R.S. 1963, which provides for liability for tortious oper-
ation of vehicles by employees of the state, county or city; 
e 13-10-2, C~R.S. 1963, which provides a dollar limit on lia-
bility;§ 13-10-3, C.R.S. 1963, which provides for acquisi-
tion of insurance to cover liability. 
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The first Colorado case to recognize and follow the general 
rule of immunity for counties was Countv Comm'rs v. Bish.121 In 
that case the court said that "The rule that counties are not li-
able for torts in the absence of statute, is universally,recognized. 
And the great weight of authority is in favor of the conclusion 
that when a duty is imposed by statute, the county is not liable 
for failure to perform iti in the absence of express provision, 
creating such liability. 11 22 The holding of the Bish case has 
subsequently been upheld and relied upon.123 . . 
As the Bish case and subsequent cases have pointed out, 
counties are immuiie from liability for the torts of their employ-
ees. But are the officers and employees individually liable for 
their torts? The general rule in· the United States is that offi-
cers who exercise discretionary functions are immune from liabil-
ity for their negligence or other unintentional torts, but are 
liable for the breach of performance of mere ministerial duties.124 
It appears that Colorado follows the general rules as to individ-
ual liability of county or other public officials. 
In the Miller case,125 the plaintiff sought to hold the 
county and its officers individually liable for the death of her 
son in a fire in the county jail •. It was held that a county com-






l8 Colo. 474, 33 Pac. 184 (1893). 
Id. at 475, 33 Pac. at 184. 
See Board of Comm'rs of Pitkin County v. Ball, 22 Colo. 125, 
43 Pac. 1000, 55 Am. St. Rep. 117 (1896); Town of Fairplar 
v. Board of Comm'rs of Park Count~, 29 Colo. 57, 62 Pac. 52 
( 1901) ; Mi 11 er v. Ouray Electric ower and Light Co. , 18 
Colo. App. 131, 70 Pac. 447 (1901); Board of Comm'rs of Logan 
Count v. Adler, 69 Colo. 290, 194 Pac. 621, 20 A.L.R. 512 
1920; Richardson v. Belknap, 73 Colo. 52, 213 Pac. 335 
1923; Newt Olson Lumber Co. v. School Dist., 83 Colo. 272, 
263 Pac. 723 (1928); School Dist. No. 28 v. Denver Pressed 
Brick Co., 91 Colo. 288, 14 P.2d 487 193 ; an Sc wa v. 
Connely, 116 Colo. 195, 179 P.2d 667 1947. 
See David, The Tort Liability of Public Officers, 12 So. Cal. 
L. Rev. 260, 368 (1939); Davis, Administrative Officers' Tort 
Liability, 55 Mich. L. Rev. 201 (1956); Jennings, Tort Lia-
bility of Administrative Officers, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 263 (1937}. 
Keefe, Personal Tort Liability of Administrative Officials, 
12 Fordham L. Rev. 130 (1943). · 
Miller v. Ouray Electric Power & Light Co., 18 Colo. App. 
131, 10 Pac. 447 (1902). 
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sonal examination of the county jail, although a statute expressly 
provided that he do so, because the duty was owed to the public at 
large and not to any particular individual. The court there said 
.. If the contention of the plaintiff be the law, then each individ: 
ual commissioner would be liable in like actions to this because 
of damages suffered by an individual by reason of alleged defects 
~n a public highway or in a county bridge, or in any public build-. 
ing, or in the public grounds in which it might be situate. To 
so hold would tend in the large counties of the State ••• to 
bring about .•• the literal abrogation of the office of County 
Commissioner, for no sane man would assume the position with such 
a liability attached." 126 The court was asked to overrule.this 
decision in the Belknap case. 127 involving a suit against the 
county commissioners for failure to construct guard rails. How-
ever, the court adhered to the rule laid down in the Miller and 
Bish cases, and said, "It would be inconsistent to relieve coun-
ties from liability and yet hold the officers liable. 11 .128 
Limitations were placed on the Miller and Belknap rule in 
the case of Schwalk v. Connely.129 There the court said, "The 
doctrine of respondeat superior, applicable to.the relation of 
master and servant, does not apply to a public officer as to 
render him responsible for the acts or omissions of subordinates, 
whether appointed by him or not, unless he, having the power of 
selection has failed to use ordinary care therein, or unless he 
has been negligent, or has directed or authorized the wrong."130 
However, the plaintiffs or employees in the Schwalk case did not 
fall within the exceptions. 
This was the status of the law when Liber v. Flor131 was 
decided. The court, in Liber, adhered to the rule laid down in 
the Schwalk case, and held that while the county itself could not 
be held liable in tort for the alleged negligence of its agents, 
the individual defendants, though concededly members of the board 
of county commissioners, might be liable if they were the actual 
tort-feasors or if they had been negligent in supervising acts of 
subordinates or had directed or authorized the wrong. Thus, if 
the individual defendants were the actual tort-feasors or if the 
126. Ibid .. 
127. Richardson v. Belknap, 73 Colo. 52, 213 Pac. 335 (1923). 
128. Ibid. 
129. 116 Colo. 195, 179 P.2d 667 (1947). 
130. Ibid. 
131. 143 Colo. 205, 353 Po2d 590 (1960). 
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evidence is such as to bring- their acts within the Schwalk rule, 
the plaintiff would be entitled to recover. This rule has been 
severely criticized and t t is claimed that "There is no valid 
reason why a county should not be respomdb.le under the doctrine 
of respondeat superior for the acts of its agents. To say-that 
the county is not liable because the state is not liable is ab-
surd and unrt?al .. ,, ,, • " 132 · 
The traditional common law distinction between governmental 
and proprietary functions has been .applied to counties in Colora-
do. Thus a county will be liable for an injury occasioned by the 
exercise of a proprietary function and i~mune.when the activity 
is governmental in nature.133 
· The municipalities .. Munid.pa1ities, like the counties, have 
also been held to be immune when acting·in a gove:rnmental capacity 
and liable when acting in·a proprietary capacity.134 The first 
case holding that a munlcipality is immune from.liability was Dan-
iels v. City of Denvernl35 An inroad on municipal immunity was 
made in Spaur v. City of Greeley,136 a case involving a contract 
of bailment which the city breached. The court held that since 
Ace Flying Serv. Inc1137 had held that the state is no longer im-
mune to contract actions, the local government units are not im-
mune either. Thus the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be 
invoked as a defense to any contract action by any governmental 







Note, Sovereign Immunity in Colorado, and the Feasibility of 
Judicial Abrogation, 35 U. of Colo. L. Rev. 540 (1963). 
See Banks, Colorado Law of Cities and Counties, _265 (1959)~ 
See note 14 supra; Banks, Municipal Tort Li.bility in Colo-
rado, 6-13 {1961). The following activities have been held 
to be proprietary functions in Colorado: nonfeasance or 
misfeasance in the construction, maintenance or repair of 
streets or sidewalks; construction and maintenance- of sewers 
and drains; operation of parks and recreational facilities; 
operation of a cemetery; trash collecting; operation; of a . 
dumping ground; decorating a municipal building for Christ-
mas; maintenance of a municipal building. The following 
have been held to be governmental functions for which no 
liability lies: operation of the health, police and fire 
departments; failure to adopt or enforce an ordinance; issu-
ance of bonds; abatement of a nuisance; installation of 
traffic zone markers. 
2 Colo. 669 (1875). 
150 Colo. 346, 372 P.2d 730 (1962). 
136 Colo. 19, 314 P52d 278 (1957). 
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has refused to abolish tort immunity. In City and Count* of Den-
yer y, Madison,138 the court distinguished those cases w ich re-
pudiated immunity as to contract actions, and stated that if 
immunity as to tort actions was to be abolished, it had to be done 
by the legislatureo 
School districts and special districts. The governmental 
and proprietary functions are applicable to the -law of immunity 
from liability with respect to special districts and school dis-
tricts.139 ~or example, for proprietary activities see Cerise v. 
Fruitvale Water & Sanitation Dist.,140 and for governmental ac-
tivities see School Dist. No. 28 v. Denver Pressed Brick Co.141 
In the recent case of Tesone v. School Dist. No. RE 2,Ia2 the 
trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the defendant 
school district, as a subdivision of the State of Colorado, is im-
mune from liability under the previous court pronouncements in the 
Madison casel43 and in Liber v. Flor.144 The plaintiff in error 
admitted that such holdings constituted the law in Colorado, but 
urged that these cases be overruled. This the court refused to do 
and affirmed the judgment, citing the Madison case, wherein it was 
said, "It is not within the province of the judicial branch of 
government thus to change long established principles of law. 
This is the function of the legislature. 0 145 The court declared 
that "In no opinion of this court has it ever been held that the 
rule on nonliability of a government agency for the negligent acts 
of its servants in the performance of governmental duties, has in 
any degree whatever been modified, discarded or minimized. 11 146 
Summary. The present general rule in Colorado with respect 
to the sovereign immunity doctrine, as developed in the common law 
through judicial interpretation and application, is that the state, 
counties, cities and other political subdivisions of government 
are deemed immune from liability for the torts committed by pub-
1386 142 Colo. 1, 351 P.2d 826 (1960). 
139. See note 7, supra. 
140. 153 Colo. 31, 384 P.2d 462 (1963). 
141• 91 Colo. 288, 14 Po2d 487 (1932). 
142. 152 Colo. 596, 384~ P.2d 82 (1963). 
143. 142 Colo. 1, 351, P.2d 826 (1960). 
144. 143 Colo. 205, 353 P.2d 590 (1960). 
145. 142 Colo. 1, 351 P.2d 826 (1960). 
146. 152 Colo. 596, 384 P.2d 82 (1963). 
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lie employees in the performance of their duties, except to the 
extent that the immunity has been judicially found to be inappli-
cable, i.e., the entity was engaged in the performance of a pro-
prietary activity. In effect, .this means that tor~ actions can 
be successfully prosecuted against governmental entities only if 
the injury complained of arose out of the performance of a "pro-
prietary" activity as distinguished from a "governmental" one. 
The Statutory Law in Colorado 
In addition to being liable for injuries ar1s1ng out of 
"proprietary" activities, the governmental erititie~ in Colorado 
are also liable to the extent that the immunity has been waived by 
statute or consent to suit and liability is granted by the General 
Assembly& To correctly ascertain the ~tatus of the present Colo-
rado law on the doctrine it is necessary, in addition- to determin-
ing what the common law rule is (.as discussed above), to determine 
whether any statutes exist which waive immunity and impose lia-
bility on the public entities or otherwise modify or reaffi~m the 
common law rules,. 
Accordinglr the Colorado statutes were surveyed with a view 
to determining ll the extent to which the statutory law provides 
for liability of the public entities (see Table II). and (2) the 
extent to which the statutory law provides immunity for the public 
entities (see Table III)~ Although some relevant statutes may 
have been overlooked, the survey presents a fair picture of the 
extent to which the Colorado General Assembly has provided for 
liability and immunity of public entities. 
Statutory consent to std t.. The Colorado statutes. contain 
many provisions which purport to subject various agencies of the 
state as well as various political subdivisions to suit in the 
courts. In most cases the statutory language indicates simply 
that the particular entity "may sue and be su~d." A list of sec-. 
tions so providing and the particular entities to which they ap-
ply is found in Table I. 
If the doctrine of sovereign immunity were deemed to be 
based solely on the absence of a remedy against the state, statu-
tory consent to suit would appear to connote a waiver of immunity. 
However, the issue of liability is distinguishable from that of 
the remedial devices available to an injured person. Most courts 
have not found in such language a substantive right implying a 
correlative liability on the part of the particular public entity. 
The granting of consent to the bringing of an action against the 
public entity is regarded not as a waiver of substantive immunity 
but simply as a remedial technique for administering such liabil-
ity as might exist under the law. Thus while such a statute may 
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subject the entity to the process of the courts~ it does not in 
itself make the entity liable for its wrongs.14, · 
If the entity is ·legally li~ble, such consent implies that 
judgment may be entered against it; but if it is not, the impli-
cation is equally clear that judgment will be,entered in the en-
tity's favor. Permission to sue simply constitutes a procedural 
remedy; it does not determine the substantive result~ This con-
clusion is made clear by the express provisions in 3-2-7, C.R.S. 
1963, which state that language granting state agencies the power 
to sue and be sued" ••• shall be construed as procedural and 
remedial and shall not be construed as extending, conferring, or 
granting such agencies any substantive powers, duties, or func-
tions, nor .•• be construed as granting permission to sue the 
sovereign state of Colorado or any agency thereof." 
From this analysis, it would appear that.without a consent 
statute, an injured person might not have a remedy even if the en-
tity were otherwise liable pursuant to a legislative enactment. 
Indeed, some acts relating to public entities contain· no statutory 
language, expressly or impliedly, consenting ·to suit against the 
entity. If it is assumed that such absence.of-consent to suit · 
precludes enforcement of tort liability which exists pursuant to 
statute or common law, situations cofJ:d arise in which liability 
may exist without a judicial remedy. 8 The implication is that 
an injured person seeking redress against a public entity by means· 
of a civil tort action must be prepared to establish, not only 
that liability exists on the part of the entity, but also that 
consent to suit against the entity has been granted. 
If it is assumed, on the other hand, that the courts will 
hold public entities subject to suit in tort despite the absence 
of any statutory consent, the only question then presented is 
whether the entity is otherwise liable. Many courts could reach 
this conclusion by viewing an omission of this type, when viewed 
against a background of consistent legislative policy-of granting 
the procedural and remedial right to sue, as the product of leg-
islative inadvertance and hence disregarded in favor of applying 
the general legislative policy. · 
The approach of the General Assembly in granting to part~c-
ular entities the power to sue and be sued and not granting this 
power to other and similar entities, and the various approaches 
which may be taken by the courts in applying these consent stat-
utes or the absence thereof, leaves this area of the law suffi-
ciently doubtful and uncertain to suggest the desirability that 




Report of the Governmental Immunity Committee, Utah Legisla-. 
tive Council, p. 21 (Dec. 1964). . 




Statutory Provisions Authorizing That Governmental 
Entities "May Sue and Be Sued11 
Colo. Rev. Stat. 1963 
3-2-4 to 3-2-7 
5-5-6 
16-1-3 





89-1-11 & 15 
89-3-14 ( 3) 
89-4-11 ( 3) 
89-5-12 (3) 












State agencies -- provisions are proce-
dural and remedial and not construed 
as granting permission to sue sover-
eign. 
Airport authority 








Improvement district in cities and towns 
Water and Sanitation district 
Fire Protection district 
Metropolitan Recreation district 
Metropolitan Water district 
Hospital district -- expressly maintains 
immunity 
Metropolitan Sewage Disposal district 
Mine Drainage district 



















Ch. 36, Sec. 21 (5), 




Trustees of the state colleges 
Colorado School of Mines 
State Board of Agriculture 
Colorado Higher Education Assistance 
Authority 
Soil Conservation district 
Cities and towns 
Urban Renewal Authority 
Irrigation Districts of 1905 
Irrigation Districts of 1921 
Internal Improvement District 
Water Conservancy District 
Colorado River Conservation District 
Southwestern Water Conservation District 
Rio Grande Water Conservation District 
Metropolitan Stadium District 
Statutory immunities and liabilities of the state. The 
state is specifically made liable for injuries caused by the neg-
ligent operation of government-owned vehicles to the extent of the 
limitations provided for in the statute as follows: bodily injury 
liability limited to $10,000 for each person and $20,000 for each 
accident; and property damage liability limited to $5,000 for each 
accident.149 
149. 13-lO-l et seq., C.R.S. 1963. 
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The state is made liable for all personal and property 
damage caused by acts done, or attempted, under color of the civil 
defense act of Colorado with procedures for the presentation of 
...,--cl~ti1Jl_$ ::md methods of providing compensation setXOrtn~150 How-
ever, the state is apparently liable only to the extent of the 
compensation provided for in the statute.151 The state is also 
made liable for any or all property damage caused by wild game 
protected by the game and fish laws of the state.152 Procedures 
for the handling of these claims are established in§ 62-2-31, 
C • R .. S . 1963 . 
The state department of public health, its officers and em-
ployees are specifically declared to be immune from liability for 
any injuries occasioned by the administration of its duties under 
the provisions of the statute on rabies control.153 In addition, 
no person, acting in good faith under any order of court direct-
ing that a person be held in custody or be held for confinement, 
examination, diagnosis, observation, or treatment, and not acting 
in violation or abuse thereof, shall be liable for such action.154 
Officers of the military forces, when exercising discretion 
or when following lawful orders and in the performance of a duty, 
and who are engaged in mob control shall not be liable for any act 
done while on such duty.155 The state, the state department of 
highways, its officers and employees shall not be liable for inju-
ries occasioned by the construction, reconstruction, maintenance, 
improvement, or operation of any turnpike o~ speedway authorized 
to be constructed.156 
150. 24-3-1, C.R.S. 1963. 
151. 24-1-10, C~R.S. 1963. 
152. 62-2-31 et seq., C.R.S. 1963; see Colo. Legislative Council 
Committee on Game, Fish and Parks, Memo. No. 3, Game Damage 
Claims, Awards, Arbitration, and Control {Sept. 20, 1967); 
Colo. Game, Fish & Parks Department, Instructions and Pro-
cedures for Reporting Game Damage and Filing Game Damage 
Claims; Attorney General, State of Colorado, Opinion No. 
66-4015, Sept. 12, 1966. 
153. 66-23-13, C.R.S. 1963. 
154. 71-1-24, C.R.S. 1963. 
155. 94-1-45, C.R.S. 1963. 
156. 120-7-13, C.R.S. 1963. 
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Statutor immunities and liabilities of cities and coun-
ties. ities and counties, 1 et estate, are 1a e or nu-
tles caused by the negligent operation of government-owned motor 
vehicles.157 The county, its officers and employees are specif-
ically held to be immune from liability for any injuries in con-
nection with the administration of a county dog licensing law,158 
for injuries caused by civil defense activities, except to the 
extent of compensation provided for in the statute,159 and for or 
on account of the escape of any prisoner from the county jail.160 
The operation of a city or county airport is declared to be a 
governmental function and it is implied that citJes and counties 
will be immune from liability for its operation.161 Finally, it 
is declared that the town treasurer or a city council member shall 
not be liable for loss of public funds by reason of the default or 
insolvency of the depository.162 
Denver charter amendment 1967 • Pursuant to Section 1 of 
Article XX of the Co orado Constitution, the City and County of 
Denver was created as a home rule city. Under the constitutional 
provision, the City and County of Denver may sue and defend, plead 
and be impleaded, in all courts and places, and in all matters and 
proceedings. However, prior to 1967, the City and County of Den-
ver applied the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity under 
which it could not be held liable for injuries sustained as a re-
sult of the performance of governmental activities. On February 
7, 1967, the voters of the City and County of Denver adopted an 
amendment to Denver's Charter which effectively waived the defense 







Denver Charter - Article IX, Section 
C6,8-l. In all suits or actions brought 
against the City and County of Denver 
jointly with any of its officers or em-
ployees charging tortious acts of said of-
ficers and employees committed in the reg-
ular course of their employment, the City 
and County of Denver shall not avail itself 
13-lo-1, C.R.S. 1963. 
36-12-4, C.R.S. 1963, as amended. 
24-1-10, C.R.S. 1963. 
105-7-27, C.R.S. 1963. 
5-4-1, C.R.S. 1963; 5-5-7, C.R.S. 1963. 
139-39-7 ( 5) ' C.R.S. 1963. 
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of the defense o:r governmental immunity 
and shall be liable· in the same manner 
and to the same extent as a private em-
ployer under like circumstances and pay 
all final judgments rendered against the 
said City and County of Denver. 
Denver Charter - Article 1x6 Section A9.4-2. The City and County of enver· 
shall be liable for the acts or omissions 
of the members of the classified service 
of the police department within the scope 
of their respective offices, in tort, in 
the same manner and to the same extent as. 
a private employer under like circumstances, 
and said city and county shall pay or in-
demnify such ~ember for the payment of 
any final judgment rendered in any such 
suit or action wherein said city and coun-
ty is a defendant or third party defendant, 
and whereln it is found by the court or 
jury that the act or omission complained of 
was within the scope of the office of said 
member. No notice of injury or claim shall 
be required in actions brought against said 
city and county under the provisions of 
this section. 
Statutory immunities and liabilities of districts. It is 
declared that a school district shall not be liable for injuries 
caused by school evacuation drills orb~ the use of buses in the 
exercise of civil defense activities.163 The statutes also pro-
vide for a remedy for the recovery of damages to property caused 
by acts done by a conservancy district.164 
163. 24-4-2, 3, c.R.s. 1963. 










Statutes Providing For Liability 
Of Governmental Entities 
Liability for injuries caused by the negligent 
operation of government vehicles. Bodily in-
jury liability limited to $10,000 for each· 
person and $20,000 for each accident. Prop-
erty damage liability limited to $5,000 for 
each accident. 
The State is liable for all personal and property 
damage caused by acts done, or attempted, under 
color of the civil defense act of Colorado, un-
less there is wilfull misconduct, gross negli-
gence, or bad faith on the part of any agent of 
civilian defense. 
Provides remedy for the recovery of damages to 
property caused by acts done by conservancy 
districts. 
Sheriff is subject to action for damages to party 
aggrieved by his neglect to make due return of 
any writ or process delivered to him to be ex-
ecuted. 
The State is liable for all or any damages done 
to the real or personal property of any person 
by any wild animal protected by game and fish 
laws, such damages to be determined and paid as 
provided in sections 62-2-31 to 62-2-38. 
During the time that a policeman, deputy sheriff, 
or fireman of a town, city, city and county, 
county, or fire protection district is assigned 
to temporary duty within the jurisdiction of 
another town, city, city and county, county, or 
fire protection district, any liability which 
may accrue under the operation of the doctrine 
of respondeat superior on account of the negli-
gent act of any such police officer, deputy 
sheriff, or fireman while performing such duty 
shall be imposed upon the requesting town, city, 
city and county, county, or fire protection dis-
trict and not upon the assigning jurisdiction; 
provided that nothing in this section shall be 
construed to impose any liability upon any such 
requesting jurisdiction nor to waive or affect 
in any way the doctrine of sovereign immunity 












Statutes Providing For Immunity 
Of Governmental Entities 
The county commissioners, county employees, or any 
person enforcing the provisions of county dog 
licensing laws shall not be held responsible for 
any accident or subsequent disease that may oc-
cur in connection with the administration of a 
dog licensing law. 
The health departments, their assistants and em-
ployees, the state department of public health, 
health officer, or anyone enforcing the provi-
sions of the statute on rabies control shall not 
be held responsible for any accident or subse-
quent disease that may occur in connection with 
the administration of the provisions of the 
statute on rabies controlo 
Operation of airport or other air navigation fa-
cility declared to be a governmental function, 
exercised for a public purpose and matters of 
public necessity. 
Airport authority declared to be a political sub-
division of the state, exercising essential gov-
ernmental powers for a public purpose. 
State and political subdivision declared to be im-
mune from liability for injuries caused by civil 
defense activities, except to extent of compen-
sation provided for in the statute. 
School district not liable for injuries caused by 
school evacuation drills in exercise of civil 
defense activities. 
School district not liable for injuries caused by 
the use of busses in the exercise of civil de-
fense activities. 
No person, acting in good faith under any order of 
court directing that a person be held in custody 
or be held for confinement, examination, diagno-
sis, observation, or treatment, and not acting 
in violation or abuse thereof, shall be liable 
for such action. No action for false arrest or 









peace officer or sheriff who, in good faith, 
takes a person into protective custody under 
section 71-1-3. No action based on the fact or 
act of filing a petition shall be brought ~gainst 
a person who, in good faith, files a petition or 
otherwise acts under section 71-1-4 or section 
71-1-5; but a person who wilfully causes, or who 
conspires with or assists another to cause, un-
warranted hospitalization or confinement under 
the provisions of this article shall be liable 
in damages to the person so hospitalized or con-
fined. 
Benefits of unemployment compensation shall be 
deemed to be due and payable only to the extent 
provided in this chapter and to the extent that 
moneys are available therefor to the credit of 
the unemployed compensation fund, and neither 
the state nor the department shall be liable for 
any amount in excess of such sums. 
The commanding officer of any of the military 
forces, engaged in the suppression of an insur~ 
rection, the dispersion of a mob or the enforce-
ment of the laws shall exercise his discretion 
as to the propriety of firing upon or otherwise 
attacking any mob or other unlawful assembly; 
and, if he exercises his honest judgment there-
on, he shall not be liable in either a civil or 
a criminal action for any act done while on such 
duty. No officer or enlisted man shall be held 
liable in either a civil or criminal action for 
any act done under lawful orders and in the per-
formance of his duty. 
County not liable for or on account of the escape 
of any prisoner from the county jail. 
State not liable to settlers of desert land for 
failure of contractors to complete work accord-
ing to construction contract with the state. 
No liability shall attach, either to the state, 
the department of highways or the individual mem-
bers of the said department of highways by virtue 
of the construction, reconstruction, maintenance, 
improvementi or operation of any t~rnpike or 





No liability of town treasurer or city council 
member for loss of public funds by reason of 
the default or insolvency of depository. 
Claims Procedure_in Colorado 
Colorado claims commission. The Colorado Claims Commission 
was established by 130-10-1 et seq., C.R.S. 1963 (1965 Supp.), as 
amended. This statute was adopted in 1965 and took effect on July 
1, 1965, and applies only to claims occurring after July 1, 1963. 
The statute was amended in 1967 by chapter 280, 1967 Session Laws. 
The commission is composed of John P. Proctor, CPA, State Auditor, 
chairman; Con F. Shea, State Controller; and Robert Bronstein, 
State Budget Di.rector. The commission was established to create 
an orderly and expeditious procedure to aid the General Assembly 
in the consideration and evaluation of tort claims against the 
state. 165 It is declared that the article shall not be construed 
as a waiver or repudiation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, 
firmly established in the law of Colorado, by the state of ColQra-
do, or any state agency, or any of its political subdivisions.166 
The statute, in essence, provides that any person claiming 
injury to his person or property or loss of life caused by the 
negligent or wrongful act or omission of a state agency, or of a 
state employee while acting within the scope of his office or em-
ployment, may (except as to claims specifically excluded) file his 
claim with the commission which shall consider each claim, and 
make findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition 
thereof. Within five days after the convening of the next regular 
session of the General Assembly the commission shall make its re-
port by filing its records, findings and recommendations with the 
chairman of the House Appropriations Committee and the chairman of 
the Senate Finance Committee. Either committee of the General As-
sembly may: (1) approve the claim as recommended or modify the 
claim and present it to the General Assembly in the form of an ap-
propriation bill; or (2) present a bill authorizing the claimant 
to sue the state; or (3) deny the claim and take no action at all.167 
i65. 130-10-1, C.R.S. 1963 (1965 Supp.), as amended. 
166. Ibid. 
167. 130-10-5, 7, 8, C.R.S. 1963 (1965 Supp.), as amended. 
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The jurisdiction of the commission does not extend to 
claims: 
(b) Based upon an act or omission of 
a state employee exercising reasonable care 
in the execution of a statute or regulation, 
whether or not such statute or regulation be 
valid; or based upon the exercise or perform-
ance or failure to exercise or perform a dis-
cretionary function or duty involving the 
determination of policy for a state agency on 
the part of a state employee or state agency, 
whether or not the discretion involved be 
abused; 
(c) Based upon an act or omission of a 
state employee for which insurance coverage 
is provided under the provisions of article 
16 of chapter 72, C.R.S. 1963, or under any 
other statutory provision; 
(d) For injury to or death of an inmate 
of a state penal institution; 
(e) Arising out of the care or treat-
ment of a person in a state institution; 
(f) For damages caused by the imposi-
tion of a quarantine by the State; 
(g) Arising out of alleged assault, 
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, 
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, 
libel or slander, misrepresentation, deceit, 
fraud, interference with contractual rights, 
or invasion of the right of privacy; 
(h) For which a remedy is provided or 
which is governed specifically by other stat-
utory enactment, or for which an administra-
tive hearing procedure is otherwise established 
by law.168 
Claims experience. From the effective date of the statute 
to January 9, 1967, a total of 21 claims amounting to $1,111,019.49 
had been filed with the commission, as detailed in Table IV of thi~ 
report. Of the 21 claims filed, 11 claims totaling $1,031,428.52 
were filed alleging damages as a result of the d~str~cti~n_ of prop-
168. 130-10-4 (2), C.R.s. 1963 (1965 Supp.), as amended. 
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erty by the flood of June 17 and 18, 1965, occasioned by the des-
truction of Clay Creek Oum and Reservoir in Prowers County, which 
was constructed by the Depc.rtment of Game, Fish and Parks • .t69 
The results of the commi~sion activities for 1966 are sum-
marized as follows:170 












66 ... 19 
66-20 
Arapahoe Basin, Inc. 
E~ B. Ketchum, d/b/a Canon Vegetable Growers 
Elnora Z. Steele 
George and Georgia Hoopes 
Alexander Thiele 
Earl Sanders 
II. Claims rejected by the Commission for lack of jurisdic-
tion: 
1. 66-1 Ralph E. Doney 
2. 66-14 William H. Dawson 
III. Claims on which the Commission hereby submits recommen-
dations to the General Assembly: 
1. That the General Assembly pass appropriate relief 
bills for; 
a) 66-2 - Janet R. Meneley - a bill in the amount 
of $20,000.00 to compensate for the death of 
her husband in a highway accident. 
b) 66-21 - Jerald C. Rich - a bill in the amount 
of $174.19 to compensate for the loss of items 
in his automobile stolen by "trustees" of the 
Buckley Field Honor Camp of the Colorado State 
Reformatory. 
2. That the General Assembly pass appropriate bills 
waiving the defense of sovereign immunity and per-
mitting the following claimants to sue for damages 
alleged to have been suffered as a result of the 
failure of the Clay Creek Dam in Prowers County; 














Darrel E. and Ruth B. Sawyer 
James M. Smith 
Carrie F. Hall 
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. 
Lamar Farms (a partnership) and Brent and 
Gary Hofmeister, (Minors) 
William Walker 
Richard I. and Bertha I. Moss 
Lamar Canal and Irrigation Company 
Wesley Sage, d/b/a Plains Outdoor Advertis-
ing Company 
Cecile and Amelia Thombleson 
Fort Bent Ditch Company 
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TABLE IV 
Claims Filed With Colorado Claim~_Commission - July 1, 1965 to Decamber 31 1 1966* 
Docket Date 
Nu::iber Amount Cle.ime.nt __ r~ Nature 1::>f Cls.im Di=nosition - ~~ .. ~ 
66-1 $ 19,941.85 Ralph E. Doney 7 .. 28-65 Airplane d~stroyed J'uz'isdictio11 denied. 
66-2 26,200.00 · .Janet R. Men'=ley lO-ll.-65 Fatal automobile accident R~c~end $~0,000 Relief Bill 
66-3 85.,274.69 Da.n~l and R-..ttb Sawyer 12-3-65 Damages - Cay Creek Dai:i:. 'Re~a:imiend sttit b,.-. ;: D,m,;,,;..:, 
66-4 7~.00 James M~ Sm.ii;h 12-3-65 Damages - Clay Cr~k Je.m ·:--.-:;cau::nend suit be ili0wed 
66-5 1;,200.00 C&r!'ie F. Kall 12-13-65 Damages - Clay Creek Dam P.~~c::::!:!end suit be a:;_1_~ 
66-6 225,597.00 A.T. & S.F. Railway Compe.ey 12-14-65 Damages - Clay Creek Dam :::~cor.,-nend sili t be ru.lo~ 
66-7 594,858.00 ta.ma.r Fs.:rm.s ( a. pa..-rtnership) s.nd 12-14-65 Damages - Clay C~eek D::..m. Re command su.1 t be a..tlow":!d 
Brent and Gary Hofmeister (Minors) 
66-8 14,000.00 William Walker 12 .. 28-65 Dama.gos ~ Clay Creek Dt".:.:l Eec0?:m1end suit b-e allc:•~d 
66-9 37,257.83 Rich2-"'"d. I. and Bertha I. Moss l-17-66 Damages - Clay Creek Dam Recommend suit be e.llo.ea. 
66-lO 1,500.00 Arapahoe Be.sin, Inc. 3-24-66 Damages from "shooting" sl.ide ties.ring pend.ing 
66-ll 10,790.00 Lamar Canal and Irrigation Company 4-20-66 Dall!B.ges - Clay Creek Dam Recon..miend suit bn allO".red. 
I 
66-12 2,oo4.93 E.B. Ketchum, d/b/a Ca.non Vegete,ble 4 .. 2.1-66 · Trailer did not clea~ unde~a~s Hea:ri.ng pexxling ~ 
°" Growers I 
66-13 900.00 Wesley Sage, d/b/a Plains Outdoor 4-27-66 Damages - Clay Creek De.m. Rec~nd. suit be allow.ea. 
Advertising Company 
66-14 1,250.00 William H. Dawson 5-26-66 Bid.ding sp~cilications changed without Jurisdiction denied 
notice 
66-15 25,000.00 Elnora z. Steele 6-30-66 Fe.te.l automobile e.ccident Heaz-i.r1.g pending 
66--16 2_~020.00 George and Georgia Hoopes 6-29-66 Automobile accident Hearing pending 
66-17 15,660.00 Cecil and Amelia Thombleson 7-5-66 Damages - Clay Creek Dam Recommend suit be allowed 
66-18 31,095.00 Fort Bent Ditch_company 7-5-66 De.ma.ges - Clay Creek Dam Recommend suit be a.l.Jg.fl!d 
66-19 (not e.Ueged.) Alexander 11hi~l.e 9-12-66 Injured when State Patrol.ms.n's gun Has.ring pending 
discharged 
66-20 1,500.00 Earl Sanders ll-8-66 Property a.long highway destroyed Hearl!'~ pending 
66-21 174.19 Jerald C. Rich 10-11-66 Auto stolen by Reformatory "trustees" Recommend $174.19 Relief Bill 
$l 2lll1019.49 TOTAL ~"iOONT OF CIAIMS FILED 
* Source: Report of the Colorado Claims Commission, January 7, 1964 
Claims filed with the commission in 1967 are listed in 
Table V below. 
TABLE V 
Claims Filed with Colorado Claims Commission -
January 1, 1967 to October, l967 
Docket Date 
Number Amount Claimant Filed Nature of Claim 
67-1 $ 1,000.00 Donna Manley - a 1-5-67 Injured in colli-
minor by mother - sion with station 
Barbara L. Davis wagon of Children~ 
Home - no Colorado 
drivers license. 
67-2 115.54 Edith Crusick 1 .. 10-67 Windshield of auto 
broken by State 
Hospital patient 
67-3 26,753.05 Virgil R. Madsen, 1-25-67 Four year old 
by parents Virgil claimant burned 
R. Madsen and Nina while playing on 
Madsen Highway Dep't ag-
gregate pile which 
was on fire. 
67-4 15,000.00 Golden Key Manor 3-21-67 City of Denver has 
Homes, Inc. and sued petitioners 
Mi-arv Invest- for discharging 
ments, Inc. water into High-




67-5 208.30 William R. Mackie 4-24-67 X-ray unit damaged 
- alleged due to 
negligence in in-
spection. 
67-6 161.03 Stanley Haynes 6-14-67 Hit boulder in 
center of Highway 
40 on Berthoud 
Pass - alleged 
negligence of 
grader. 
67-7 90.00 Floyd Ellis 7-25-67 State patrolman 










Rep. G~orge 9-5-67 
Fe~tress - fo~ ap-
p:,~ .. oxlmatel y 24 
claimants 
Nature of Claim 
Residences clamaged 
by flooding due to 
inadequate drain-
age of Highway. 
· During the 1967 session, the General Assembly adopted HnB. 
No. 1127, which granted to perso.ns who sustained injury by the di-
version of Clay Creel~ flood water by Clay Creek dam in June, 1965, 
the right to initiate a civil action against.the state to recover 
damages. The General Assembly in 1967 d:i.so passed H.B. No .. 1114 
which grantee' $20,000 to Mrs. Janet R. Meneley for damages sus-
tained when her husband was killed as a result of negligent. repairs 
of a state highway. 
Q_t,her cJ_aims against· the sta..:.tn,. The division of accounts 
and control is authorized to receiv~, hear and settle all claims 
against the state and issue warrants for payment thereof from the 
treasury.171 Warrants for the payment of duly audited and ap-
proved claims shall be ~repared, signed and transmitted to the 
state treasurer by the controller or his authorized agent.172 It 
is also provi.ded that "The attorney general shall be the legal ad-
visor of the controller and the division of accounts and control 
and to him shall be rererred any question concerning the legality 
of any obligation by or claim against the state~l73 Whether these 
provisions relate to the presentation of tort claims against the 
state is not quite clear as there are no cases in which this ques-
tion has been decided or the provisions construed. In the light 
of the Colorado C~aims Commission Act, however, it would appear 
that these provisions relate only to the presentment of claims on 
contract, and not tort claims, which are presented to the claims 
commission. 
Claims handled by independent agencies or deeartments. 
Section 24-2-1 et seq., c.ff.s. !963, establishes a procedure for 
the presentation of claims for compensation benefits of volunteer 
workers injured in civil defense activities. These claims are 
presented to the Industrial Commission and the procedure thus es-
tablished is similar to the procedure for the presentation of 
claims for workmen's compensation benefits. 
111. 3_j.! (Is), C.R.S. 1963. 
172. 3-3-2 (6), C.R.S. 1963. 
173. 3-3-2 (10), C.R.S. 1963~ 
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Claims for damages for injuries by wild.animals which are 
protected by the game and fish laws of the state are presented to 
the Game, Fish and Parks Commission pursuant to the procedure ex-
tablished by sections 62-2-32 through 62-2-38, CaR.S. 1963. Any 
person who has sustained damages by wild animals must notify the 
commission of such loss and claim for damages within 10 days and 
file proof thereof. Within 30 days from the filing of notice the 
commission, if possible, shall agree with such person upon a set-
tlement. If no settlement can be reached, the claimant and the 
commission shall each appoint an arbitrator, in which event the 
two arbitrators shall agree upon a third arbitrator. Within 60 
days from the appointment of the arbitrators, an award must be 
made. The arbitration award shall be finalo Payment of the award 
is out of the game and fish fund. 174 
All claims against the University of Colorado must be au-
dited.and allowed by the Board of Regents pursuant to 124-2-17, 
C .. R. S .. 1963 . 
Claims against counties. All claims against a county shall 
be presented for audit and allowance to the board of county commis-
sioners of the proper county before an action in any court can be 
maintained against the county. When allowed by the board, the 
claims shall be paid by a county warrant, or order, drawn by said 
board on the county treasury, upon the proper fund in the treasury, 
for the amount of such claim. When the claim is disallowed, in 
whole or in part, by the board, such person may appeal the decision 
of the board to the district court for the same county within 30 
days after the making of such decision. 175 Provision i~ made for 
the proceedings and pleadings upon appeal to the district court.176 
Claims against special districts. There are several pro-
visions ot the Colorado statutes which provide for the presenta-





62-2-32 to 62-2-38, C.R.S. 1963; see also note 152, supra. 
36-2-10 et seqo, C.R.S. 1963. 
36-2-13, CaR~S. 1963, as amended 
E.g •• 89-1-25, C.R.S. 1963 (water ork districts); 150-1-25, 
C.R.S. 1963 (irrigation district of 1905); 150-2-29, C.R.S. 
1963 (irrigation district of 1921}; 150-4-37, C.R.S. 1963 




Provisions Relating To 
Claims Against GovernmentaJ Entities 
C.R.S. 1963 
3-3-1 (18) 
24-2-1 et seq. 
36-2-10 et seq. 
Authorizes division of accounts and control to 
receive, hear~ and settle all claims against 
the state and i~sue warrants for payment there-
of from the treasury. 
Establishes procedore for presenting claims for 
compensation benefits of volunteer workers in-
jured in civil ~efe1'se activitieso Claims are 
presented to Industr~al Commission~ Procedure 
is similar to procedure established for the 
presAntment of claims for workmen's compensa-
tion benef .L ts. 
All claims and demands held by any person against 
a county shall be presented for audit and al-
lowance to th~ board of county commissioners of 
the proper county, in due form of law, before 
an action in any court shall be maintainable 
thereon, and ~11 claims, when allowed, shall be 
paid by a county warrant, or order, drawn by 
said board on the county treasury, upon the pro-
per fund in the treasury, for the amount of such 
claim. 
The nature of the claim, the name of and the 
amount paid to each individual, disclosure of 
the fund charged with the claim, etc., must be 
published by the board according to the provi-
sions in 36-2-11~ 
When any claim of any person against a county 
shall be disallowed, in whole or in part, by 
the board, such person may appeal from the de-
cision of such board to the district court for 
the same county, by causing a written notice of 
such appeal to be served on the clerk of such 
board within 30 days after the making of such 
decision, and executing a bond to such county, 
with sufficient security, to be approved by the 
clerk of said board, conditioned for the faith-
ful prosecution of such appeal, and the payment 
of all costs that shall be adjudged against the 
appellant. See section 36-2-12. 
Section 36-2-13, C.R.S. 1963, as amended, provides 















Establishes a procedure for the presentation of 
claims to the game, fish and parks commission, 
and for the determination and payment of such 
claims for damages for injuries by wild animals. 
Establishes procedure for the presentation, deter-
mination and payment of claims against water-
works districts. 
All claims against the University of Colorado must 
be audited and allowed by the Board of Regents. 
Audit and payment of claims against Irrigation 
District of 1905. 
Audit and payment of claims against Irrigation 
District of 1921. 
Audit and payment of claims against Internal Im-
provement District. 
Provides remedy for the recovery of damages to 
property caused by acts done by conservancy 
districts. 
Provides for the establishment of the Colorado 
Claims Commission, the jurisdiction of the com-
mission, procedure for the presentation of 
claims, etc. See amendments in chapter 280, 
1967 Session Laws. 
Actions and Judgments Against Governmental Entities 
Statutor revisions relatin to actions and ·ud ments 
a!ainst governmental entities. In the preceding section on t e 
c aims commission, it was observed that the commission has no jur-
isdiction over those claims based upon an act or omission of a 
state employee for which insurance coverage is provided under the 
provisions of 72-16-1 et seq., CsR.S. 1963, or any other statutory 
provision. Thus any claim based upon an act or omission of a state 
employee for which insurance coverage is provided must be brought 
in the courts, but no action shall be brought unless it is brought 
within two years from the date the cause of action, if any, shall 
accrue.178 
11a. 72-16-6, c.RnS. 1963. 
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If any judgment is given and rendered against a county, 
provision is made for the payment of such judgment"l79 The coun-
ty board is authorized to pay such judgment by warrant drawn on 
the county fund or the j~dgment may be paid by the levy of a tax 
upon the taxable property in the county not to exceed one and one-
half per centum on the dollars of assessed property for any fiscal 
year. The board is not required to levy such special tax to pay 
any such judgment unless in its discretion the board shall so de-
termine. The amount of any such levy necessary to be made for the 
purpose of paying any judgment against the county is in no way 
limited by the provisions of article 3 of chapter 36, C.R.S. 
1963.180 
The statutes contain provisions relating to the bringing 
of an action against a city for the recovery of compensation for 
personal injury or death.181 The statute provides that written 
notice must be given to the town or city within 90 days after the 
happening of the accident which gave rise to the cause of action. 
The action must be commenced within two years from the occurrence 
of the accident causing the injury or death. Cities and municipal 
corporations, like counties, are alsn authorized to levy a special 
tax to pay judgments rendered against them.182 Like a county, 
there is no limit on the amount of any levy necessary to be made 
for the payment of any judgment rendered against the cityol83 
All actions against sheriffs or other officers for the 
escape of persons imprisoned on civil process shall be commenced 
within six months fro~ the time of such escape, and not after-
wards.184 In addition# all actions against sheriffs and coroners 
upon any liability incurred by them by the doing of any act in 
their capacity or by the omission of any official duty, except in 
relation to accounting to the county for fees earned or collected, 
and except for escapes, shall be brought within one year after the 
cause of action shall have accrued.185 
179. 36-2-4, C.R.S. 1963. 
180. 36-3-5, C.R.S. 1963. 
181. 139-35-1, C.R.S. 1963. 
182. 77-10-1, C.R.S. 1963. 
183. 36-3-5, C .. R.S. 1963. 
184. 87-1-1, C.R.S. 1963. 
185. 87-1-3, C.R.S. 1963,. 
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TABLE VII 
Provisions Relatinq To Actions and Judgments 










Provides for the payment of a judgment given and 
rendered against a county. County board can 
pay judgment by warrant drawn on county fund 
or may be paid by the levy of a tax upon the 
taxable property in the county not to exceed 
one and one-half per centum on the dollars of 
assessed property for any one fiscal year. The 
board is not required to levy any special tax 
to pay any judgment unless in its discretion 
the board shall so determine. 
The provisions of article 3 of chapter 36 shall 
in no way limit the amount of any levy neces-
sary to be made for the purpose of paying any 
judgment against any county, city, town or 
school district, or the interest on such judg-
mento 
No action arising against an officer, employee, 
or agent of the state or state governmental 
subdivision for which insurance coverage is 
provided pursuant to 72-16-1, shall be brought 
unless the same is brought within two years 
from the date the cause of the action, if any, 
shall accrueo 
Authorizes municipal corporations to levy a spe-
cial tax to pay judgments rendered against them. 
All action against sheriffs or other officers for 
the escape of persons imprisoned on civil pro-
cess, shall be commenced within six months from 
the time of such escape, and not afterwards. 
All actions against sheriffs and coroners upon 
ary liability incurred by them by the doing of 
a, y act in their capacity or by the omission 
of any official duty, except in relation to ac-
counting to the county for fees earned or col-
lected, and except for escapes, shall be brought 
within one year after the cause of action shall 
have accrued, and not after that period. 
Provisions relating to the bringing of an action 
against an officer of the military forces or an 
enlisted man acting pursuant to an order of any 
such officer. 
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Provides relating to the bringing of an action 
againJt a city for the recovery of compensation 
for personal injury or death. Written notice 
must 11e given to town or city within 90 days 
after accident. Action must be commenced with-
:i.P b'l.10 Y':'ars from the occurrence of the acci-
dent cauring the injury or death. 
Statutory provisions relati_ng to insurance, generally. 
Pursuant to the provisions of section 13-10-3, C.R.S. 1963, the 
state, counties: municipalities or quasi-municipalities may cover 
their liabilities and shall cover the liabilities of their motor 
vehicle drivers in whole or in part through the procurement of 
insurance from any insurance company authorized to do business in 
this state, or, in their discretion, may self-insure and may set 
aside necessary public funds to create proper reserves against 
contingent and anticipated liabilittes, or may effect a combina-
tion of the two methodso The state, counties, municipalities or 
quasi-municipalities are thus made liable for injuries caused by 
the negligent operation of government-owned vehicles to the extent 
of the following limitations: bodily injury liability limited to 
$10,000 for each person and $20,000 for each accident; and prop-
erty damage liab.:.lity limited to $5,000 for each accident. 
The state, its 2gencies, cities, counties, or city and 
county, are authorized to procure insurance for the purpose of in-
suring their officers, employees, and agents against any liability 
for injuries or damages resulting from their negligence or other 
tortious conduct du~ing the course of their service or employment. 
The extent of the insurance coverage is limited to $50,000 for 
bodily injury liability for each person, $100,000 for bodily in-
jury liability for each accident, and $25,000 liability for prop-
erty damage.186 
School district. A school district is authorized to ex-
pend funcrs--fo pay premiums to procure liability and property 
damage insurance covering such district, its governing body, of-
ficers and employees, and others while participating in civil de-
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fense activities. Immunity is waived to the extent of the amount 
as is covered by an existing and valid policy of insurance.187 
Boards of education and boards of cooperative services. 
Boards of education and boards of cooperative services are author-
ized to procure public liability insurance covering the school 
district, directors, employees, and others.188 They are also au-
thorized to procure liability and property damage insurance on 
school busses or motor vehicles owned or rented by the school dis-
tricts. Each policy of liability insurance purchased by a school 
district or a board of cooperative services is to contain a condi-
tion to the effect that said insurer or carrier shall not assert 
the defense of sovereign immunity otherwise available to the school 
district or employee thereof within the maximum amounts payable 
thereunder. The failure to procure such insurance or the failure 
to procure any such insurance in an amount sufficient to satisfy 
the entire claim or claims is not to be construed as creating any 
liability against the school district, director, or employee, or 
against the board of cooperative services.189 
TABLE VIII 
Provisions Relating to the Purchase of 
Insurance By Governmental Entities 
C.R.S. 1963 
13-10-3 The state, counties, municipalities or quasi-
municipalities authorized to purchase insurance 
to cover liabilities of motor vehicle drivers. 
24-4-4 A School district is authorized to procure insur-
ance to cover liabilities arising from the ex-
ercise of civil defense activities. 
72-16-1 et seq. Authorizes the state, its agencies, city, county, 
city and county to procure insurance to insure 





24-4-4, C.RoS. 1963. 
123-30-10 (23) & (24), C.R~S. 1963, as amended (boards of 
education); 123-34-7, C.R.S. 1963, as amended (boards of co-
operative services). . 









Boards of education authorized to procure public 
liability insurance. 
Provides that contract of insurance entered into 
by board of education pursuant to section 123-
30-10 (23) and (24) is to contain condition 
that carrier shall not assert the defense of 
sovereign immunity within the maximum amounts 
payable under the policy. 
Boards of cooperative services authorized to pro-
cure public liability insurance. 
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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
. The.doctrine of soverei9n immunity has become firmly es-
tablished in the states. Despite condemnation by legal writers 
and scholars in terms of the history, the legal theory and the 
philosophies that bear on the problem, or the procedur; and de-
cisions in particular jurisdictions, the fact of the doctrine's 
existence remains and the general rule continues to be that there 
is no state liability for tort unless consent is given. In all 
of the states, however, consent has been given, to a greater or 
lesser extent, and in a variety of forms. 
It is the purpose of this part to explore the condition of 
the law on the problems raised by the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity in the other states and the solutions to these problems 
which have been formulated, in the hope that trends, procedures, 
progress, or the lack of it, and state policies as revealed by 
state action will be made clearer and more significant as illus-
trating the alternatives open to the state of Colorado in ration-
alizing our law on the subject. 
For this purpose the existing immunities and liabilities 
in each of the several states are surveyed and examined in terms 
of the extent to which government entities are immune from lia-
bility and the extent in which they are liable. In addition, the 
various remedies that have been formulated by the states in pro-
viding procedures for adjudicating claims against the state, its 
agencies and subdivisions when immunity has been waived, or the 
courts have declared the doctrine to be inapplicable, are set out 
in summary fashion. 
Immunities and Liabilities in Other Jurisdictions 
There is, of course, great variation from state to state, 
and reference has been made to the law in each jurisdiction rath-
er than a random sampling. A summary of the law in each juris-
diction is contained herein~ This summary is by no means detailed 
and complete and it is probable that some relevant statutes or 
lines of judicial decision in some of the states have been over-
looked. Nevertheless, a fair picture of the way each state han-
dles the problem of tort claims against it is presented. 
The states. The common law doctrine of governmental im-
munity is the basic rule throughout most states. Few states have 
broken away from the immunity rule in any substantial degree. 
New York has done so more completely than any of the other states, 
and a few others, such as Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, 
Iowa, Nevada, Oregon, Michigan, Utah, Vermont, and Washington, 
have gone most but not all of the way. 190 
190. See notes 191, 192, 193, and 194, infra. 
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Alaska and Hawaii adopted at statehood statutes patterned 
after the Federal Tort Claims Act.191 Only Iowa, Nevada, New 
York, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington have done away with the im-
munity of the state for tortious acts by statute.192 Arizona is 
the only state which 5.s presently liable for its torts at common 
law as a result of judicial decision.193 California, Michigan 
and Utah have enacted leglslation which continues to make the 
state immune, except as otherwise provided by statute, and these 
exceptions are very broad, which in effect makes the state liable 
in most circumstancesrl94 Thus 1 with the exception of the 12 
states enumerated, in every other jurisdiction the states enjoy 
general immunity for their tortious acts either at common law or 
by constitutional provision, subject, in certain states, to spe-
cific statutory or judicial exceptions. 
Immunity Qf states. In 24 states this immunity is either 
reinforced by or derived from constitutional provisions. Four of 
these states have constltutional prohibitions against the-state 
ever being made a defendant in its own courts.195 It is inter-
esting to notep however, that all four have provided ~dministra-
tive procedures for the adjudication of tort claims.196 In 19 
states, constitutional provisions to the effect that suits may be 







Alaska Stat. § 09.50.250 et seq. (1952, Supp. 1965); Rev. 
Laws of Hawaii§ 24~A-l et seq. (1965 Supp.). 
"Iowa Tort Claims Act! 0 61 G.A., ch. 79 (1965) and Iowa Code 
§ 25A.l et seq. (1966J; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.031 (1965); 
N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act§ 1 et seq. (1963); Oregon Laws, ch. 627 
(1967); Vt. Stat. Ann. T.12, § 5601 et seq (1961, as amended 
1963); Rev. Code Wash. § 4.92.010 et seq. (1963). 
Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 
107 (1963). 
Calif. Govt. Code Ann. § 810-996.6 (Supp. 1965)j Mich. Pub-
lic Act 170 (1964) and Mich. Stat. Ann§ 3.996 \Supp. 1965); 
Laws of Utah, Ch. 139, § 1 et seq. (1965) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-1 et seq. (Supp. 1965). 
Alabama, Ala. Const. Art. 1, § 14; Arkansas, Ark. Const. Art. 
V, § 20; Illinois, Ill. Const. Art. IV, § 26; West Virginia, 
W. Va~ Const. Art. VI, § 35. 
Code of Ala., tit. 55, §§ 333, 334 (Supp. 1963); Ark. Stat. 
Ann. § 13-1401 et seq. (Supp. 1965); Ill. Ann. Stato Ch. 37 
§ 439.1 et seq. (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966); W. Va. Code Ann. 
§ 1143 et seq. (1961). 
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have been construed to mean that the state is immune in the ab-
sence of legislative action consenting to suit or liability.197 
Four states have constitutional boards of examiners which are 
given sole jurisdiction over claims against the state.198 This 
means that the state is immune except for those claims which are 
presented and allowed by the board of examiners. Nineteen states 
includi~g Colorado, have no constitutional provisions directly ' 
concerning the matter but have been made immune from liability by 
judicial decision.199 
197. California, Calif. Const. Art. XX, § 6; Delaware, Del. Const. 
Art. 1, § 9; Florida, Fla. Const. Art. III, § 22; Indiana, 
Ind. Const. Art. IV, § 24; Iowa, Iowa Const. Art. III,§ 31; 
Kentucky, Ky. Const. § 231; Louisiana, La. Const. Art. 3, 
§ 35; Nebraska, Neb. Const. Art. V, § 22; New York, N.Y. 
Const. Art. VI, § 23; North Dakota, N.D. Const. Art. I, 
~ 22; Ohio, Ohio Const. Art. I, § 16; Oregon, Ore. Const. 
Art. IV, § 24: Pennsylvania, Pa. Const. Art. I, § 11; South 
Carolina, S.C. Const. Art. XVII, § 2; South Dakota, S.D. 
Const. Art. III, § 27; Tennessee, Tenn. Const. Art. 1, § 17; 
Washington, Wash. Const. Art. II, § 26; Wisconsin, Wis. Const. 
Art. IV, § 27; Wyoming, Wyo. Const. Art. I, § 8. 
198. Idaho, Idaho Const. Art. 4, § 818; Montana, Mont. Const. 
Art. VII, § 20; Nevada, Nev. Const. Art. IV, § 22; Utah, 
Utah Consto Art. VII, § 13. 
199. Colorado, Ace Fl in Service Inc. v. Colo. De t. of A ricul-
ture, 136 olo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 957 · Connecticut, nse no 
V:-Cox, 135 Conn. 78, 60 A.2d 767 (1948); Georgia, National 
Distributing Company v. Oxford, 103 Ga. App. 72, 118 S.E.2d 
274 {1961); Kansas, Phillirs v. State Highway Commission, 
148 Kan. 702, 84 P.2d 9271938); Maine~ Austin W. Jones Co. 
v. State, 122 Me. 214, 119 A. 577 (1923J; Maryland, Davis v. 
State, 183 Md. 385, 37 A.2d 880 (1944); Massachusetts, Exec-
utive Air Service, Inc. v. Division of Fisheries and Game, 
342 Mass. 356. 173 N.E.2d 6I4 (1961); Minnesota, Youngstown 
Mines Corp. v. Prout, 124 N.W.2d 328 (1963); Mississippi, 
Horne v. State Buildin Commission, 233 Miss. 810, 103 So~2d 
~1958; Missouri, Gas Service Co. v. Morris, 353 S.W.2d 
645 (1962; New Hampshire, St. Re is Pa er Co. v. N.H. Water 
Resources Board, 92 N.H. 164, 26 A.2d 832 1942; New Jersey, 
McCabe v. N.J. Turn ike Authorit , 35 N.J. 26, 170 A.2d 810 
1961 ; New Mexico, State v. Burs, 75 N.M. 19, 399 P.2d 920 
1965 ; North Carolina, State Highway Commission v. Batts, 
265 N.C. 346, 144 S.E.2d 126 {1965); Oklahoma, Mountcastle 
v~ State, 193 Okla. 506, 145 P.2d 392 (1943); Rhode Island, 
Rhode Island Turnfike and Bridge Authority v. Nugent, 95 R.I. 
19, 182 A.2d 427 1962); Texas, Allen v. State, 410 S.W.2d 
54 (1966); Vermont, Town of Stockbrid e v. State Hi hwa Bd., 
125 Vt~ 366, 216 A.2d 44 1965 ; and Virginia, Elizabeth 
River Tunnel Dist. v. Beecher, 202 Va. 452, 117 S.W.2d 685 
(196l)ft 
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hlability of states. Although the states in general enjoy 
governmental immunity, most of ~hem have made statutory excep-
tions to the doctrine and have consented to be liable in partic-
ular instances. The twelve states which provide liability to the 
greatest extent are listed ~bove. Also a total of 19 states, in-
cluding Colorado, are made liable for injuries caused by the neg-
ligent operation of go·,.rernment-owned motor vehicles .200 Twenty 
states are liable for ~njuries caused by the defective conditions 
of public highwdys, bridges, etc.201 
200. Alaska, Alaska Stat:§ 09.50.250 et seq. (Supp. 1966); Ari-
zona, Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 
P.2d 107 (1963); California, Calif. Govt. Code Anne § 815 et 
seq. (Suppo 1965); Colorado, C.R~S. 13-10-1 et seq. (1963); 
Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-556 (1958l; Hawaii, Rev. 
Laws of Hawaii, § 245A-l et seq. (1965 Supp. ; Iowa, Iowa 
Code§ 25A-l et seq. (1966); Kansas, K.S.A. 12-2601 et seq. 
{
Supp. 1966); Michigan, Mich_ Stat. Ann. § 3-996 (1)-(15) 
1948 as amended 1964); Nevada, Nev~ Rev. Stat.§ 41-031 
19651; New York 1 N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act (1963); Oregon, Ore. Rev. Stat. § 278.090 ,1965); Pennsylvania, Pa. Statp Ann. T. 71 
§ 634 (Purdon 1962); South Carolinar S.C. Code Ann.§ 33-229 
(1962); Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-801 et seq. (1956. as 
amended 1965); Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq (Supp. 
1965); Vermont, Vt. Stat. Ann. T. 12 § 5601 et seq. (1961, 
as amended 1963); Washington, Rev. Code Wash.§ 4.92.010 et 
seq. (1963); Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. Ann.§ 345.01 (1965). 
201. Alaska, Alaska Stat. § 09.50.250 et seq. (Supp. 1966); Ari-
zona, Stone v. Arizona Hi~hway Commission, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 
P.2d 107 (1963); California, Calif. Govt. Code Ann. § 815 et 
seq. (Supp. 1965); Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 13a-144 
(Supp. 1966); Georgia, Ga. Code Ann. § 95-1710 (1958); Hawaii, 
Rev. Laws of Hawaii, § 245A-l et seq. (1965 Supp.); Iowa, 
Iowa Code§ 25A-l et seq. (1966); Kansas, K.S.A. § 68-419 
(1964); Louisiana, Kilgatrick v. State, 154 So.2d 439 (1963); 
Maine, Me. Rev. Stat. h. 17 § 1451 (1964); Massachusetts, 
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 81 § 18 (1961); Michigan, Mich. 
Stat. Ann. 3-996 (1)-(15) (1948, as amended 1964); Nevada, 
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.031 (1965); New.Hampshire, N.H. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 245:20, 247:17 (1966); New York, N.T. Ct. Cl. 
Act (1963); Oregon, Ore. Rev. Stat. § 366.430, 373.060, and 
105.760 (1965); South Carolina, S.C. Code Ann. § 33-229 
(1962); Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-801 et seq. {1956, as 
amended 1965); Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq. (Supp. 
1965); Vermont, Vt. Stat. Ann. T. 19 § 29, 33 (1959); Wash-
ington, Rev. Code Wash. § 4.92.010 et seq. (1963). 
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The purchase of liability insurance constitutes in some 
states a waiver of immunity. Eleven states authorizing the pur-
chase of general liability insurance,202 and six states authoriz-
ing only automobile liability insurance,203 have express provi-
sions waiving their immunity to the extent of the insurance. Six 
other states, including Colorado, are also permitted to purchase 
either general or automobile liability insurance, but the stat-
utes do not indicate that the purchase constitutes a waiver of 
the defense of sovereign immunity.204 
Other Factors affecting immunity or liability. Several 
states have constitutional prohibitions against the enactment of 
special acts giving legislative relief.205 Another significant 
fact is that enactment of procedural statutes authorizing suits 
against the state or its subdivisions by all persons having claims 
against them has very little bearing upon the substantive tort 
liability of the government entity. In many states, these enact-
ments have been interpreted as merely permitting the filing of 
suits or claims, but as having no effect upon the state's sub-
stantive tort liability, the theory being that these statutes 






Arkansas, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 66-3240 et seq. (1963 Supp.); 
Idaho, Idaho Code§ 41-3501 et seq. (1962); Indiana, Ind. 
Stat. Anno § 39-1819 (Burns 1963); Iowa, Iowa Code§ 517.l 
(1966); Montana, Mont. Rev. Code§ 83-701 et seq. (1965 
Supp.); Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 41.037, 41.038 (1965); 
New Hampshire, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 412:3 (1955, as amended 
1961); New Mexico, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5-6-18 et seq. (1966 
Supp.); Oregon, Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 243.110, 278.090 (1965); 
Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq. (1965 Supp.); Vermont, 
Vt. Stat. Ann. T. 29 § 1403 et seq. (1959). 
Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-556 (1958); Florida, Fla. 
Stat.§§ 234.03, 240.191, 455.06 (1965 Supp.); Georgia, Ga. 
Code Ann. §§ 32-429, 32-431 (1965 Supp.); Kansas, Kan. Stat. 
Ann. § 12-2601 et seq. (1964); North Dakota, N.D. Rev. Code 
§ 39-01-08 (1965 Suppe); Oklahoma, Okla. Stat. Ann. T. 47 
§§ 157.1, 158.l (1962, as amended 1963). 
California, Calif. Govt. Ann. §§ 990-991.2 (Supp. 1965); 
Colorado, C.R.S. § 13-10-1 (1963); Kentucky 1 K.R.S. § 44-055 (1962); Michigan, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 3.996 \1)-(15) (1948, 
as amended 1964); Pennsylvania, Pa. Stat. Ann. T. 71 § 364 
(Purdon 1962); Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 66.18 (1965). 
E.g., Neb. Const. Art. III, § 18. 
206. E.g., Lauritzen v. Chesa eake Ba 
259 F. Supp. 633 1966; Va. Code 
amended 1966). 
Tunnel Dist., 
seq. 1957, as 
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TABLE IX 










l Adopted at statehood statutes patterned after the Federal Tort 
Claims Act. 
2 Enacted statutes which have abolished sovereign immunity. 
3 Is liable at common law as result of judicial abrogation of 
doctrine. 
TABLE X 






























Constitutional provision takes an affirmative form to the 
effect that the state is immune from suit. 
Constitutional provisions construed by courts to confer 
immunity in the absence of express legislative action. 
Constitution establishes a board of examiners to hear and 
determine claims against the state. 
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TABLE XI 
States Where Immunity Is Conferred By Statute* 
California Michigan Utah 
* These states are immune generally, but have broad statutory 
exceptions to their immunity. 
TABLE XII 





















States Which Are Liable For Negligent Operation 















































States Authorizing Purchase of Liability Insurance And 













General liability insurance. 







~tates Authorizing Purchase of Liabilitr Insurance 







I General liability insurance. 
2 Automobile liability insurance only. 
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Inverse Condemnation. Some states have acknowledged lia-
bility by classifying some types of property harms as sounding in 
condemnation for eminent domain purposes. The form of recovery 
for this type of damage is often referred to as inverse condemna-
tion and is usually supported by the self-executing constitutional 
prohibition against the taking or damaging of private property for 
a public purpose. This is done when a tort action for property 
damage would not succeed because of the immunity doctrine.207 
The term inverse condemnation in its most general sense is 
used to indicate an action instituted by a landowner for the pur-
pose of compelling the state to compensate for any taking or 
damaging of his property. It is distinguished from a tort action 
in trespass or negligence in that it proceeds on the constitu-
tional theory that private property may not be taken or damaged 
for public purpose without compensation.208 More particularly, 
the term inverse condemnation has been applied to liability for 
purely consequential damage, i.e., damage in the absence of actual 
physical taking. 
Not all states give relief by way of actions for damages 
when consequential property harms occur ·1n connection with public 
uses. In seventeen states there is some liability under a theory 
of inverse ~ondemnation for purely consequential damage in the 
absence of an actual takingo209 In fifteen states there is no 
207. See gen~rally, Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse 
Condemnation: The Scope of Legislative Power, 19 Stan. L. 
Rev. 727 (1967); Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Con-
stitutional Limits of Public Responsibility, 1966 Wis. L. 
Rev. 3; Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L. J. 36 
( 1964) . . 
208. "Private property shall not be taken or damaged, for public 
or private use, without just compensation." Colo. Const. 
Art. II § 15; "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law." Colo$ Const. Art. 
II§ 25; Farmers Irrigation Co. v. Game and Fish Commission, 
149 Colo. 318, 369 P.2d 557 (1962); Faber v. State, 143 Colo. 
240, 353 P.2d 609 (1960), distinquishing'Colo. Racing Com-
mission v. Brush Racin9 Ass'n., Inc., 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 
582 (1957) and Ace Fl in Service Inc. v. Colo. De artment 
of Agriculture, 36 o o. 9, 3 4 .2d 278 957; Box er~er 
v. State Highway Dept., 126 Colo. 438, 256 P.2d 1007 (l95). 
209. Ariz. Const. Art. II§§ 4,17 and State v. Leeson, 84 Ariz. 
44, 323 P.2d 692 (1958); Ark. Const. Art. II§§ 8,13,22 and 
Hot S rin s Count v. Bowman, 229 Ark. 790, 318 S.W.2d 603 
958; Ca if. onst. Art. I§§ 13,14 and Frustuck v. City of 
Fairfax, 212 Cal. App.2d 345, 28 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1963); Colo. 
Const. Art. II§§ 6,25 and Farmers Irrigation Co. v. Game and 
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such liability.210 In addition, the authorities in six states 
210. 
Fish Commission, 149 Colo. 318, 369 P.2d 557 (1962); Ill. 
Const. Art_ II§§ 2, 13, 19 and People v. Rosenstone, 16 IlL 
2d 513 (1959); Minn. Const. Art. II§ 13 and State v. Ander-
.!Q!!, 220 Minn. 139, 19 N.W.2d 70 (1945}; Mo. Const. Art. I 
§ 26 and Lewis v. Cit~ of Potosi, 348 S .. W.2d 577 {Mo. 1961); 
Neb. Const. Art. I§ I and Patrick v. City of Bellevue, 164 
Neb. 196, 82 N.W.2d 274 (1957); N.M. Const. Art. II§ 20 and 
Board of County Commissioners of Lincoln County v. Harris, 
69 NaM. 315, 366 P.2d 710 (1961); Penn. Const. Art. I§§ 10, 
11 and Laws of Penn. 1963, No. 6, §§ 502(e), 612; S.C. Const. 
Art. I§§ 5, 17 and Chick S rin s Water Co •. v. State Hi hwa 
Dept., 178 S.C. 4~5, 183 S~E. 27 1935; Tex. Const .. Art. 
§§ 13, 17 and Abilene v. Downs, 367 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. 1963); 
Vt. Const. Art. I§§ 2, 4 and Griswald v. Town School Dist., 
117 Vt .. 224. 88 A~2d 829 (1952); Va. Const. Art. IV§ 58 and 
Hicks v. Anderson, 182 Va. 195, 28 S.E.2d 629 (1941); Wash. 
Const. Art. I§§ 3, 16 and Peterson v. Kint County. 41 Wash. 
2d 907, 252 P.2d 797 (1953); W.Va. Const. \rt. III§§ 9, 10, 
17 and Morqan v. Logan 125 W.Va 445, 24 S.E.2d 760 (1943).; 
Wyo. Const. Art. I§§ 6, 33 and Hirt v. Casper, 56 Wyo. 57, 
103 P.2d 394 (1940). 
Conn. Const4 Art. I§§ 11, 12 and Benson v. Housing Author-
ity of City of New Haven, 145 Conn. 196, 140 A.2d 320 {1958); 
Fla. Declaration of Rights§§ 4, 12 and City of Tampa v. 
Texas Co., 107 So.2d 216 (Fla. 1958); Ind. Const. Art. I§§ 
12, 21 and State v. Ensley, 240 Ind. 472, 164 N.E.2d 342 
(1960); Iowa Const. Art. I§§ 9, 18 and Anderlik v. Highway 
Commission, 240 Iowa 919, 38 N.W.2d 605 (1949); Kan Bill of 
Rights§ 18 and Richert v. Board of Education of the City of 
Newton, 177 Kan. 502, 280 P.2d 596 (1955); Me. Const. Art. I 
§§ 6, 21 and Opinion of the Justices, 103 Me. 506, 69 A. 
627 (1908); Mass Declaration of Rights§ 10 and Connor v. 
Metro olitan Dist. Water Su 1 Commission, 314 Mass. 33, ·49 
•. d 593 1943 ; • ~Const.Art. I§ 20 and N.J. Bell 
Telephone Co. v. Delaware River Joint Commission, 125 N.J. 
235, 15 A.2d 221 (1940); N.C. Const. Art. I§ 35 and Snow v. 
N.C. State Highwaf Commission, 136 S.E.2d 678 (N.C. 1964); 
Ohio Const. Art. §§ 16 19 and Lucas v. Carney, 167 Ohio 
St. 416, 149 N.E.2d 238 (1958); Okla. Const. Art. II§§ 7, 
24 and State v. Alford, 347 P.2d 215 (Okla. 1959}; S.D. Const. 
Art. VI§§ 2, 13 and Vesely v. Charles Mix Countr, 66 S.D. 
570, 287 N.W. 51 (1936); Tenn. Const. Art~ I§§ 7, 21 and 
Hawkins v. Dawn, 347 S.W.2d 480 {Tenn. 1961); Utah Const. Art. 
I§§ 7, 11, 22 and Fairclou9h v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah2d 
417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960); Wis. Const. Art. I§§ 9, 13 and 
Wisconsin Power and Li ht Co. v. Columbia Count , 3 Wis.2d, 
87 .W.2d 279 958. 
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indicate,211 but do not hold, that there is liability; and five 
states indicate,212 but do not hold, that there is no liability. 
The political subdivisions. The traditional common law 
rule applicable to municipal corporations is that there is no 
liability for injuries caused in the performance of "governmen-
tal" functions, whereas liability is imposed for similar injuries 
caused in the performance by the municipality of "proprietary" 
functions.213 This distinction is often referred to as a dis-
tinction between activities of employees· which are "ministerial" 
or "discretionary. 11 214 Liability attaches when an employee is 
engaged in the performance of 11 ministerial" duties, but not when 
he is performing 11 discretionary" duties. This distinction has 
not in general been applied in tort suits against the state, be-
cause they are usually deemed immune regardless of what kind of 
functions they are performing. The distinction is not always 
applied to counties, which in some jurisdictions are treated at 
common law as arms of the state, but in general counties are also 
subject to the distinction.215 T~ese distinctions are also ap-








Ala. Const. Art. I§ 23, Art. XII§ 235 and Cf. McClunI v. 
Louisville and N.R.R., 255 Ala. 302, 51 So.2d 371 (195); Ga. 
Const. §§ 2-103, 2-301 and Cf. Sheehan v. Richmond Count , 
100 Ga. App~ 496, 111 S.E.2d 924 1959; La. Const. Art. I 
§§ 2, 9 and Cf. Beck v. Boh. Bros. Construction Co., 72 So. 
2d 765 (La. 1954); Miss. Const. Art. III§§ 14, 17 and Cf. 
Quin v. Mississippi State Highway Commission, 194 Miss.4Il, 
11 So.2d 810 {1943) (dictum); Mont. Const. Art. III§§ 14, 
27 and Cf. State v. District Court, 48 Mont. 614, 139 P. 791 
(1914) (dictum); N.D. Const. Art. I§§ 13 1 14, 22 and Cf. Little v. Burleigh County, 82 N.W.2d 603 lN.D. 1957). 
Idaho Const. Art. I§§ 13, 14, 18 and Cf. Turcotte v. State, 
84 Ida. 451, 373 P.2d 569 (1962); Ken.c;'onst. § l3 and Cf. 
Danville v. Smallwood, 347 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. 1961); Md. Const. 
Art. III§ 40 and Cf. Feldman v. Star Homes, Inc., 199 Md. 
1, 84 A.2d 903 (19°5IT (dictum); N.Y. Const. Art. I§§ 6, 7 
and Cf. In re East 5th St. Borou h of Manhattan, 146 N.Y.S. 
2d 794 ( 955 dictum; Ore. onst. Art. I O, 18 and Cf.. 
Tomasek v. State, 196 Ore. 120, 248 P.2d 703 (1952). 
See notes 14, 21-35, supra. 
See notes 37-47, supra. 
See notes 10-12, supra. 
See notes 15, 16, supra. 
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Immunity of subdivisions~ In 35 states, including Colorado, 
counties, municipalities, and other political subdivisions 
are immune from tort liability, at least for "governmental" and 
"discretionary" functions, either at common law or by statute.217 
In three of these states general immunity is conferred by stat-
217. Alabama, Hillis v. City of Huntsville, 151 So.2d 240 (Ala. 
1963): Arkansas; Kirksey v. City of Fort Smith, 300 S.W.2d 
257 (Ark. 1957) ; California, see note 218, infra .. ; Colorado, 
County Commissioner v. Bish, 18 Coloo 474, 33 Paco 184 
(1893, City and County of Denver v. Madison, 142 Colo. 1, 
351 P~2d 826 (1960); Connecticut, Pluhowsky v. City of New 
Haven, 197 A .. 2d 645 (Conn .. 1964); Delaware, Pruett v. Dayton, 
I68A.2d 543 (DeL 1961;; Ger,rgia, t-rrs v. Franklin County, 
73 Ga. App~ 207, 36 S.E.2d 110 (1945, Ga. Code Ann. § 23-
1502 (Supp~ 1965), City of Thompson v. Davis, 92 Ga. App. 
216, 88 S.E.2d 300 {1955), Ga. Code Ann. §§ 69-301, 69-303 
(1957); Idaho, ~ord v. City of Caldwell, 79 Idaho 499, 321 
P.2d 589 (1958); Indiana, Sherfey v~ City of Brazil, 213 Ind. 
493,. 13 N.E.2d 568 (1938), Flowers v. Board of Commissioner 
of County of Vanderburgh_~ 240 Ind. 668, 168 N. E.2d 224 ( 1960); 
Kansas, Wilburn v. Boein Air lane Co., 188 Kan. 722, 366 P. 
2d 246 ( 1961 P al:"ker v. City of Hutchinson• 196 Kan. 148, 
410 P.2d 347 (1966); Louisiana, Hamilton v. City of Shreve-
12.Qtl, 247 La. 784, 174 So .. 2d 529 (1965); Maine, Dugan v. Cit_y 
~£-Portland, 157 Me. 521, 174 A~2d 660 \1961); Maryland, 
Irvine v. Montgomery County, 210 A.2d 359 (Md. 1965); Massa-
chusetts, Moschella v. City of Quincy, 196 N.E~2d 620 (Mass. 
1964); Michigan, see note 218, infra~; Missouri, Fette v. City 
of St. Louis, 366 S~W~2d 446 (Mo. 1963), Smith v. Consoli-
dated School Dist. No. 2, 408 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. 1966); Montana, 
Barovich v. City of Miles City, 135 Mont. 394, 340 P.2d 819 
(1959), Jacoby v. Chouteau County, 112 Mont. 70, 112 P.2d 
1068 (1941); Nebraska, McKinney v. County of Cass, 180 Neb. 
685, 144 N.W.2d 416 (1966); New Hampshire, Gossler v. City 
of Manchester, 107 N.H. 310, 221 A.2d 242 (1966); New Mexico, 
Andrade v. City of Alburguergue, 74 N.Me 535, 395 P.2d 597 
(1965); North Carolina, Mosseller v. City of Asheville, 267 
N.C. 104, 147 S.E.2d 558 (1966); North Dakota, Belt v. City 
of Grand Forks, 68 N.W.2d 114 (N.D. 1955); Ohio, Hyde v. Cit~ 
of Lakewood; ~ Ohio St,,2d 155, 207 N.E.2d 547 {1965); ok!a·-
homa, Chica o R.I. and Pac~ R.R. Co. v. Board of Count Com-
missioner, 389 .2 476 Ok a. 1964 ; ennsy vania, Esposito 
v. Emery, 249 Fff Supp. 308 (E.D.Pa. 1965), Dillon v. York 
City School Dist., 422 Pa. 103, 220 A.2d 896 (1966); Rhode 
Island, Mais v. Ilg, 199 A~2d 727 (R.I. 1964); South Carolina, 
Chilton v. Cit of Columbia, 247 S.C. 407, 147 S.E.2d 642 
1966; Sout Dakota, Conway v. Humbert, 145 N.E.2d 524 
1966; Tennessee, Johnson v. City of Allison, 50 Tenn. App. 
532, 362 SoW.2d 813 (1962); Texas, City of San Antonio v. 
Ramundo, 411 S.Wo2d 428 (Tex. 1967); Utah, see note 218, infra; 
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ute.218 In the majority of these jurisdictions the proprietary-
governmental distinction is applied both to municipalities and to 
counties. In five states only the counties enjoy immunity, mu-
nicipalities having been made liable either by statute or at com-
mon law.219 In eleven states, both counties and municipalities 
appear to be liable at common law, and by statute.220 
Liability of subdivisions. The broadest general category 
of liability is that of municipalities for injuries caused in the 
performance of so-called "proprietary" functions. Although·the 
criteria for distinguishing proprietary from governmental func-
tions vary from state to state, there is general agreement that a 
city may be liable in the former but not the latter area. As 





Virginia, Fenon v. City of Norfolk, 203 Va. 551, 125 S.E.2d 
808 (1962); West Virginia, Jones v. Cit of Mannin ton, 148 
W.Va. 5830 136 S.E.2d 882 (1964 ; Wyoming, Chavez v. City of 
Laramie, ~89 P.2d 23 (Wyo~ 1964 , Fanning v. City of Laramie, 
402 P.~d 460 (Wyo. 1965). 
California Calif. Govt. Code Ann. §§ 810-996.6 (West 1966); 
Mich. Comp. Laws§§ 691.1401-1415 (Supp. 1965); Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-10 et seq. (Supp. 1965). 
Florida, Koulakis v. Boyd, 138 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1962), Har-
grove Ve Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957);il-
linois, Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 
Ill.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), Hutchings v. Kraject, 34 
Ill.2d 379, 215 N.E.2d 274 (1966); Kentucky, Haney v. City 
of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964); Mississippi 1 Logjn v. City of Clarksdale, 340 Miss. 716, 128 So.2d 537 \1961 · 
New Jersey, Hoy v. Capelli, 48 N.J. 81, 222 A.2d 649 (19661, 
Visidor Corp. v. Borough of Cliffside Park, 48 N.J. 214, 225 
A.2d 105 (1966). 
Alaska, Alaska Stat. § 09.50.250 et seq. (Supp. 1966), Scheele 
v. City of Anchora9e, 385 P.2d 582 (Alaska 1963); Arizona, 
Stone v. Arizona Hi hwa Commission, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 
07 1963; Hawaii, Rev. Laws of Hawaii§ 245A-l et seq. (1965 
Supp.l, Carter v. County of Hawaii, 47 Hawo 68, 384 P.2d 308 
(1963; Iowa, Iowa Code§ 25A-l et seq. (1963); Minnesota, 
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 466.01 et seq. (1963), Spanel v. Mounds 
View School Dist. No. 621, 118 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1962); Ne-
vada, Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 41.031-.038 (1965), Walsh v. Clark 
County School Dist., 419 P.2d 775 (Nev. 1966); New York, N.Y. 
Ct. Cl. Act§ 8 (1963), Hefele v. City of New York, 267 N.Y.S. 
2d 946 (1966); Oregon, Ore Laws 1967, Cho 627; Washington, 
Rev. Code Wash. § 4.92.010 et seq. (1963), Provins v. Bevis, 
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As not~d above, in the area of "governmental" activities, 
eleven states hold their subdivisions liable at common law and/or 
by statute for their torts.221 Although California, Michigan and 
Utah have by statute enacted the rule of governmental immunity as 
applicable to subdivisions, these three states have made broad 
statutory exceptions to the rule which, in effect, makes the sub-
divisions liable for most activities involving the possibility of 
injury to private persons.222 In five states municipalities but 
not counties are generally liable at common law for their torts.223 
Liability for road defectso By far the most specific excep-
tion to the immunity rule is statutory or common law liability for 
injuries arising from defective conditions of public streets and 
sidewalks. In 26 states both counties and municipalities are so 
liable224 and in six additional states only municipalities are 
liable.225 
70 Wash. Dec.2d 127, 422 P.2d 505 (1967); Wisconsin, Wis. 
Stat. Ann. § 895.43 (1966)_ 
221. Sae note 220, supra~ 
222. See note 218, supra. 
223. See note 219, supra. 
224. Alabama, Code of Ala~ T. 37 § 502 (1958), Code of Ala. T. 23 
§ 57 (1958) Densmore v, Birmingham, 223 Ala. 210, 135 So. 
320 (1931) {limits the statute's impact to ministerial func-
tions); Alaska, Alaska Stat. § 09.65.70 {Supp. 1966); Arizona, 
Talor v. Roosevelt Irri ation Dist., 71 Ariz. 254, 226 P.2d 
54 950 ; Ca ifornia, Calif. Govt. Code Ann.§§ 815-996.6 
(Supp. 1963); Connecticu~, Conn. Gen. Stat.§ 13a-149 (Supp. 
1966}; Georgia, Ga. Code Ann. §§ 95-1001, 69-131 (1958); 
Hawaii, Rev. Laws of Hawaii§ 245A-l et seq. (1965 Supp.); 
Iowa, Iowa Code§ 25A.l et seq. (1966); Kansas, Kan. Stat. 
Ann. § 68-301 (1964), Bisho v. Board of Count Commissioners, 
188 Kan. 603, 364 P.2d 65 196 ; a ne, e. ev. Stat. • 
313 § 3651 et seq. (1964), Beging v. Bernard, 160 Me. 233, 
202 A.2d 547 (1964); Massachusetts, Mass. Gen. Law~ Ann. Ch. 
84 § 15 (1961, as amended 1965), Souza v. City of New Bedford, 
22 Mass. App. Dec. 106 (1961); Michigan, Mich. Comp. Laws§§ 
691.1401-.1415 (Supp. 1965); Minnesota, Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 
466.01-.17 (1965); Nebraska, Nev. R.R. Stat. §§ 14-801~ 39-809 
(1943); Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.031 et seq. (1965}; New 
Hampshire, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 245:20, 247:17 (1966); ·New 
York, N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act (1963); North Dakota, N.D. Rev. Code 
§ 40-42-01 et seq. (1960); Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§ 305.12 
(Page 1953); Oregon., Ore. Rev. Stat. § 368.940 (1965), Oregon 
Laws 1967, Ch. 627; South Carolina, S.C. Code Ann.§§ 33-234, 
47-70, 47-71. 14-401 et seq., 33-921 et seq. (1962); South 
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Liability for negligent o7eration of motor vehicles. Another area in which a number o states have imposed liability 
upon their political subdivisions, either by statute or by court 
decision, is the area of injuries caused by the negligent opera-
tion of motor vehicles. In 19 states, including Colorado, munic-
ipalities and counties both are liable for damages caused by the 
negligent operation of motor vehicles.226 In five additional 
Dakota, S.D. Code§ 28.0913 (Supp. 1960); Utah, Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-8 (Supp. 1965); Washington, Rev. Code Wash. § 
4.92.010 et seq. (1963); West Virginia, W.Va. Code Ann.§ 
1597 (9) (1961) 1 Cunnin ham v. Count Court of Wood Count, 134 S.E.2d 725 lW. a. 1964 ; Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 
81.15 (1965), Dunwiddie v. Rock County, 28 Wis.2d 568, 137 
N.W.2d 388 (1965). 
225. Florida, Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 
1957), Koulakis v. Boyd, 138 So.2d 505 {Fla. 1962); Illinois, 
Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 34 § 301.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961), 
Hutchings v. Kraject, 34 111.2d 379, 215 N.E.2d 274 (1966); 
Kentucky, Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 
1964); Louisiana, Carlisle v. Parrish of East Baton Rou e, 
114 So.2d 62 (1959 ; Mississippi, Logan v. City of arks-
dale, 240 Miss. 716, 128 So.2d 537 (1961); North Carolina, 
N.c. Gen. Stat. § 160.54 (1964), Faw v. North Wilkesboro, 253 
N.C. 406. 117 S.E.2d 14 (1960); Vermont, Vt. Stat. Ann. T. 19 
§ 1371 ( 1959). 
226. Alaska, Alaska Stat. § 09.65.70 (Supp. 1966); Arizona, Stone 
v. Arizona Hi hwa Commission, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 
963; California, Calif. Govt. Code Ann.§§ 815-996.6 
1963 ; Colorado, C.R.S. § 13-10-1 et seq. (1963l; Hawaii, 
Rev. Laws of Hawaii§ 245A-l et seq. (1965 Supp. ; Iowa, Iowa 
Code§ 25A.l et seq. (1966); Michigan, Mich. Stat. Ann. 3.996 
(1)-(15) (1964); Minnesota, S}anel v. Mounds View School Dist. 
No. 621, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 466.0l et 
seq. (1965); Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.031 (1965); New 
York, N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act (1963l; North Carolina, N.C. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 153.9.44, 160.191.1 (1964 ; Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 
307r44, 701.02 (Page 1953); Oregon, Oregon Laws 1967, Ch. 627; 
Pennsylvania, Pa. Stat. Ann. T. 75 § 623 (Purdon _1960); South 
Carolina, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 33-234, 33-921, 47-70, 47-71, 14-
401 (1962), Clawson v. City of Sumter, 148 S.E.2d 350 (1966); 
Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-7 (Supp. 1965); Washington, Rev. 
Code Wash. § 4.92.010 et seq. (1963), Kelso v. CitW of Tacoma, 
63 Wash.2d 913, 390 P.2d 2 (1964); West Virginia, V.Va. Code 
Ann. § 494 (6) (1961); Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. Ann.§ 345.01 
(1965). 
-71-
states only the municipalities are so liable.227 
Insurance. In 25 states, including Colorado, the political 
subdivisions are authorized to purchase some form of liability in-
surance,228 and in 14 of these states the statute indicates that 
such purchase eonstitutes a waiver of immunity to the extent of 
the coverage$229 
227. Florida, Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach. 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 
1957); Illinois, Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 34 § 301.1 (Smith-Hurd 
Supp. 1966) Hutchings v. Kraject, 34 Ill.2d 379, 215 N.E.2d 
274 (1966) {held statute unconstitutional); Kentucky, Haney 
v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (1962); "Mississippi, 
Logan v. City of Clarksdale, 240 Miss. 716, 128 So.2d 537 
(1961); New Jersey, Amelchenko v. Borough of Freehold, 42 
N.J. 541, 201 A.2d 726 (1964), Hoy v. Capelli, 48 N.J. 81, 
222 A.2d 649 (1966). 
228. Arkansas, Ark. Stat. Ann.§ 66-3240 et seq. (Supp. 1963); 
California, Calif. Govt. Code Ann. §§ 990-991.2 (1965 Supp.); 
Colorado, C.R.S. § 13-10-3 (1963); Florida, Fla. Stat. §§ 
234.03, 240.191~ 455.06 (1965 Supp.); Georgia, Ga. Code Ann. 
§ 56-2437 (1960J 1 Ga. Const. Art. 2-5902; Idaho,Idaho Code§ 41.3501 et seq. ll962), Dewea v. Keller, 86 Idaho 506, 388 
P.2d 988 (1964); Indiana, In. Stat. Ann. § 39-1819 (Burns 
1965), Hardbeck v. Anderson, 209 N.E.2d 769 (Ind. 1965); Iowa, 
Iowa Code§ 517.1 (1966); Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-2601 
et seq. (1964), Caywood v. Board of Count~ Commissioners, 194 
Kan. 419, 399 P.2d 561 (1965}; Michigan, ich. Stat. Ann. § 
3.996 {lJ-(15) (1964); Minnesota, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 466.01 
et seq. (1965); Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.031 (1965); New 
Hampshire, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 412:3 (1955, as amended 
1961) Cushman v. Grafton Count*, 97 N.H. 32, 79 A.2d 630 
(1951J; New Mexico, N.M. Stat.on. § 5-6-18 et seq. {Supp. 
1966); North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153.9.44 (1964), 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160.191.1 (1964); North Dakota, N.D. Rev. 
Code§§ 39-01-08, 40-43-07 (Supp. 1965); Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 307.44 (Page 1953); Oklahoma, Okla. Stat. Ann. T. 11 
§ 16.1 (1959); Oregon, Ore. Rev. Stat. § 243.110 (1965), 
Vendrell v. School Dist. No. 26C, 226 Ore. 263, 360 P.2d 282 
(1961); Pennsylvania, P~. Stat. Ann. T. 53 § 65713, T. 16 §§ 
2303 5502 (1956); Utah, Utah Code Ann.§ 63-30-28 (Supp. 
1965f; Vermont, Vt. Stat. Ann. T. 29 § 1403 et seq. (1959) 
T. 24 § 1092 (1959); West Virginia, w.va. Code Ann.§ 494 (6) 
(1961); Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 66.18 (1965); Wyoming, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-4 (1965). 
229. See note 228, supraa Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, 
Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, Utah, Vermont, Wyoming. 
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TABLE XVII 
Political Subdivisions Immune From 




































1 Statutes which make subdivisions immune generally, but have 
broad exceptions to immunity rule. 
TABLE XVIII 
Political Subdivisions Liable at Common 
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Streets, s, etc. 
Alabama Kentuckyl North Carolinal 
Alaska Louisianal North Dakota 
Arizona Maine Ohio 
California Massachusetts Oregon 
Connecticut Michigan South Carolina 
Floridal Minnesota South Dakota 
Georgia Mississippi! Utah 
Hawaii Nebraska Vermontl 
Illinoisl Nevada Washington 
Iowa New Hampshire West Virginia 
Kansas New York Wisconsin 































































Includes either general liability insurance or automobile lia-
bility insurance, or both. 
Statutes authorizing purchase of liability insurance expressly 
waive the subdivisions immunity to the extent of the insurance 
coverage so obtained. 
Statutes authorize purchase of automobile liability insurance 
only. 
Remedies and Procedures For Adjudicating Claims 
Introduction. In those states in which liability for torts 
is the general rule, either as a result of judicial decision or 
legislative enactment, a claimant may usually bring an action 
against the state in any proper court the same as if he were suing 
a private person. However, there are generally provided by stat-
ute certain procedures that the claimant must follow. In those 
states i.n which immunity from liability is the general rule the 
state may either not be sued at all, or may be sued only in the 
manner and courts prescribed by the legislature. The manner in 
which tort claims may be enforced against the states and their 
subdivisions, either in those situations in which responsibility 
has been undertaken or in those situations in which the state and 
subdivisions remain immune, varies widely. 
Summar~ of remedies in states. Twelve states provide for 
recovery int eir regular courts by all or most tort claimants.230 
230. See note 191, 192, ~93, and 194, supra. These states are 
Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, 
New York, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, and Washington. 
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The regular courts of eight additional states, including Colorado, 
are presumably open to enforce the statutory liability of those 
states, i.e., for defective highways and/or negligent operation of 
motor vehicle$.231 Nine states have administratiyj? claims tribu-
nals or officers whose determinations are fina1o2::S2 Ten states, 
231. These states are Colorado, Connecticut, Fl~rida, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, and South Carolina. 
232. Alabama, Code of Ala~ In 55 §§ 333, 334 (Supp. 1963) (Board 
of Adjustmentb The Board hears claims for damages to per-
sons or property caused by the state or its agencies. Re-
lief for injuries caused by counties or municipalities may 
not be had before the Board.)· Arkansas, Ark. Stat~ Ann.§ 
13-1401 et seq. (1965 Supp*) (state Claims Commission); Con-
necticut, Conn. Gen. Stat~ § 4-141 (Supp. 1963) (Claims Com-
mission. The Commission's determination is final as to 
claims less than $2,500. Larger claims require legislative 
approval and the Commission's action is merely. recommenda-
tory to the legislature~ The Commission may also ·authorize 
suits against the st~te in the regular courts, but the st~te 
cannot be sued without the consent of the Commission.); Ken-
tucky, KoR.S. § 44-070 et seq. (1962) (Board of Claims. The 
Board has jurisdiction to hear and to allow claims for dam-
ages as a result of negligence on the part of the state and 
its agencies. The jurisdiction of the Board is exclusive 
and a claim shall not exceed $10,000. The Board's findings 
of fact, where based on substantial evidence, are conclusive 
upon review by the courts and the awards are enforceable as 
court judgments.l, Foley Construction Co. v. Ward, 375 S.W. 
2d 392 (Ky. 1964 · Massachusetts, Mass. Gen~ Laws Ann. Ch. 
12 § 3A-D (1966) (Attorney General. The Attorney General has 
authority to investigate and determine claims against the 
state not otherwise provided for by law. The Attorney Gen-
eral's determination is final up to the amount of $1,000. 
Upon a determination that the claimant is entitled to dam-
ages in excess of $1,000, the Attorney General's decision is 
only recommendatory to the general court.); North Carolina, 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143.291 (1964, as amended 1965) (The In-
dustrial Commission is authorized to hear and determine tort 
claims.against the state. The Commission determination may 
be appealed on questions of law, but findings of fact are 
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. The amount 
of damages awarded cannot exceed the amount of $12,000.); 
Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§ 127.11 (Page Supp. 1966) (Sundry 
Claims Board. The Board has jurisdiction to hear claims 
against the state for the payment of which no money has been 
appropriated. The Board has authority to deter~ine and or-
der final payment qf claims not exceeding $1,000. All 
claims over $1,000 are reported to the following session of 
the legislature for action.); Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann.§ 
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including Colorado, have administrative tribunals or legislative 
committees whose determinations are merely recommendatory to the 
legislature.233 In addition, several states have passed private 
9-801 et seq. (1956, as amended 1965) (Board of Claims. The 
Board has jurisdiction to hear and determine all claims 
against the state for personal injuries or property damage 
~aused by defective highways and negligence in the operation 
of motor vehicles. The decision of the Board upon any claim 
is final.); West Virginia, W.Va. Code Ann. § 494 (6) {1961) 
(Attorney General. The Attorney General is authorized to 
act as a special instrumentality of the legislature for the 
purpose of considering and determining claims against the 
state and recommending the disposition thereof to the legis-
lature.). 
233. Colorado, C.R~S. § 130-10-3 (1965 Supp.) (Claims Commission. 
The Commission was established to aid the General Assembly 
in the consideration and evaluation of tort claims against 
the state. The determination of the Commission is recommend-
atory to the General Assembly.); Georgia, Ga. Code Ann. § 47-
504 et seq. (Supp. 1965) (Claims Advisory Board. The Board's 
determination of claims is recommendatory to the General As-
sembly.); Idaho, Idaho Gonst. Art. 4 § 818, Art. 5 § 10. 
(The constitution provides that a Board of Examiners consist-
ing of certain state officials shall have exclusive juris-
diction and power to examine all claims against the state 
and that no claim shall· be passed upon by the legislature 
without having been first so presented. Another section of 
the constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall have 
original jurisdiction to hear claims against the state, but 
its decisions shall be merely recommendatory to be reported 
to the legislature for action. The courts have reconciled 
the two sections by requiring claims to be submitted to the 
Board before the court may hear them. Thomas v. State, 16 
Idaho 81, 100 Pac. 761 (1901), Jewett v. Williams, 84 Idaho 
93, 369 P.2d 590 (1962). The legislature has also set up 
procedures for presenting claims to the Board. Idaho Code 
§§ 67-1008, 67-2001 (1947). The word "claims" has not been 
held to include tort claims so that there can be no recovery 
for torts of agents or employees of the state or its instru-
mentalities, unless the immunity is expressly .waived by 
statute.); Minnesota, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 3.66 et seq. {1965) 
(State Claims Commission. The Commission was created in 
1953 and given jurisdiction to adjudicate and hear claims 
against the state, its determination being only recommenda-
tory to the legislatire.); Montana, Mont. Const. Art. VII§ 
20, implemented by Mont. Rev. Code§ 82-1101 et seq. (Supp. 
1965) (Board of Examiners. The Board has the duty of exam-
ining all unliquid~ted claims against the state, its final 
determination being recommendatory to the legislature.); 
Nevada, Nev. Const. Art. IV§ 22. (The constitution creates 
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legislation compensating individuals having tort claims against 
the state. Fourteen states are authorized to purchase general 
liability insurance and nine more are authorized to purchase auto-
mobile liability insurance.234 When insurance is in force, there 
is of course a right to recover against the insurer. In three 
states, a claimant must. bring his action against the state in a 
special claims court.235 
a Board of Examiners with the duty of exam1n1ng all unliq-
uidated claims against the state.-· The conclusion and 
determination of the Board is only recommendatory to the 
legislature.); Rhode Island, R.I. Gen. Laws§ 22-7-1 et seq. 
(1956) (The legislature has established a joint committee on 
accounts and claims, consisting of four Senate members and 
five House members, with the responsibility of investigating 
all claims against the state. The committee's determination 
is recommendatory to the leqislature.); South Dakota, S.D. 
Code§ 33.4301 et seq. (Supp. 1960) (The state has estab-
lished a Commission of Claims, with each senior circuit 
judge in the state to serve as commissioner in the respec-
tive counties, to hold hearings on tort and contract claims 
against the state, and to transmit advisory recommendations 
concerning them to the next session of the legislature.); 
Utah, Utah Const. Art. VII§ 13, Utah Code Ann. § 63-6-10 
(1953) (Claims against the state must be filed with the gov-
ernmental entity or its insurance carrier, and upon its 
denial an action may be brought in the courts. If payment 
by the entity is not authorized by law then the judgment or 
claim shall be presented to the Board of Examiners.}; Ver-
mont, Vt. Stat. Ann. T. 32 § 935 (1959) (A Claims Commission 
has been established to hear and determine claims when the 
amount claimed does not exceed $1,000. An appeal from the 
decision of the Commission is granted by petition of the 
claimant to the General Assembly.). 
234. See notes 202, 203, and 204, supra. 
235. Illinois, Ill. Stat. Ann. Ch. 37 § 439.1 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 
Supp. 1966) (In 1903 the legislature created a Court of 
Claims, which in 1917 was given jurisdiction of matters in 
contract, and in 1945 was given jurisdiction in actions con-
cerning the negligence of the state's officers, agents and 
employees in the course of their employment. The determina-
tion of the court is final and conclusive and awards for dam-
ages for torts may be granted only up to $25,000. The entire 
enactment has been interpreted as "a complete waiver by the 
state of its immunity from liability in tort for the negli-
gent exercise of a governmental function." Rickelman v. 
State, 19 Ill. Ct. Cl. 54 (1949); Michigan, Mich. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 27A.640l-.6475 ('1962) (Claims against the state authorized 
by Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 3.996 (1)-(15) (1964) are brought in 
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Summar of remedies in subdivisions. With respect to 
politica subdivisions, they are general y liable for injuries 
caused in the course of performing a proprietary activity and 
this liability can be enforced in the regular courts. In addi-
tion, the courts of 13 states enforce the general liability of 
their subdivisions in tort.236 Five more states enforce the lia-
bility of municipalities only in the regular courts,237 and the 
courts of 17 states, including Colorado, are open to enforce the 
specific statutory liabilities of subdivisions.238 Twenty-five 
states authorize their political subdivisions to purchase gener-
al liability insurance and/or automobile liability insurance.239 
To the extent that such insurance is in force, an injured party 
has a legal remedy against the insurer. In addition to the 
foregoing, it is probable that in many cases informal adminis-
trative remedies are available to a person injured by a subdivi-
sion. 
the Court of Claims created pursuant to the Court of Claims 
Act. This act has been construed as not waiving the defense 
of goverrnmental immunity which is applicable unless prohib-
ited by the 1964 legislation.); New York, N.Y. Const. Art. 
VI§ 23. (New York's constitution provides for the estab-
lishment of a court of claims to hear claims providing that 
"the state •.. waives its immunity from liability and action 
and ... assumes liability and consents to have the same 
determined in accordance with the same rules of law asap-
plied to action ••. against individuals and corporations •. 
N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act§ 8 ll963). New York has thus made itself 
and all its agencies and political subdivisions generally 
liable for torts.). 
236. See notes 218 and 220, supra. 
237. See note 219, supra. 
238. See notes 224, 225, 226, and 227, supra. 
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States In Which Action Against State May be Brought 










States.In Which Claims Must be Presented To-An Administrative 










- Board of Adjustment 
- State Claims Commission 
- siate Claims Commission~ final determination not 
to exceed $2,500 
- Board of Claims - final determinatiQn not to ex-
ceed $10,000 
- Attorney Gnneral - final determination not to 
exceed $1,000 
- Industrial Commission - final determination not 
to exceed $12,000 
- Sundry Claims Board - final determination not to 
exceed $1,000 
- Board of Claims 
- Attorney General 
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TABLE XXVI 
States In Which Claims Must Be Presented To An Administrative 
Tribunal or Legislative Committee whose Determination 
Is Recommendatory To The Legislature 
COLORADO - Claims Commission 
Georgia - Claims Advisory Board 
Idaho - constitutional Board of Examiners 
Minnesota - State Claims Commission 
Montana - constitutional Board of Examiners 
Nevada - constitutional Board of Examiners 
Rhode Island - Joint Committee on Accounts and Claims - Legis-
lative 
South Dakota - Commission of Claims 
Utah - constitutional Board of Examiners 
Vermont - Claims Commission - hears claims not in excess 
of $1,000 
TABLE XXVII 
States In Which Action Must Be Brought In A Special Court 
Illinois - Court of Claims 
Michigan - Court of Claims 
New York - Court of Claims 
TABLE XXVIII 
States In Which General Liability of Subdivisions 
















States In Which General Liability Of Municipalities Only 







States In Which Statutory Liabilities of Subdivisions 


















Methods of providing remedies. As can be seen from the 
above summary, the several st~tes have accepted responsibility 
for their wrongs to some degree and have provided various methods 
for the redress of such grievances. The method of redress may 
take the form of allowing the state to be sued in the regular 
courts of the state, in a specially created court of claims, be-
fore an ex officio board or a board created for that purpose, 
allowing the presentation of claims directly to the legislature, 
providing for the purchase of liability insurance with a right of 
action against the carrier, or a combination of all or any of 
these. 
Thus the method of redress for injuries cause~ by torts of 
the state and its agencies may be legislativ~, administrative, 
judicial, or by the use of liability insurance. Although most 
states use one or two methods generally, and several use all three 
methods, very few states use only one method exclusively. For 
example, New York is the only state which uses the judicial method 
exclusively and gives its court of claims jurisdiction broad 
enough to include almost any claim against the state and its in-
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strumentalities, including political subdivisionsJ40 Alabama 
is probably the only state using the administrative method ex-
clusively for claims against the state, but claims against the 
subdivisions are specifically exempt from the jurisdictional 
coverage of the Board of Adjustment~241 
Le{islative methoq. Historically, the first agency for 
the adjud cation of claims against the state was the legislature. 
In fact, private tort claims are still made the subject of indi-
vidual legislative consideration and appropriation in many states, 
including Colorado.242 The legislative procedure for the adjudi-
cation of claims ls usually patterned after the following proce-
dure. The claimant requests a legislator to i.ntroduce a bill 
which appropriates an amount sufficient to satisfy his claim. 
After introduction the bill is referred to the appropriate commit-
tees of the House and Senate. The committees hold hearings and 
examine the documentary materialo The committees then make their 
decisions~ Final approval by two-thirds of the members of each 
house and by the Governor is necessary before the claim can be 
paid.243 Only a majority vote is necessary for final approval in 
Colorado .. 
With little variation~ the above procedure is essentially 
the same in all states using the legislative method .. The commit-
tees to which a claim bill is referred may vary from state to 
240. N.Y~ Const4 Artu VI§ 23; NoY. Ct. Cl. Act§ 8 (1963); 
Granger v. State, 14 A.D.2d 645, 218 N.Y~S.2d 742 (1961); 
Shaw Vo Village of Hempstead, 177 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1958); Hefele 
v. City of New York, 267 N.YcS~2d 946 (1966) (New York has 
thus made itself and all its agencies and political subdivi-
sions generally liable for their tortss Since the Court cif 
Claims is a court of record with appeal permitted, the num-
ber of reported opinions in suits against the state, its 
agencies or subdivisions far exceeds those from any other 
state~ Most cases turn on ordinary questions of tort law.). 
241. Code of Alao Tc 55 §§ 333, 334 (Supp. 1963); State Board of 
Adjustment v~ Lacks, 247 Ala. 72, 22 So.2d 377 (1945). 
242. See Governmental Immunity, Kentucky Legislative Research Com-
mission, Research Report Noe 30, pe 24 (1965); e.g •• Senate 
Bill No. 4, House Bill No~ 1061, 1968 Session of the Forty-
sixth Colorado General Assembly, and House Bill 1114, 1967 
Session of the Forty-Sixth Colorado General Assembly. 
243. See Claims Against the State, Florida Legislative Council 
and Reference Bure~u, Pn 5 (1957); Payment of Claims Against 
the State, Minnesota Legislative Research Committee, p. 17 
(1954). 
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state.244 Also, in some states the request in the bill is for 
permission to sue the state in a specific case rather than a re-
quest for an appropriation to satisfy a claim.245 However, the 
constitutional prohibition of special acts may make this impo~-
sible in some stateso246 
Role of legislative method in relation to other methods. 
Generally, tFierole played by the legislature is limited to claims 
which may not be adjudicated in any other fashion. This duty of 
the legislature may by law be vested in an administrative agencr 
or in the courts to whatever degree the legislative body is wil -
ing to relinquish the sovereign immunity of the state.24 7 Claims 
covered by liability insurance have been the first to be severed 
from legislative control~248 In states which have established an 
administrative agency or board to hear and determine claims, the 
legislature has often declared that the board's or commission's 
determination shall be final.249 Other states have provided that 
the determination is recommendatory and the legislature retains 
final approval over the board's recommendations.250 
Administrative method. This method of creating a board or 
commission with authority to hear and determine claims brought 
against the state is employed in 19 stateso The composition, ex-
tent of authority and jurisdiction, and methods of making awards 







See Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 
N.Y.U$L. Rev. 1363 (1954). 
Eeg., House Bill No. 1005, 1968 Session, Forty-sixth Colo-
rado General Assembly, and House Bill No. 1127, 1967 Session, 
Forty-sixth Colorado General Assembly. 
E.g., Neb. Consto Art. III§ 18, Cox v. State, 134 Neb. 751, 
279 NoW. 482 (1938); Okla~ Const. Art. V § 59, Duncan v. 
State Highway Commission, 311 P.2d 203 (Okla. 1957); Lowry 
v. Commonwealth, 365 Pa. 474, 76 A.2d 363 (1950); Ind. Const. 
Art. IV§ 24; State ex rel Davis v. Love, 99 Fla. 333, 126 
So. 374 (1930). 
See Claims Against the Statef Fla. Legislative Council and 
Reference Bureau, p. 6 (19571. 
See notes 202, 203, 204, 228, and 229, supra. 
See note 232, supra~ 
See note 233, supra. 
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Composition. The board or commission may function ex 
officio or the membership may be appointed for the sole purpose 
of adjudicating claims and have no other state duties. The most 
prevalent form used is the ex officio board composed of all or 
some of the principal officers of the state. Its membership 
varies among the states but three is the number most commonly 
used. In Colorado, the Claims Commission is made up Qf the state 
auditor, state controller, and state budget director.251 Two 
states, West Virginia and Massa~husetts, use the attorney general 
as a one-man instrumentality.252 Instead of an ex officio board, 
the legislature of North Carolina has designated an existing 
state agency, the Industrial Commission, as its claims board.253 
Some states, such as Arkansas and Minnesota, have an ad hoc 
claims commission.254 In South Dakota the senior circuit judge 
of the cou~ty where the alleged claim arose is the commissioner 
of claims. 55 Instead of an administrative board or commission 
the state of Rhode Island has created a permanent legislative 
Joint Committee on Accounts and Claims, consisting of four Senate 
and five House members~256 
In addition to the reqular members of the board, some 
states provide for investigators whose duty it is to investigate 
the facts, receive complaints, take depositions, receive testi-
mony, and report his findings to the board.257 To facilitate its 
investigation, the board may also be authorized to administer 
oaths, subpoena witnesses, and take depositions. The proceedings 
of the board are usually informal and authority is usually given 








C.R.S. § 130-10-1 et seq. (1963, as amended 1967). 
Mass. Gen. Laws Anna Ch. 12 § 3A-D (1966); W.Va. Code Ann. 
§ 1143 et seq. (1961). 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143.291 (1964, as amended 1965). 
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 13-1401 et seq. (Supp. 1965); Minn. Stat. 
Ann. § 3.66 et seq. (1965). 
S.D. Code§ 33~4301 et seq. (Supp. 1960). 
R.I. Gen. Laws§ 22~7.l et seq. (1956). 
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 13-1402 (Supp. 1965) (The comptroller is 
designated as the investigator.); Iowa Code§§ 25.1-.8 (1966) 
(special assistant attorner general); Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-
803 (1956, as amended 1965 (special assistant attorney gen-
eral). · 
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Jurisdiction~ The jurisdiction of the administrative 
claims board is limited to the degree of delegation of legislative 
authorityo The legislativ~ delegation of authority and jurisdic-
tion in some states is stated in language broad enough to include 
all claims against th~ stJte for which relief is not otherwise 
provided by law~25U This broad jurisdiction is mitigated in some 
states by judicial interpretations,259 and in others by statutes, 
which allow tertain types of claims to be adjudicated in the 
courts or by other ~clministrative agencies.260 These statutes 
often give a de,talled Ii.sting of the categpries of claims over 
which the bo,1rd is granted jurisdiction.261 In some instances, 
including Colorado, the act creating the board or commission, in-
stead of enumerating the specific areas of jurisdiction, will give 
the board general jurisdiction to hear claims with enumerated ex-
ceptions c262 · 
· Re.cori1i:nendd:~g,ry action. In ten states using this method, 






Iowa Code§ 25.l et seq. (1966) (The State Appeals Board is 
granted jurisdiction to hear all claims against the state 
for which"~ • ,the state would be liable except for the fact 
of its soverelgni:y,, • ~11 ); Ark. Stat. Ann.§ 13-1401.et seq. 
{Supp. 1965) (All types of claims, both in contract and tort, 
are heard and may be allowed by the Claims Commission·.) • . 
Idaho Const. Art. 4 § 818. The Board of Examiners is given 
exclusive jurisdiction to hear all claims against the state. 
The wo1:d ei claims", however, has not been held to include 
tort claims so that there can be no recovery for th~ torts 
of agents or employees of the state or its instrumentalities, 
unless immunity is expressly waived by statute. pigg v. 
Brockman, 79 Idaho 233, 314 P.2d 609 (1957); Carlon v. State, 
la Ill. Cto Cl. 167 (1949), holding that the Court of Claims 
has no jurisdiction over the torts of local school boards 
and municipal corporations under Ill. Stat. Ann. Ch. 37 § 
431.1 et seq. (Smith~Hurd Supp. 1966). 
Some states limit the jurisdiction of its administrative 
claims board to claims which do not exceed a specified amount. 
E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat.§ 4.141 (Supp. 1961) (claims over 
$2,500 require legislative approval); e.g., Neb. R.R. Stat.§ 
24.324 (1943) (allows claims on contract to be sued in courts). 
E.g., Code of Ala. T. 55 § 334 (Supp. 1963); Tenn. Code Ann. 
§ 9-801 et seq. (1956, as amended 1965). 
E.g., C.R.S. § 130-10-4 (1963, as amended 1967). 
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that the claim be paid. 263 In this case, the liability of the 
state attaches only when the legislature approves the claim and 
an appropriation is made. The usual procedure is for the board 
to investigate the claim and to transmit all the facts together 
with its approval or disapproval and recommended award to the 
legislature. In some states the recommended awards are included 
in the budget and in others the approved award must be reported 
to the legislature in bill form.264 An aggrieved claimant may 
generally appeal the board's determinatioo to the legislature, 
except in those states in which the claimant may bring an action 
on a rejected claim against the state in designated courts.265 
The determination of the legislature is usually final. 
Final action. In nine states using this method, the board 
is given authority to hear and make a final determination of the 
claim~266 This final determination may be unlimited as to amount 
or the determination may be final if it does not exceed a certain 
amount. If the board determines that the claimant is entitled to 
an amount above the statutory limit, the board's determination 
then becomes recommendatory to the legislature.267 
Awards. In states which have a contingent appropriation 
for the payment of claims against the state, the claim when final-
ly approved by the board may be paid through the regular channels 
without further approval of the legislature until the appropria-
tion is exhausted, in which case the board's determination theo 
becomes recommendatory to the next session of the legislature.i68 
Also, a recommendation for the payment of an award above the stat-
utory limit may be recommendatory to the le~islature while those 
awards below the statutory amount may be paid from the contingent 
appropriation. In some states the awards are paid only through an 
appropriation made by the legislature after the claims have been 
263. See note 233, supra. 
264. E.g., C.R.So § 130-10-1 et seq. (1963, as amended 1967). See 





E.g., Vt. Stat. Ann. T. 32 § 935 (1959); Rev. Code Wash. § 
4.92.010 et seq. {1963). Ibid, at p. 24. 
See note 232, supra. 
See notes 232 and 233, supra. 
See Claims Against the State 1 Florida Legislative Council and Reference Bureau, p. 23 \1957). 
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passed upon by the board, in which case the liability of the state 
attaches only when the legislature approves the claim and an ap-
propriation is made.269 In some states in which the board's de-
termination is final, no appeal to either the courts or to the 
legislature is allowed and the decision of the board may be en-
forced as a judgment at law.270 
Judicial method~ Although most states utilize their courts 
in varyrng degrees for suits against the state, the jurisdiction 
of the court is usually limited to a specific category of claims, 
such as actions on contract" 271 If actions are permitted· ·on 
torts, they are usually limited to specific causes.,·such as cases 
arising out of defects in hignways or inju'ries caused by the neg-
ligent operation of motor vehicles, but generally ordinary torts 
are excluded.272 As mentioned above, only 12 states provide for 
recovery in their regular courts by all or most tort claimants.273 
The regular courts of eight additional states are open to enforce 
the statutory liability of those states.274 
With respect to the political subdivisions of the states,. 
the regular courts are open to enforce liability caused by negli-
269 .. Ibid. 
270. Ibid .. 
27L "Persons having claims on contract. • . , which have been 
disallowed, may bring action thereon against the state and 
prosecute the action to final judgment." Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
§ 12-821 et seq. (1956); Ind. Stat. Ann. § 4.1501 (Burns 
1946) (The statute provides for suits on claims against the 
state but covers only contract matters.); La. Rev. Stat. § 
1305101 et seq. (Supp. 1962, as amended 1966); Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ann. Ch. 258 §§ 1-4 (1959) (The statute permits the 
superior court to hear ..... all claims at law or in equity 
•.. " against the Commonwealth. However, the term 0 all 
claims" has been construed not to include tort claims. 
Arthur A. Johnson Cor. v. Commonwealth, 306 Mass. 347, 28 
.E.2d 465 940 ; Ne •• R. Stat. § 4-319 (1943) (This 
statute has been ineefectual as far as tort claims are con-
cerned. Gentry v. State, 174 Neb. 515, 118 N.W.2d 643 (1962); 
Va~ Code§ 8-752 et seq. (1957, as amended 1966) (Pursuant to 
.this provision, proceedings based on contracts will lie 
against the state but actions based on torts are not author-
ized.). 
272. See notes 200 and 201, supra. 
273. See note 230, supra. 
274. See note 231, supra. 
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bility of municipalities only in the regular courts,276 and the 
courts of 17 are open to enforce the specific•statutory liabili-
ties of subdivisions~277 
A state may consent to be sued in one of two ways: (1) by 
general act which authorizes suits in cases falling within a gen-
eral category, and (2) by special act which authorizes a desig-
nated party to bring suit on a particular claim. As has been 
previously pointed out, there may be constitutional provisions in 
the particular state which prohibit either the state from being 
made a defendant in its own courts,278 in which case the adminis-
trative or legislative methodt or both, is the only alternative, 
or provisions which prohibit special legislation~ in which case 
permission to sue must be given by general act.2,9 
Procedure. Suits against the state may be brought in one 
of several courts as designated in the act which consents to suit. 
States which have waived their immunity usually have granted jur-
isdiction of claims cases to trial courts already in existence, 
usually the trial courts of the county or district where the cause 
of action arose. However, in some states suits against the state 
may only be brought in a court in the county or district in which 
the state capital is located.280 In some states the constitution 
empowers the state supreme court or other state courts ·with orig-
inal jurisdiction of suits against the state. The conclusion of 
the court is usually final although some states declare that the 
decision of the court is recommendatory in naturP. only and must 
be reported to the legislature for final action. 28 1 Also, some 
states having administrative boards or commissions require that 
275. See notes 218, 220 and 236, supra. 
276. See notes 219 and 237, supra. 
277. See notes 224, 225, 226, 227 and 238, supra. 
278. Ala. Const. Art. 1 § 14; Ark. Const. Art. V § ~O; Ill. Const. 
Art. IV§ 26; W.Va. Const. Art. VI§ 35. 
279- See note 246, supra. 
280. See Claims Against the State, Florida Legislative Council and 
Reference Bureau, p. 25 (1957). 
281. E.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 258 §§ 1-4 (1959); Idaho Const. 
Art. V § 10; N.C. Const. Art. IV§ 9. 
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the claim be submitted to .the board or commission before going to 
the courts for a hearing.282 
The procedure in claims suits generally is the same as when 
an individual sues another individual, including the method of ap-
peal and the rules of evidence. However, special rules of proce-
dure and evidence may be established. 
Special claims court. Jurisdiction of claims cases may be 
vested in a special court created for that purpose. Three states, 
Illinois,"~8~ York, and Michigan have established a special court of claims. The composition of the court varies. In New.York, 
the Governor appoints five full time judg~s to .serve for·nine-year 
terms,284 and in Illinois, the Governor appoints ~he three judges 
of the court to serve a term concurrent ·with his. 85 In Michigan, 
the circuit judges alternately sit on the bench·of the court·of 
claims.286 · 
In Michigan, the act creating the court of claims has been 
construed as not waiving the defense of governmental immunity 
which is applicable unless expressly waived by st9tute. Its jur-
isdiction.is limited to claims against the state.287 
The Illinois court of claims has jurisdiction over cases 
against the state involving general liability for torts·where the 
damages claimed do not exceed $25,000. If the court determines · 
that the claimant is entitled to an amount which exceeds $25,000, 
the award is recommendatory only and requires a subsequent appro-
priation by the legislature. A deci~ion of the court· is not ap-
pealable.288 · 
The jurisdiction of the court of claims in.New York is very 
broad. The waiver of immunity from liability for torts extends to 
282. Conn. Gen. Stat.§ 4-141 (Supp. 1963); Idaho Const. Art. 4 § 
818, Art. 5 § 10, Jewett v. Williams, 84 Idaho 93, 369 P.2d 
590 (1962); Miss. Code Ann. § 4387 et seq. (1942). 
283. See note 235, supra. 
284. N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act§ 8 et seq. (1963}. 
285. Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 37 § 439.l et seq. (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966). 
286. Mich. Stat. Ann.§§ 27A.6401-.6475 (1962). 
287. Ibid. 
288. See note 285, supra. 
-90-
the state, its departments and agencies, and the counties and mu-
nicipalities. The court of claims is a court of record with ap-
peal permitted to the appellate division and ultimately to the 
court of appeals.289 
No attempt has been made in this summary to detail the pro-
cedures followed before the various court of claims, claims com-
missions, and legislative committees. The procedures are various, 
sometimes simple and sometimes complex. In general a rigid com-
pliance with the procedures is insisted ·upon. The tendency is to 
establish a regular system of investigation and hearing and in 
almost all states which have standardized procedures for presen-
tation of claims, one feature is the imposition of time limits, 
often fairly short, within which claims must be filed or be for-
ever lost. 
289. See note 284, supra., § 24. 
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CURRENT TRENDS IN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
Trends Toward Sovereign Responsibility 
The basic doctrine that the sovereign cannot be sued or_ 
held liable without its consent continues to be the general rule, 
not the exception. We have seen, however, that consent has been 
given in many cases 1 and in a variety of forms. This consent has 
taken the form of (1) private laws enacted as a matter of legis-
lative grace, (2) general or limited public legislation creating 
liability, (3) indirect liability through such means as insurance, 
(4) liability of governmental units under the judge-made doctrine 
concerning proprietary or ministerial functions, and (5) judicial 
abrogation of the doctrine of immunity, in whole or in part, by 
various courts. All of these forms of assuming responsibility for 
governmental torts combine to support the conclusion of most legal 
writers that there is a trend toward governmental responsibility 
and away from governmental immunity. 
Private laws. Several states have assumed liability by 
passing private legislation compensating individuals having tort 
claims against the state. Several states have also consented to 
suit by passing a special act which authorizes a designated party 
or parties to bring suit on a particular claim. These procedures 
have been followed in Colorado.290 
As has been previously pointed out, there may be constitu-
tional provisions in the particular state which prohibit either. 
the state from being made a defendant in its own courts, in which 
case the administrative or legislative method for the adjudication 
290. In the 1967 Session, Forty-sixth Colorado General Assembly, 
the general assembly adopted_H.B. No. 1114, which granted 
$20,000 to a widow for damages sustained when her husband 
was killed as a result of negligent repairs of a state high-
way. The general assembly also adopted H.B. No. 1127, which 
granted to persons who sustained injury by the diversion of 
Clay Creek flood water by Clay Creek Dam in June, 1965, the 
right to initiate a civil action against the state to re-
cover damages. In the 1968 Session, the general assembly 
adopted H.B. No. 1905, which granted to persons in Jefferson 
County who sustained property damage the right to bring a 
civil action against the state to determine the state's neg-
ligence. These actions are to be conducted in accordance 
with the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure and the laws of 
the state applicable to actions for damages to property. 
The state is to have all rights to which any other defendant 
would be entitled.· 
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of claims is the only remedy,291 or provisions which prohibit spe-
cial legislation, in which case permission to sue must be given by 
general act,292 
In some cases, the legislatures consider the claims direct-
lye Nine states have delegated their authority to consider claims 
to an administrative claims tribunal or officer whose determina-
tion is final.293 Ten states, including Colorado, have adminis-
trative tribunals or leqislative committees whose determinations 
are merely recommendatory to the legislature.294 The legislature, 
if it approves the recommendation of the tribunal, can then either 
pass an appropriation bill for the amount of the claim, or pass a 
bill authorizing the particular claimant to sue in the courts. 
The extent to which the state legislatures have moved to-
ward the assumption of state liability through special acts and 
private bills has not been ascertained, as it would call for a 
complete survey of the session laws of each state and is beyond 
the scope of this study. Nevertheless, it is sufficient to say 
that the various state legislatures appear to be using this method 
of assuming liability more than ever before. 
Public legislation creating liability. Some public legis-
lation provides for the payment of claims within limited areas. 
This legislationp which provides an inroad upon sovereign immun-
ity by way of statutory exception to the immunity rule, has usu-
ally been of a piecemeal character. Nevertheless, this piecemeal 
legislation has accumulated to the extent that it provides a sub-
stantial ground for tort liability. 
The most common types of limited legislation are statutes 
creating liability for the negligent operation of motor vehicles 
and for injuries caused by defective sidewalks, streets, etc. A 
total of 19 states, including Colorado, have made themselves li-
able for injuries caused by the negligent operation of government-
owned motor vehicles.295 Twenty states are liable for injuries 
caused by the defective conditions of public highways, bridges, 
etc.296 
291~ See note 278, supra~ 
292. See note 246, supra~ 
293. See note 232, supra. 
294. See note 233, supra. 
295. See note 200, supr~. 
296. See note 201, supra~ 
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In 19 states, including Colorado, municipalities and coull-
ties both are liable for negligent operation of motor· vehicles,?97 
and in five additional states only municipalities are liable.2~8 
In 25 states both counties and municipalities are liable for in-
juries arising from defective streets and sidewalks 299 and in six 
additional states only municipalities are liable.30c:J In Colorado, 




d liabill ty for in-
juries sustained in civil defense activitie~ and for damages 
caused by wild game.302 · . 
General legislation of a comprehensive nature dealing with 
governmental tort liabilities and immunities has been enacted in 
recent years in several states.303 This legislation undertakes 
government responsibility in most cases. New York has adopted leg-
islation which purports to make it liable for substantially all of 
its torts.304 Alaska and Hawaii have ~dopted statutes patterned 
after the Federal Tort Claims Act.305. Iowa, Nevada, O~egont Ver-
mont and Washington, in addition t8 New York, have done away with 
immunity of the state by statute.3 6 California, Michigan and 
Utah have enacted legislation which continues to make the·state im-
mune, except as otherwise provided by statute, and these exceptions 













See note 226, supra. 
See note 227, supra. 
See note 224,. supra. 
See note 225, supra. 
C .. R.S. § 24-3-1 (1963). 
C.R.S. § 62-2-31 (1963). 
Calif. Govt. Code Ann.§§ 810~996.6 (1966); Mich. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 691.1401-.1415 {Supp. 1965); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 466.01-
.17 (1963); Nev. Rev. Stat.§§ 41.031-.038 (1965); Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to 63-30-34 (Suppo 1965); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 
895.43 (1966). 
N.Y. Ct_ Cl. Act§ 8 (1963). 
Alaska Stato § 09.50.250 et seq. (Supp. 1965); Rev. Laws of 
Hawaii, § 254A-l et seq. (Supp. 1965.). 
Iowa Code§ 25A.l et seq. (1966); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.031 
(1965); Oregon Laws 1967, ch. 627; vt~ Stat. Ann. T. 12 § 
5601 et seq. (1961, as amended 1963); Rev. Code Wash. § 4. 
92.010 et seq. (1963). 
See note 194, supra. 
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Although these states appear to be few in number, it is 
significant that the statutory assumption of liability by these 
states has occurred in recent years. Several states are now in 
the process of modifying their sovereign immunity,308 and sev-
eral more are in the process of study.309 It thus appears that 
the trend toward assumption of responsibility by legislation will 
continue, whether it be in a limited form or in a general compre-
hensive form.310 
Indirect methods of creatin9 liability. The most important 
indirect method by which tort liability of governmental units is 
created is the use of public liability insurance. 
Legislators who are wary of making state or 
local units liable for torts are increasingly 
willing to provide for payment of premiums for 
308. H.B. No. 119~ 28th Legislature, 1st Regular Session 1967, 
State of Arizona. This is one of several comprehensive 
bills dealing with governmental immunity and liability which 
has been introduced in the Arizona Legislature. To date, 
none of these btlls have been adopted. See Hink and Schutter, 
The Need for a egislative Solution to Government Tort Lia-
bility in Arizona, Public Affairs Bulletin, Ariz. State Univ., 
Vol. 5, No. 4. 
309. E.g., Public Laws of Maine 1965, ch. 202, and ch. 425 § 8-A. 
This is a legislative resolution requiring the Attorney Gen-
eral of Maine to conduct a two-year study of sovereign im-
munity and to report his findings to the legislature. It is 
understood by this writer that a study is being conducted in 
Texas. 
310, For the background study and policy evaluations which under-
lie the California Legislation, see Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, 
Recommendations Relating to Sovereign Immunity: Number 1 --
Tort Liability of Public Entities and Public Employees, in 4 
Reports, Recommendations and Studies 801 (Cal. Law Revision 
Comm'n ed. 1963). For background information on the Utah 
legislation, see Utah Legislative Council, Report of the Gov-
ernmental Immunity Committee, (1964). See also Kentucky Leg-
islative Research Commission, Governmental Immunity, Research 
Report No. 30 (1965); Governmental Immunity Interim Commis-
sion of Minn~sota, Report of the Governmental Immunity In-
terim Commission, (1965); State Legislative Research Commis-
sion of South Dakota, Staff Memorandum: The Feasibility of 
Abolishing or Modifying the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity 
in South Dakota, (1967). 
-95-
liability insurance, either insurance protect-
ing the units and waiving immunity to the extent 
of the insurance coverage, or insurance protect-
ing the officers or employees ••• The typical 
statute and policr provide that the insurer may 
not set up sovere gn immunity as a defense, for 
in the absence of such provision some courts have 
held that the insurer is no;
1
\iable unless the 
governmental unit would be& 
Some cases have held that the carrying of liability insur-
ance is a limited consent, or waiver of the immunity, at least to 
the extent of the insurance coverage.312 Other cases have held 
that the immunity is not waived by the insurance.313 
Eleven states authorizing the purchase of general liability 
insurance, and six states authorizing the purchase of only automo-
bile liability insurance, have express provisions either waiving 
their immunity to the extent of the insurance coverage obtained or 
denying the defense of immunity to the insurer.314 Six other 
states, including Colorado, are also permitted to purchase either 
general or automobile liability insurance, but the statutes do not 
indicate that the purchase constitutes a waiver of the defense of 
sovereign immunity.315 In 25 states, including Colorado, the po-
litical subdivisions of the state are authorized to purchase some 
form of liability insurance,316 and in 14 of these states the stat-
311. 3 Davis, Administrative Law§ 25-04 (1958). 
312. 
313. 
Marshall v. Cit of Green Ba, 18 Wis.2d 496, 118 N.W.2d 715 
TI%2; Vendre 1 v. School Dist,, 226 Ore. 263, 360 P.2d 282 
(1961; Flowers v. Board of Commissioners, 240 Ind. 668, 168 
N.E.2d 224 (1960); Ginter v. Montgomery eounty, 327 S.W.2d 
98 (Ky. 1959); Ballew v. City of Chattanoo1a, 205 Tenn. 289, 326 S.W.2d 466 (1959); Moreno v. Aldrich, 3 So.2d 406 {Fla. 
App. 1959); Lynwood v. Decatur Park District, 26 Ill. App. 
2d 431, 168 N.E.2d l85 (1960). 
314. See notes 202 and 203, supra. 
315. See note 204, supra. 
316. See note 228, supra. 
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utes indicate that such purcha~e constitutes a waiver of immunity 
to the extent of the coverage.317 It appears that more states are 
following this trend or at least considering this approach.318 
Common law exceptions to immunity. As has been indicated 
before, one of the central ideas in the law of governmental tort 
liability is that a government entity is liable for its torts in 
the exercise of proprietary but not governmental functions.319 
This distinction between governmental and proprietary functions 
has been severely criticized, for it has caused confusion not only 
among the various jurisdictions but almost always within each jur-
isdiction.320 The United States Supreme Court, in speaking on the 
distinction, has stated that."A comparative study of the cases in 
the forty-eight states will disclose an irreconcilable conflict. 
More than that, the decisions in each of the States are disharmo-
nious and disclose the inevitable chaos when courts try to apply 
a rule of law that is inherently unsound. 11 321 
It has been declared that governmental immunity from tort 
liability is shrinking as time goes on, and that the tendency of 
the courts is to restrict the immunity doctrine, to construe it 
strictly against the governmental entity, and to move away from 
the somewhat artifirial distinction between governmental and pro-
prietary functions.322 The courts are more inclined to find a 
particular activity as being proprietary in nature, rather than 
governmental, thus making the entity liable. This trend has fur-
ther eroded the sovereign immunity doctrine and will probably 







Judicial abrogation of the doctrine~ 
Sovereign immunity in state courts is on the 
run. State courts are taking the offensive against 
it. The development during the period 1957-1965 
is deep and dramatic. The movement seems to be 
See note 229, supra9 
Note, Municipal Tort Liability; Purchase of Liability In-
surance As a Waiver of Immunity, 18 Wyo. L.J. 229 (Spring 
1964) . 
See notes 21-35, supra. 
See note 2 and 14, supra. 
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 
122, Ibo L.Ed. 48 (1955). 
3 Davis, Administrative Law§ 25107 (1958). 
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gaining momentum. The states in which judicial 
action has been taken to abolish large chunks of 
immunity, although some have wavered, are, 
chronologically, Florida, Colorado, Illinois, New 
Jersey, California, Michigan, Wisconsin, Alaska, 
Minnesota, Arizona, Nevada, and Washington~ The 
District of Columbia has also abolished the im-
munityo The action of these thirteen jurisdic-
tions should make it easier for other states to 
do the job. One may confident!~ expect that 
others will follow~ The state courts that have 
recently considered overruling sovereign immun-
ity but have left the task to the legislature 
include Utah, Maine, Oklahoma, Ohio, Iowa, and 
New Mexico. The Oregon court brands immunity as 
'not defensible' but is forced to bow to an ex-
plicit constitutional provision. 
The story of what each court has done is 
especially interesting. The barriers relate to 
stare decisis, not to a belief that the immun-
ity doctrine deserves to be continued. The 
scope of the abolition varies from court to 
court, and so do the remarks about location of 
new limits on liability.323 
These decisions will be examined in order to demonstrate the 
trend toward sovereign responsibility and to understand any prob-
lems involved in judicial abrogation of the doctrine, as opposed to 
legislative abolition or modification. 
Judicial Abrogation of Immunity 
Widespread dissatisfaction with the doctrine of immunity 
and judicial impatience with legislative inaction have led many 
courts to repudiate the doctrine in whole or in part.324 
323. 
324. 
3 Id. § 25 .oi. 
Scheele v. City of Anchorage, 385 P.2d 582 (Alaska 1963); 
Stone v. Arizona Hi hwa Commission, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 
107 1963 ; Muske v. Cornin Hos. Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, 
359 P.2d 457, 11 Ca • Rptr. 89 1961 ; Hargrove v. Town of 
Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957 ; Molitor v. Kaneland 
Community Unit Dist., 19 111.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), 
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960); Haney v. City of Lexing-
ton, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964); Hamilton v. City of Shreve-
port, 247 La. 784, 174 So.2d 529 (1965) (construing article 
3, § 35 of the Louisiana Constitution); Williams v. City of 
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State court decisions which abolished immunity. Chronolog-
ically, the direct attack upon governmental immunity itself began 
in 1957 with the Supreme Court of Florida in the case of Hargrove 
v. Town of Cocoa Beach,325 The court declared that since the ju-
diciary had originated the doctrine, legislative action was not 
necessary to abollsh it, and held that no municipality should have 
immunity from tort liability, even in its governmental capacity. 
However, the opinion admonished against construing the decision as 
imposing liability on municipalities in exercising their judicial, 
quasi-judicial, legislative, or quasi-legislative functions. The 
court soon made a judicial retreat by holding that it had not 
overruled tort immunity as to the state, its counties, or other 
political entities_326 In both of these later cases the court said 
that it was the job of the legislature to abrogate immunity as to 
the state and its agencies. 
Also in 1957 Colorado permitted an action against the State 
Racing Commission in Colorado Racin Commission v. Brush Racin 
Association, 327 in wh1.c was coine the much-quoted phrase, "In 
tolorado 'sovereign immunity' may be a proper subject for discus-
sion by students of mythology but finds no haven or refuge in this 
court." Later the court declared: "The doctrine of soverei~n im-
munity in Colorado is in limbo, only the memory lingers on." 28 
These decisions were believed by many to be a judicial abrogation 
of the doctrine, but three years later the court backtracked by 
invc.,king immunity with respect to gove~nmental functions of a coun-






Detroit, 364 Micho 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 {1961); Spanel v. Mounds 
View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 {1962); Rice 
v. Clark County, 79 Neve 253, 382 P.2d 605 (1963); McAndr~ 
v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960); Schuster v. 
City of New York, 5 N.Yo2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 
265 {1958); !S,_elso v. City of Tacoma, 63 Wash.2d 913, 390 P. 
2d 2 (1964); Holytz v. Cit! of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 
N.W.2d 618 (1962 . 
96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957) o 
Buck v. Mclean 1 115 So.2d 764 (Fla. 1959); Moreno v. Aldrich, 113 So.2d 406 ~Fla. 1959). 
136 Coloo 279P 316 P.2d 582 {1957). 
Stone v. Currigan, 138 Colo. 442, 334 P.2d 740 (1958). 
Liber v. Flori; 143 Colo. 205, 353 Po2d 590 (1960); City and 
County of Denver v. Madiron, 142 Colo. 1, 351 P.2d 826 (1960); 
and Tesone v. School Dist. No. RE-2, 384 P.2d 82 (Colo. 1963). 
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The next case to attempt judicial abrogation of immunity was 
an Illinols case in 1959.330 Th~ court prospectively abolished the 
doctrine as applied to school districts and stated that: "We 
closed our courtroom doors without legislative help, and we can 
likewise open them. 0 331 As to whether this decision will be ap-
plied to other governmental units in Illinois, the question has not 
expressly been decided, although there are several cases in which 
the court has implied that it would abolish municipal immunity.332 
Shortly after the Molitor decision, the Illinois legislature 
enacted five statutes reestablishing sovereign immunity for various 
governmental entities~ Apparently, counties are still immune al-
though a statute declaring counties to be immune was recently de-
clared unconstitutional as violating the prohibition against spe-
cial legislation.333 
New .Jersey in 1960 took a step forward in discarding the 
last vestiges of municipal tort immunity by broadening the rule of 
respondeat superior with respect to agents of municipal corpora-
tions. The court brushed aside the question of stare decisis and 
the objection that this was exclusively a legislative prerogative 
by saying that: "Judicial and not legislative action closed the 
courtroom doors, and the same hand can, and in proper circumstances 
should, reopen them. 11334 Another bite into sovereign immunity WJ.J 
taken in New Jersey in McCabe v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority,33~ 
holding the Turnpike Authority liable when snow and ice fell from 
the superstructure of a bridge on plaintiff's car. Also, liabil-
ity was imposed for wrongdoing by a township "in planning, con-
structing and maintaining the sewer line" in Fagliarone v. Township 







Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill. 
2d 11, 163 N.E.2d ag (1§59). 
!,Qig. 
Peters v. Bellinger, 22 Ill. App. 2d 105, 159 N.E.2d 528 
(1959). 
Hutchings v. Kraject, 34 Ill.2d 379, 215 N.E.2d 274 (1966). 
~or a criticism of the entire Molitor decision, see Huff, Tom 
Molitor and the Devine Right of Kings, 37 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 
44 (1960). 
McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820, 88 A.L.R. 
2d 313 (1960). 
35 N.J. 26, 170 A.2d 810 (1961). 
336 •. 78 N.J. Super. 154, 188 A.2d 43 (1963). 
-100-
cause the activity was "governmental" in Kent v. Hamilton Town-
ship.337 
California was the next state to follow the trend of 1udi-
cial abrogation. In Muskopf vft Corning Hospital District,338 
immunity was abolished as to hospital districtso The court traced 
the doctrine of immunity and concluded that it is "an anachronism 
without rational basis and has existed only by force of inertia." 
In reply to the objection that it was the legislature's duty to 
abolish it, the court held that it was a court-made rule initially 
and its "requiem has long been foreshadowed." The California As-
sembly promptly declared a moratorium on this and other claims 
similarly situated so that the problems could be analyzed and 
reasonable provisions made for suits against the government. In 
1963 the Assemblyp after an exhaustive study by the California Law 
Revision Commission, enacted a series of laws which set forth the 
c·ondi ti9ns under which public entities and employees are to be li-
able for their tortso 
Michigan followed shortly after California by holding that 
immunity as to all governmental bodies within the state was abol-
ished in the case of Williams v. City of Detroit,339 In prospec-
tively overruling the doctrine the court declared: "From this 
date forward the judicial doctrine of governmental immunity from 
ordinary torts no longer exists i., Michigan. In this case, we 
overrule preceding court-made law to the contrary. We eliminate 
from the case law of Michigan an ancient rule inherited from the 
days of absolute monarchy which has been productive of great in-
justice in our courts. By so doing, we join a major trend in 
this country toward the righting of an age-old wrong. 11 340 Subse-
quent opinions have made it clear that the Williams decision was 
limited to the abrogation of municipal immunity only, the tort 
liability of the statP ~nd other subdivisions being controlled by 
statutory provisions.341 On the basis of the Sayers decision, the 
court in 1965 held that the school districts were immune from lia-
bility and declared that, despite the holding in Williams, the 






82 N.J" Super. 113, I96 A.2d 798 (1964) o 
55 Cal.2d 211, 359 Pe2d 457 (1961). 
364 Micha 231, 111 N.We2d 1 (1961). 
Ibid. 
McDowell v. State Highway Commissioner, 365 Miehe 268, 112 
N.W.2d 491 (f962) and Sayers v. Schoo! District No. 1, 366 
Miehe 217, 114 N.W~2d 191 (1962). 
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the performance of a governmental function is still with us. 11 342 
By legislative enactment vn1ich became effective on July 1, 1965, 
the Michigan legislature granted immunity to the state, its agen-
cies and subdivisions and enumerated exceptions-thereto. . 
The courts of Wisconsin were next to abolish the doctrine 
of immunity in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee .. 343 After tracing the 
history of the doctrine of governmental immunity ~nd reviewing 
the authorities, the court held that"· •• the doctrine of gov-
ernmental immunity having been engrafted upon the law of this 
state by judicial dacision, we deem that it may be changed or ab-
rogated by judicial provision.u The decision was applied to the 
state, its agencies and local political subdivisions. As to the 
scope of the change, the court said that the decision "does not 
broaden the government's obligation so as to make it responsible 
for all harms to others; it is o:,ly as to •those harms which are 
torts that governmental bodies are to be liable by reason of this 
decisiori. This decision is not to be interpreted as imposin~ lia-
bility on a governmental body in the exerclse of its legislative 
or judicial or quasi-legislative· or qu_asi-judicial functions. 11 
Supplementing the Holvtz case in overruling sovereign im-
munity, the Wisconsin court also holds that purchase of liability 
·insurance constitutes a waiver of immunity.344 As a result of 
these decisions, the legislature has enacted statutory provisions 
which provide a procedure for the bringing of tort actions and 
limit the amount that can be recovered. 
The Alaska Supreme Court is the only state court that has 
been able to impose sovereign tort liability on historical grounds. 
as distinguished from policy grounds and ari overruling of prece-
dents. Congress in 1884 enacted that the _general laws of Oregon 
should govern the district of Alaska, and at that time a statute 
of 1862 imposed liability upon cities and other local units in 
Oregon. The Alaska court accordinglr held: CIA municipal corpor-
ation in Alaska does not enjoy immun ty from tort liability, · 
whether the act or omission giving rise to the liability is con-
nected with either a governmental or proprietary function." 345 . 





v. Genesee County, 375 Mich. 1, 133 N.W.2d 190 9 5. 
343. 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 ,(1962). 
344. Marshall v. Cit! of Green Bay, 18 Wis.2d 496, 118. N.W.2d 715 
(1962) and Wohl eben v. City of Park Falls, 23 Wis.2d 362, 
127 N.W.2d 35 (1964). 
345. City of Fairbanks v~ Schaible, 375 P.2d 201 (Alaska 1962). 
-102-
The Minnesota court.was next in holding that the defense of 
sovereign immunity was abolished with respect to school districts. 
municipal corp~rations and other subdivisions of government.346 
The court prospectively overruled the doctrine but added that"··· 
we do not suggest that discretionary as distinguished from minis-
terial activities, or judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or 
quasi-legislative functions may not continue to have the benefit of 
the rule. Nor is it our purpose to abolish. sovereign immunity as 
to the state itself." 
In anticipation of legislative action subsequent to its de-
cision, the Minnesota court suggested a number of procedural and 
substantive proposals for the orderly processing of claims. Among 
them are: 11 (1) A requirement for giving prompt notice of the 
claim after the occurrence of the tort, l2) a reduction in the 
usual period of limitations, (3) a monetary limit on the amoun\ of 
liability, (4) the establishment of a special claims court or com-
mission, or provision for trial by the court without a jury, and 
{5) the continuation of the defense of immunity as to some or all 
uni ts of government for a limi t.ed or indefinite period." 347 Act-
ing upon the views expressed by the court, the 1963 Minnesota leg-
islature enacted statutes which, subject to certain limitations, 
swept away the doctrine as applied to all political subdivisions 
and s&t forth the procedure for presenting claims against the 
lesser units of government. 
In 1963 Arizona abolished the doctrine in Stone v. Arizona 
Highway Commissiori. 348 The court declared: "We are of the opin-
ion that when the reason for a certain rule no longer exists, the 
rule itself should be abandoned. After a thorough re-examination 
of the rule of governmental immunity from tort liability, we now 
hold that it must be discarded as a rule of law i~ Arizona and all 
prior decisions to the contrary are hereby overruled." The court 
concluded that " ••. the substantive defense of governmental immun-
ity is now abolished not only for the instant case, but for all 
other pending cases, those not yet filed whi~h are not barrerl
3 
by 
the statute of limitations and all future causes of .action." 49 
In 1964 Kentucky abolished the doctrine with respect to mu-
nicipal corporations in Haney v. City of Lexington.350 The court 
346. Spane! v. Mounds View School District No. 621, 118 N.W.2d 795 
t Minn . 1962} • 
347. Ibid. 
348. 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963). 
349. ,!bid. 
350. 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ken. 1964); see al)so City of Louisville v. 
Chapma~, 413 S.W.2d 74 (Ken. 1967 • 
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did not consider the liability of any governmental unit other than 
that of a municipal corporation ~nd its agents. The court declared 
that its holding was " ••• applicable not only to this case, but to 
all cases which may have arisen within the proper time of limita-
tion."351 · 
Nevada in 1963 declared that county immunity was abolished 
in Rice v. Clark Counti.352 In 1965 the legislature enacted iaws 
which waived the immunity of the state ~nd all political subdivi-
sions from liability. Subsequently the co~S~ extended the holding 
in Rice to the state and all subdivisions. 
In Washington a statute consenting to suits against the 
state has been held to abolish immunity of municipalities. "Munic-
ipal corporations enjoy their immunity for torts only in so far as 
they partake of the state's immunity. They have not sovereighty 
of their own .. '' 354 
State court decisions which refused to abolish immunitv. 
Although most legal scholars have concluded that the trend is to-, 
ward judicial abrogation of the doctrine, there are several recent 
state court decisions in the various states .in which the courts 
have refused to abrogate the doctrine,·concluding that this is 
solely a legislative function. · 
The majority of the Supreme·Court in Utah ~as consistently . 
followed long-standing precedents of ·sovereign immunity and refused 
to abolish the doctrine when it examined the question in State·of 
Utah v. Parker,355 and again in Campbell~. Pack,356 Later in 
1964 the Supreme Court of Utah. ·continued t~ refuse to abolish the · 
doctrine. declaring that "If this doctrine, so long firmly em~ 
bedded in the structure of our law,· is to be changed,-such change 
should come from the rep9sitory of the sovereign power itself,.the 
people, speaking through their chosen representatives in the leg-
islature.11357 Subsequently the legislature did enact laws waiving 





79 Nev. 253, 382 P.2d 605 (1963). 
Walsh v. Clark County School riistrict~ 419 P.2d 775 (Nev. 
1966). 
354. Kelso.v. City of Tacoma, 63 Wash.2d 913, ·390 P.2d.2 (1964). 
355. 13 Utah 2d 65, 368 P.2d 585 (1962). 
356. 15 Utah 2d 161, 389 P.2d 465 (1964). 
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In 1961, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine refused to 
abolish the doctrine, declaring that whether .. ,governmental immunity 
from liability for tort should be discarded or··destroyed is a pol-
icy question for the Legislature and not for the courts.358 
Two years later, New Mexico also refused to abolish the doc-
trine in Clark v. Ruidoso-Hondo Valley Hospita1.359 In discussing 
the cases in which the courts have abolished the doctrine, the New 
Mexico court said that "The basis of these decisions is that the 
doctrine of immunity is a court-made rule and should, therefore, 
be abrogated by the courts, because the reason upon which the en-
tire theory was based is erroneous. These same courts declined to 
follow their previous holdings, and disposed of stare decisis by 
saying that the rule of law should not be followed which no longer 
has a valid basis; that therefore, the entire question should be 
reexamined. However, Michigan, Florida, Colorado and Washington 
seem to.have had some second thoughts on the subject, to the ex-
tent that they apparently have modified their rulings in subsequent 
cases; in California the legislature suspended the effect of the 
decision, and in Illinois the legislature promptly reinstated tort 
immunity as to certain governmental subdivisions. There are, how-
ever, many other jurisdi.ctions which have, in recent years, de-
clined to overrule their prior decisions, and continue to follow 
the rule of sovereign immunity, ... " The court concluded: "If the 
people of this state desire any change in this policy, it can be 
and should be done through the legislature and not by judicial fiat. 
The not-too-satisfactory experience in most of those jurisdictions 
which have attempted to overrule the immunity doctrine by court de-
cision should make it obvious that legislative action on the sub-
ject is the preferred solution. 11 360 
In 1963 the Supreme Court of Missouri was asked to follow 
the cases from other states which abolished the doctrine. The 
court refused to do so, declaring that: "While the complexity of 
modern government may require a relaxation of present rules of ab-
solute nonliability, undoubtedly this is a matter for the legisla-
ture to provide in the interest of more complete justice to the 
individual but under strict regulations and with very definite 
limitations to protect the public interest. 11 361 The court con-
cluded by saying that " .• &whatever is done to change the doctrine 
••• should be done by the legislature and not by the courts." 
358. Nelson v. Maine Turnpike Authority, 157 Me. 174, 170 A.2d 
687 (1961). 
359. 22 N.M. 9, 380 P.2d 168 (1963). 
360. Ibid. 
361. Fette v. City of St. Louis, 366 S.W.2d 446 (Missuori 1963). 
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The Supreme Court of Oklahoma also refused to abolish the 
doctrine in Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Comgany v, 
Board of Couiity Commissioners of the County of ~tephens.~ 2 In 
Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Association, 63 the Supreme 
Court of Iowa, after carefully considering the decisions in other 
states which abolished the doctrine, concluded that legislative 
Action was a better solution and refused to abolish the doctrine. 
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reached the same con-
clusion and stated that~ •.• this Court should not undertake, by 
judicial pronouncement, to abrogate a legal principle which has 
through~ long period of years been so basic in the laws,of this 
state." 364 
In Fetzer v. Minot Park District,365 the Supreme Court of 
North Dakota declared that: "The courts cannot legislate, regard-
less of how much we might desire to do so. Our power is limited 
to passtng on law enacted by the Legislature, and, if the Legisla-
ture fails to act, we cannot change the law by judicial decision." 
On this basis the court refused to abolish the doctrine.# In Mary-
land, when asked to overrule its prior decisions and abolish sov-
ereign immunity, the Court of Appeals of Maryland refused to do so, 
saying that: "If there is to be a change, we think the Legislature 
should make it. 11 366 
In the New Hampshire case of Gossler v, City of Manches-
ter,367 the court ruled that any expansion of the scope of munici-
pal liability is a matter for legislative rather than judicial 
determination. In refusing to abolish the doctrine, the Supreme 
Court of South Dakota declared that: ''Judicial abrogation in it-
self would make for uncertainties and would not •.. diminish in-
equalities .. " 368 
362. 389 P.2d 476 (Okla. 1964). 
363. 256 Iowa 337, 127 N.E.2d 606 (1964). 
364. Court of Wood Count, 148 W.Va. 303, 
365. 138 N.W.2d 
366. Board of Education 
9 5 . 
367. 221 A.2d 242 (N.Hn 1966). 
368. Conway v. Humbert, 145 N.Wo2d 524 (S.D. 1966). 
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Summaryo Thirteen jurisdictions have taken judicial action 
to abolish, in whole or in part, the doctrine of sovereign immun-
ity. The signs are that the movement is still in its early stages, 
that the momentum for overruling is strong, and that other states 
will probably follow this movement. Yet despite this trend or 
movement, many jurisdictions, in c9nsidering whether or not some 
portion of sovereign immunity should be overruled, have decided 
to leave the question to the legislaturese These decisions were 
usually by divided courts and this deference by the judiciary to 
the legislature should not be taken for granted because similar 
intimations by several courts, when ignored repeatedly by the 
state legislatures, have finally led to the judicial conviction 
that the initiative had to be undertaken by court decision.369 
A most significant fact that is shown by a review of the 
above cases is that in the many opinions, including concurring 
and dissenting opinions, hardly a word has been written in favor 
of the doctrine itself. It appears that a majority of those who 
have considered the questions, both those who favor and those who 
oppose judicial abrogation of the doctrine, assume that the doc-
trine should be abolished. The main debate is over the question 
whether judges or legislators should do the job .. The point has 
been summarized by saying that the demise of the inconsistencies 
and injustices of governmental immunity" ... is now clearly 
foreordained. The real issue is who will preside at the wake --
courts or legislatures. 11 370 
369. The latest state court decision abrogating the doctrine was 
the Supreme Court of Arkansas in the case of Parrish v. City 
of Little Rock, 244 Ark. 1239 (1968). "However, the Court 
felt that even though it might agree that the present rule 
of municipal immunity from tort actions should be replaced 
with a stricter, more complete rule of responsibility, it 
was a matter of public policy and therefore, for considera-
tion for the Legislature, not ·the Court. Kirksey v. City of 
Fort Smith, 227 Ark. 630• 300 SeW .. 2d 257 (1957). The legis-
lature's broad investigative powers to determine facts and 
its greater flexibility in dealing with complex problems in-
dicate a preference for a solution by statutory action. 
Despite the Court's invitation for legislative action ten 
years ago there has quite understandably been no comprehen-
sive legislative solution, or action on this troublesome 
question.•§ •. Considerations of public policy are not and 
never have been for determination by the Legislature alone. 
Especially is this so when the individual's rights are put 
in question by governmental activity as here. We are now of 
the opinion that re-examination of the principle of govern-
mental immunity from tort action is the duty of this Court 
and should be undettaken at this time." Id. at 1242. 
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LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO CHANGING THE OOCTRINE 
Apparently no state legislature has acted to change the 
g~neral rule of sovereign immunity except after a state court has 
done so. All states have responded to judicial abrogation of the 
doctrine, with the exception of Arizona, in one statutory form or 
another. For those state legislatures, such as the Colqrado Gen-
eral Assembly, which are considering a change in the doctrine, 
without being faced with a court ruling abolishing the common law 
rule of immunity, seven alternative approaches are available. 
These seven approaches are listed below. 
370. 
1. Take no legisl~tive action; 
2. Enact the immunity rule as applied to 
all governmental entities, whether en-
gaged in governmental or proprietary 
functions; 
3. Enact legislation which waives all im-
munity of governmental entities and · 
d~clares that liability ~hall be de-
termined as if the entity were a pri-
vate person; 
4 •. - Provide for the purchase of liability 
insurance by all governmental entities 
and waive the immunity up to the ex~· 
tent of the coverage so obtained; 
5. Enact legislation which reaffirms the 
immunity rule in general and sets out 
exceptions where the entities are to 
be liable; 
6. -Enact legislation which waives the 
immunity of certain entities, retain-
ing immunity for the remainder; or 
7. Adopt the approach wherein the specific 
liabilities and immunities of all. gov-
ernmental entities are set out in the 
legislation. 
Van Alstyne, The Decline of Governmental Immunity, State Gov-
ernment, 36 (Winter 1966). In addition to the cases cited 
above which refused to abrogate the doctrine, leaving such 
action to the Legislatures, see Maffei v. Incorp. Town of 
Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808 (1959}; Parker v. City of 
Hutchinson, 196 Kan. 148, 410 P.2d 347 (1966). 
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These seven approaches are evaluated here for the purpose 
of demonstrating the advantages and disadvantages of each approach 
and the experience in the various states under each of the differ-
ent approaches. 
1. Take no le9islative action and wait for abolishment of immun-
ity by decision of the Supreme Court. 
· Immunity in general has been abolished by judicial decision 
in California, Arizona, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin, and to a 
limited extent in Florida, New Jersey, Minnesota, Kentucky, Ne-
vada, and Washington.371 In disregarding the sovereign immunity 
rule, which they regard as unjust and outmoded, these courts ap-
pear to be motivated by a desire to provide just recompense for 
those injured by government. They have usually justified judicial 
abrogation of the rule on the ground that it was originally judi-
cially created and since "We closed our courtroom doors without 
legislative help, .... we can likewise open them. 11 372 
These courts have declined to follow their previous hold-
ings that, because the immunity rule has existed for such a long 
period of time, only the legislature can now change it. They have 
disposed of stare decisis by saying that the rule of law should 
not be followed when it no longer has a valid basis. Some feel 
that this is the best method of change, believing that since the 
doctrine was originally court-made it should now be abolished .by 
the courts .373 
371. See note 324, supra. 
372. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill.2d 
11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959). 
373. A reading of the opinions in the various cases abolishing 
immunity suggests the conclusion that the courts, aware of 
their responsibility for having originally created the rule, 
are attempting to rectify their error, but at the same time 
are attempting to force legislatures into action fixing gov-
ernmental responsibilityo Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 
Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1, 11 (1961). Government liability, 
they assert, is the modern trend. The majority of state 
courts, however, holding that the immunity question is a pol-
icy matter to be resolved by the legislature, do not accept 
this view. See Annot. 60 A.L.R.2d 1198, 1199-2200 (1958). 
A game of quasi-legal basketball could exist, wherein the 
courts, hoping for legislative action defining governmental 
responsibility, are reluctant to act, while members of the 
legislature, feeling that since the rule was judicially 
created the judici~ry should assume the responsibility in 
modifying it, with responsibility being tossed back and forth 
between judges and legislators, with no visible effort on the 
part of either to secure a decisive result. 
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Critics of the decisions abrogating immunity contend that 
such decisions violate the separation of powers principle.by 
usu~ing the legislature's prerogative to determine public poli-
cy.374 Further, judicial abrogation appears to be a slow and tor-
tuous process, and not nearly as satisfactory a method of solving 
the immunity problem as legislative enactment of a carefully drawn 
ggvernmental responsi.bility statute.375 Indeed, in almost every 
instance where immunity has been judicially abolished, the situ-
ation has been satisfactorily resolved only through subsequent 
legislative action defining governmental responsibility, -such ac-
tion being necessary to safeguard the interests of both govern-
ment and the injured individuale376 In addition, some courts have 
374. See the dissenting opinions in Haney v. City of Lexington, 
386 S.W.2d 738, 743 {Kye 1964) 1 and Parrish v. City of Lit-tle Rock, 244 Arkn 1258, 1268 \1968). 
375. It is even conceded by courts abolishing immunity that the 
legislature is the logical agency to accomplish abolition, 
since it alone is in a position to $Upply the necessary 
corrective legislationo The legislature is also in a posi-
tion to declare a logical and consistent philosophy re~ 
specting the liability of all governmental units. Judicial 
~~gencies, because of the n~ture of their role, cannot sat-
isfactorily do this. For instance, some courts make their 
rulings applicable only to the governmental unit involved 
in the instant case, whereas other courts render broad rul-
ings affecting all units. Occasionally, rulings are so 
vague and confused that subsequent rulings are necessary to 
clarify the judicial position. Sometimes, .in view of the 
state-local legal relationship, decisions are illogical and 
inconsistent. For instance, courts of Michigan, Kentucky, 
and Florida hold municipalities liable, but not the state 
and counties; and the Minnesota Supreme Court holds all lo-
cal units liable, but not their parent, th~ state. In con-
trast, in the states of New York and Washington, where the 
legislature has waived the state's sovereign immunity, the 
state and local units alike are held accountable. 
376. Since judicial abrogation, some state legislatures, such as 
that of Illinois, have ·restored considerable immunity for 
local governmental entities. Legislative restoration of im-
munity may suggest that the legislature f~vors it as public 
policy. On the other hand, through abrogation of the rule 
of local immunity, the courts are at least placing the duty 
of determining governmental responsibility on the legisla-
ture. 
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modified or receded from their original rulings abrogating immun-
ity.377 
In Illinois, the legislature promptly reinstated tort im-
munity as to certain governmental units after the decision in 
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302.378 In Michigan, 
after a decision abolishing immunity,379 the legislature in 1965 
enacted legislation which granted immunity to the state, its 
agencies and subdivisions and enumerated exceptions thereto.380 
3 1 In the wake of a decision in Wisconsin which abolished immunity, 8 
the legislature quickly enasted leqislation which provided a pro-
377. This is particularly true in the Michigan case of Williams 
v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961). Al-
though one justice did note that the decision applied to mu-
nicipalities only, it was certainly not apparent from the 
major opinion~ Subsequent decisions, however, made it clear 
that Williams abrogated municipal immunity only. See Sa ers 
v. School Dist. No. 1, 366 Mich. 217, 114 N.W.2d 191 (1962 ; 
McDowell v. State Highway Comm'n, 365 Mich. 268, 112 N.W.2d 
491 (1961). See notes 339 to 342, supra, and related dis-
·cussion in text~ See also Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush 
Racing Association, 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582 (1957) (court 
adopted)~ and Liber v. Flor, 143 Colo. 205, 353 P.2d 590 
(1960) (court retreated); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 
96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957) (court adopted), and Kaulakis v. 
Boyd, 138 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1962) (court retreated). 
378. See note 372, supraa Immediately following judicial abroga-
tion, the Illinois General Assembly enacted a series of acts 
granting immunity to a number of local governmental units. 
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, voided one of the acts 
granting immunity to such districts, because it violated 
Article IV§ 22, of the Illinois Constitution which forbids 
special legislation granting immunity to any corporation. 
See Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 Ill.2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573· 
(1965). Following this decision, the legislature repealed 
the previous acts and enacted the Local Governmental and 
Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, approved August 13, 
1965 (House Bill Noo 1863). This Act, which grants limited 
immunity to all local governmental units eliminates the ob-
jection raised by the Harvey case. See also notes 330-334, 
supra, and related discussion in text. 
379. Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 
(1961). 
380. Micho Public Acts 170 (1964), Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 3.996 (107) 
(Supp. 1965). 
381. Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 
(1962). 
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cedure for claims and limited the amount of recovery.382 Minne-
sota restored school district and drainage district immunity for 
a five-year period ending January, 1968.383 
As a result of court action in California,384 the state was 
deluged with suitso In the face of such an increase in claims, 
the California legislature in 1961 passed legislation requiring a 
two-year moratorium on claimso385 After a two-year moratorium 
study period, the California legislature in 1963 enacted legisla-
tion by which sovereign immunity was re-established and exceptions 
made theretoA386 
In Arizona, a similar increase in claims was experienced. 
A survey, complete through August lA 1965, reveals that, since the 
court decision abolishing immunity,~87 49 lawsuits were filed 
against the state and its entities asking for more than $9,177,000. 
There was much displeasure with the decision but legislative ac-
tion has not followed to correct the situation.388 
These legislative reactions to judicial decisi~ns which 
abolished the immunity rule serve to focus attention upon the need 
for legislative development of appropriate procedures for process-
ing liability claims and suits efficiently and for funding the lia-
bilities without undue strain upon governmental fiscal resources. 








Wis. Stat. Annp § 895.43 (1965). 
Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 466.12 and 466.13 (1963). 
Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 55 Cal.2d 211, 359 P. 
2d 457 (1961). 
Calif. Session Laws, ch. 1404 (1961). 
Calif. Session Laws, ch. 1681 et seq. {1963). 
Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 
107 (1963). 
Heinz R. Hink & David C. Schutter, "The Need for a Legisla-
tive Solution to Government Tort Liability in Arizona", Vol. 
5, No. 4, Public Affairs Bulletin p. 2, Bureau of Govern-
ment Research, Ariz. State Univ. {1966). The Kentucky Leg-
islature also has not taken action to define government 
responsibility, although the decision in Haney v. City of 
Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964) did cause the legisla-
ture to authorize a study of the immunity rule. ·See Ky. 
Legislative Research Commission, Governmental Immunity, Re-
search Report No. 30 (1965). 
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mandates to abrogate have been delayed for a period to allow en-
actment of legislation providing the necessary arrangements for 
governmental responsibility. The Minnesota Supreme Court sug-
gested guidelines for legislative action and delayed operation of 
its mandate until the end of the next legislative session.389 
All this experience with judicial abrogation of immunity may well 
confirm the validity of one writer's observation that "adequate 
reformation can be achieved only by legislation. 11 390 However, 
although general agreement exists that the immunity problem can 
most satisfactorily be resolved by legislative action, most state 
legislatures have neglected to act. As one dissenting Iowa Jus-
tice has observed, when the matter of modifying immunity is left 
to the legislature, nothing happens.391 Are courts therefore 
justified in overruling the doctrine as a means of forcing legis-
lative action? Judicial abrogation, it must be admitted, has 
usually produced subsequent legislative action. 
389. Spanel v~ Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minne 279, 
292-94, 118 N.W.2d 795, 803-4 (1962). 
390. Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 41, 56 
(1959) o "State legislatures, which alone can effectively 
solve the problem of governmental responsibility, have ne-
glected their obligation to act; and some courts by abroga-
tion have forced them to face the problem. In this respect 
the principal contribution of the judicial abrogation move-
ment will very likely be its influence on legislative con-
sideration of the problem. Such consideration is necessary; 
legislative help is needed to fix the legal responsibility 
of the various governmental units with due regard for the 
position they occupy in the total governmental structure. 
In overturning immunity, the courts seem clearly to be de-
termining public policy, usually the sole prerogative of 
the legislatureo But the legislature has the last word: it 
alone can vest or divest the courts with jurisdiction to 
hear tort suits against governmental units; it alone can ap-
propriate funds to satisfy tort judgments; and, finally, it 
alone can enact laws defining governmental responsibility, 
laws which when enacted will be binding on the courts. 
Whether governmental liability, now asserted by some courts 
as the 'modern trend' will become the rule in most states, 
remains to be seen. Judging by remedial legislation enacted 
in some states where judicial abrogation has occurred, its 
likelihood is certainly not evident. In the long run, how-
ever, authority to determine the outcome appears to rest, 
not with the courts, but with the legislature." Vanlanding-
ham, Local Governmental Immunity Re-examined, 61 N.W.U.L. 
Rev. 263 (1966). 
391. Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Ass'n, 127 N.W.2d 606, 
6l7 (Iowa 1964). 
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Upon survey1.ng what had happened in states where courts had 
abrogated immunity, many state courts refused to abrogate the doc-
trine, concluding that :tt would be more agoropriate for the change, 
if any, to emanate from the legislature.392 The Supreme Court of 
Missouri, in 1964, declined to discard the immunity rule, reason-
ing that, if judicial abrogation required subsequent legislation, 
the whole matter should be left to the legislature~393 
Whether or·not the Supreme Court of Colorado will refute, 
change or otherwise amend the rule of governmental immunity is, 
of course, not known& To this date the majority of the court has 
consistently upheld the doctrine and reaffirmed the position that 
any change in the rule should be a legislative matter. A change 
in the thinking of the court as a result of decisions in other 
states, a change in the composition of the court itself_ or im-
patience by the court for action by the legislature. could result 
in a ch~nge of position by the courto · 
2. Enact the immunity rule as applied to all governmental enti-
ties; whether engaged in governmental or proprietary functions. 
Courts and legislatures have advanced a number of arguments 
in defense of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. One argument 
expresses a concern that the unlimited liability of the state and 
its political subdivisions would have an adverse effect on the 
proper conduct of governmental services and activities and that 
immunity is necessary to protect the government from a rash of 
litigation and from unnecessary expensive settlement~. Another 
argument against state liability concerns the fiscal integrity of 
the state and other public bodies; that unlimited liability could 
lead to very serious consequences, including the-risk ~f fiscal 
bankruptcy. It is said that there would be a real danger to the 
fiscal stability of government, and normal services might be dis-
rupted, since claims could not be expected and could not be bud-
geted. 
There is little doubt that, if it desired to do so, the 
legislature could enact a statute giving full governmental immun-
ity to the state and other entities. However, the injustice and 
confusion inherent in the doctrine is so manifest· that this ac-
tion is not seriously considered anywhere. Almost all legal 
scholars, and students of government generally, have for years 
condemned the principle of governmental immunity and urged its 
~92. See notes 355 through 368, supra, and related discussion in 
text. 
393. Fette v. City of St. Louis, 366 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1963) e 
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abolition.394 Formerly justified as good public policy because 
it prevented diversion of public funds to satisfy tort judgments. 
immunity is now frequently condemned because it is at variance 
with modern concepts of social justice.395 Payment of liability 
claims should not be viewed as diversion of public funds, but 
rather as a legitimate part of the cost of performing public 
functions.396 Undoubtedly, immunity is unjust, since it causes 
the individual harmed by government to bear costs which should 
be borne by society. Indeed, it appears that the rule on non-
liability, by denying the individual just recompense for a gov-
ernment-inflicted injury, violates the spirit of due process 
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution and by similar provisions contained in state constitu-
tions.397 
The view that government should always be immune and should 
never use public funds to redress injuries to private persons is 
an extr·eme view. At the opposite extreme is the view which holds 
that government should always be liable for wrongs which it in-
flicts. These extreme positions are the exception .. Very few 
states have adopted either of the extreme positions (complete im-





See note 2 and 14, supra; Davis, Administrative Law 451 
(1951). 
Determining whether any financial burden is bearable neces-
sarily depends upon social policy. The trend of present-day 
policy, reflected in workmen's compensation statutes, the 
tort doctrine of strict liability, child labor acts, and 
warranties, is based upon the concept that liability should 
be imposed on those best able to bear the burdens of liabil-
ity -- which is often society at large. See Prosser, Torts 
§ 74, at 509 (3rd ed. 1964). Also, contrary to the fears of 
many, statistical studies and judicial opinions indicate 
that the financial burden of liability does not seem prohib-
itive. Note, The Utah Governmental Act: An Analysis, 120 
U. of Utah L. Rev. 122 (1967). 
See Blachly and Oatman, Approaches to Governmental Liability 
in Tort: A Comparative Survey, 9 Law & Comtemp. Prob. 213 
(1942); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 11 
Ill .. 2d 11, 22-23, 163 N.E.2d 89, 94-95 (1959). Usually,. pur-
chase of public liability insurance is not considered to con-
stitute diversion of public funds. 
See concurring opinion of C. J. Moore in Ace Flfing Serv. 
Inc. v. Colo. Department of Agriculture, 136 Coo. 19, 28, 
314 P.2d 278, 282 (1957). 
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to an either-or propositiono A fair and open-minded approach to 
the problem of public liability should proceed not from a start-
ing point of either complete immunity or unlimited liability, but 
with quest).ons of liability to what extent, under what circum--
stances, and subject to what conditions~ in order· to take into 
account the legitimate interests of both the citizen and his gov-
ernment. Thus the problems raised by the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity are how to reconcile two spheres of interest that are in 
competition with each other. First, the interest of the individ- · 
ual citizen, who through no fault of his own sustains an injury 
.as the result of governmental action or omission; and second, the 
interest of all citizens collectively as taxpayers to be protected 
from exorbitant or frivolous claims against the public treasury. 
_In the first approach to consideration of sovereign immun-
ity legislation discussed above, in which no action is taken by 
the leg_islature and the determination. of whether the doctrine 
should be abolished or modified is left to the judiciary, no con-
sideration is given to the sphere of interest of all citizens 
collectively as taxpayers to be protected. In the second approach 
to consideration of sovereign immunity legislation, in which the 
legislature declares that government is always immune, no consid-
eration is given to the sphere of interest of the individual 
citizen. The other five approaches discussed bel'ow deal with al-
ternatives to these two positions and attempt to resolve the cort-
f licting interests between government and the citizen who is in-
jured by government, 
Enact legislation which waives all immunity of governmental 
entTties and declares that liability shall be determined as 
if the entity were a private person. 
This is essentially the approach taken by New York and the 
United States. By statute in 1929,398 New york generally-placed 
public agencies on the same footing as private persons with re-
spect to tort liability and this statute was construed sixteen 
years after its enactment to waive immunity of all local enti-
ties.399 The liability of the state is a direct-liability and is 
not dependent upon any determination that the officer or employee 
who actually caused the harm would be personally liable •. There 
are no limitations on the state~s liability contained in the Court 
of Claims Act. There is no limitation on the amount that can be 
recovered in a particular case and there is ~o limitation_ on the 
kind of torts for which recovery is permitted. Nonetheless, the 
courts have created some imm~nities from liability by judicial· 
decision. This liability of the state is determined by the Court 
of Claims without a jury~ 
398. N.Y. Ct. Cl~ Act§ 1 et seq. (1963). 
399. Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 
(1945). 
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The United States government has been subject to tort lia-
bility since 1946 when it enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act. 
The essential provisions of this act are found in 28 U.S.C. § 1346 
(b) and 2671-2680.400 These statutes impose liability on the 
United States for negligent or wrongful acts of officers or em-
ployees of the United States in the same manner and to the same 
extent as a private individual under like circumstances. The lan-
guage of the act imposes liability directly on the United States 
and does not require any finding that the responsible officer or 
employee would be personally liable. 
The Federal Tort Claims Act serves as a general waiver of 
immunity in suits arising from the negligence of government em-
ployees. The act neither repealed existing remedies nor created 
new causes of action; but served as a waiver of the privilege 
from tort suits allowed the sovereign which could now be pleaded 
to the same extent as against private persons, subject to the 
limitations contained in the act. It covers claims against de-
partments, agencies, and corporations, whether or not empowered 
to sue and be sued, but excepts contractors with the Federal gov-
ernment. 
Basically the Federal Tort Claims Act authorizes claims, 
"or suits on claims, against the United States on account of 
damages to or loss of property or an account of personal injury 
or death caused by negligent or wrongful act or omission of an 
employee of the government while acting within the scope of his 
employment or office,401 which, under the laws of the place where 
such injuries were inflicted, would give rise to a cause of ac-
tion against a private individual,"402 except for interest prior 
to judgment, or for punitive damages. If a claimant elects to 
sue the government instead of a tortfeasor employee, or obtains 
an award or settlement against the government, the judgment will 
constitute a complete bar to the right of the claimant against 
the employeeo 
A number of immunities are provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2680. 
The most important immunity is that which provides that the United 
States is not liable on any claim "based upon the exercise or per-
formance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee 
of the government, whether or not the discretion involved be 
abused. 11 403 The Federal Tort Claims Act thus provides some stat-
400. Ch. 753, 60 Stato 842 (1946) (codified in scattered section 
of 28 U.S. C.) o 
401. 28 u.s.c.A. § 921: 8 F.C.A. Tit. 28, § 921. 
402. 1 A.L~R.2d 222 (1948). 
403. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a). 
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utory immunities which reduce the scope of.liability of the fed-
eral government under the act. This is lacking in the New York 
Court of Claims Act. Otherwise, the two statutes are essentially 
the same~ 
The main criticism of this type of approach is that the. 
nature of governmental and public activities and functions is not 
comparable to private activities and responsibilities. Public 
agencies necessarily engage in a broad spectrum of activities· 
having no private counterpart, which often involve relatively 
high degrees of exposure to injury-producing event_s, and which 
the government cannot voluntarily terminate since they are per-
formed as a matter of public duty. Private persons and corpora-
tions, on the other hand, are ordinarily free to withdra~ from 
activities which entail undue risks of liability. As the.Cali-
fornia Law Revision Commission has pointed out: " .•• Private 
persons do not make law. Private persons do not issue or revoke 
licenses to engage in various professions and occupations. Pri-
vate persons do not quarantine sick persons and do not commit 
mentally disturbed persons to involuntary confinement. Private 
persons do not prosecute and incarcerate violators of the law or 
administer -prison systems~ Only public entities are required to 
build and maintain thousands of miles of streets, sidewalks and 
highways. Unlike many private persons, a public entity often 
cannot reduce its risk of potential liability by refusing to en-
gage in a particular activity, for government must continue to 
govern and is requir$d to furnish services that- cannot be ade.-
quately provided by any other agency. 11 404 These differences sug:. 
gest that it might not be wise to treat public and private enti-
ties alike for tort liability purposes. 
In order to bring some·fairness both to the government and 
the citizen who is injured by government negligence when faced 
with tort claims exemplifying the differences discussed above, the 
courts have felt constrained to develop-new line~ of ·judicially 
recognized tort immunity in order to· avoid the logical consequences 
of the statutory language. Thus the courts have formulated rules 
which give immunity to public agencies when acting in a "discre-
tionary" or "policy-making" manner and when -conducting purely 
"governmental" activities. The decision as to whether an act is 
"governmental" or "proprietary", or whether it is a "discretion-
ary" or "ministerial" functi"on always rests with the courts. This 
approach, in effect, delegates to the courts the responsibility 
for formulating public policy. This in turn leads to unpredicta-
bility and confusion in the law, which, so far as possible, should 
be clarified and simplified so that persons aff~cted thereby may 
with some degree of ~ssurance arrange their affairs accordingly. 
It is interesting to note that none of the recent legislative pro-
grams resulting from judicial abrogation of governmental immunity 
has followed the New York approach. 
404. Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, A Study Relating to Sovereign Im-
munity, p. 269 (1963). 
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4. Provide for the purchase of liability insurance by all gov-
ernmental entities and waive the immunit u to the extent of 
the covera e so obtained and or rovide limitations on the 
amount that can he recovered. 
This approach places governmental tort liability on a par 
with private tort liability, but limits. the amount of damages re-
coverable from the public entity. This is essentially the ap-
proach taken by Minnesota in 1963.405 The Minnesota statute 
authorizes the purchase of liability insurance and constitutes a 
waiver of immunity to the extent of the insurance coverage. This 
approach has also been adopted in several other states, including 
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, New · 
Hampshire, Oregon, and Vermonte406 
The main criticism of this approach is that it creates un-
predictability in the law, since it assumes continued judicial 
development of degrees of immunity or liability like the New York 
law. In addition, it is said that any dollar limitation is arbi-
trary and bound to be unfair to some claimants since such limits 
will usually have no rational relationship to the amount of actual 
damages sustained. On the other hand, this approach does elimi-
nate to a considerable degree the danger of the catastrophe judg-
ment, and provides a sound basis for rational fiscal planning and 
the computation of instirance pr~miums.407 The provision for the 
purchase of insurance ought to be stated in mandatory language to 
have proper effect. If the provision for the purchase of insur-
ance is permissive, as it is in Idaho, Indiana and other states, 
the purchase by some but not all of the public entities may re-
sult in an unfair and discriminatory law. 
Closely related to this approach is the approach adopted 
in several states, such as Kentucky, North Carolina, Wisconsin, 
Illinois, and Nevada, in which a limit has been placed on the 
amount of damages which can be recovered against the state or 
other political entity without regard to whether or not there is 
any insurance coverage._ This is similar to the approach in the 




Minn. Laws 1963, Ch. 798 § 2. 
Idaho Code, § 41-3501 et seq. (1962); Ind. Stat. Ann.! 39-
1819 (Burns 1965) 1 Iowa Code§ 517.l (1966); Mont. Rev. Code 
§ 83-701 et seq. ~1947 Supp. 1965); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5-6-
18 et seq. (Supp. 1966J; N.D. Rev. Code§ 39-01-08 (1960, 
Supp. 1965); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 412:3 (1955, as amended 
1961); Ore~ Rev~ Stat. § 243.110 (1965); Vt. Stat. Ann. T. 
29 § 1403 et seq. (1959). 
Van Alstyne, The Decline of Governmental Immunity, State 
Government, p. 33 (Winter 1966). 
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Kentucky has been liable for the negligence of its officers 
~nd employees since 1946. The liability is limited, however, for 
no damages are awarded for pain or suffering, and the total amount 
that may be recovered upon any claim is $10,000. The legislature 
oas set up an administrative Board of Claims, which consists of 
the members of the state's Workmen's Compensation Board, with jur-
lsdiction to hear and allow claims for damages resulting from gov-
ernmental negligence. The Board's findings of fact, where based 
on substantial evidence, are conclusive upon review by the courts 
and the awards are enforceable as court judgments.408 
In 1951, North Carolina imposed liability upon the state 
government for the negligence of its officers and employees. The 
Industrial Commission was authorized to hear and determine tort 
claims against the state, in a manner similar to that in Kentucky. 
The Commission determination may be appealed on questions of law 
but fin_dings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial 
evidence. The amount of damages awarded cannot exceed the amount 
of $12,000.409 
The Wisconsin Legislature in 1963 provided a procedure for 
bringing tort actions against political corporations, governmental 
subdivisions or agencies, and governmental officers and employees. 
The amount of ~ecovery cannot exceed $25,000.410 Tort claims in 
Illinois are within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims which 
has the power to determine all claims against the state. The de-
termination of the Court of Claims is final and conclusive and 
awards for damages for torts may be granted only up to $25,00Q.411 
In 1965 the legislature of Nevada enacted laws which waived the 
immunity of the state and all political subdivisions and consented 
to have its liability determined in accordance with the same rules 
of law as are applied to individuals and corporations. The waiver 
of immunity is subject to the conditions and limitations as set 
~~~t~x~~e~h~h!t!~~t6fa$~s:So~~Jf~ for damages in a tort action may 
408. Ken~ Rev. Stat. § 44-070 et seq. (1962). 
409. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143.291 (1964, as amended 1965). 
410. Wis~ Stat. Ann. § 895.43 {1965). 
411. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, § 439 .1 et seq. (Smith-Hurd Supp. 
1966}. 
412. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.035 ( 1965). 
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5. Enact legislation which reaffirms the immunity rule in general 
and sets out broad exceptions where the entities are to be 
liable. 
This approach is essentially the one adopted by the Michi-
gan legislature in 1964,413 and by the Utah legislature in 1965.414 
Section 3 of the Utah Immunity Act initially grants immunity to all 
governmental entities for injuries resulting from the discharge of 
a governmental function. Sections 5 through 9 then proceed to 
waive that immunity for enumerated types of public activities. 
Section 10 generally waives immunity for negligent acts or omis-
sions by employees; nevertheless it reinstates immunity forcer-
tain types of employee-caused injuries through exceptions to that 
general waiver.415 The final provision of the act sets forth the 
requirements for the purchase of liability insurance by govern-
mental entities, allowing all entities to purchase such insurance 
for risks created by the act and setting minimum amounts of cover-
age.416 · The approach of both Michigan and Utah is to codify the 
common law rule of sovereign immunity by declaring public entities 
immune when acting in a 11 governmental 11 capacity but liable when 
acting in a "proprietary" capacity. Specific exc_eptions to the 
immunity rule have been devised to accompany the general principle. 
For example, liability is authorized without regard for the gov-
ernmental-proprietary distinction, in cases arising from highway 
defects, dangerous or defective conditions of public buildings, 
and negligent operation of governmentally-owned vehicles. 
The distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary". 
functions is thus given statutory sanction. However, no exact 
413. Mich~ Public Acts 1964, ch. 170; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 3.996 
( 1) - ( 15) ( 1948, as amended 1964). 
414. Laws of Utah 1965, ch. 139, § 1 et seq.; Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-1 to 34 (Supp. 1965)0 
415. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-10 (1) - (11) (Supp. 1965) excepts 
the following from liability: discretionary acts, certain 
intentional tortsp license and permit issuance on demand, 
improper inspection, institution or prosecution of any ju-
dicial or administrative proceeding, misrepresentation, 
riots, and civil disturbances, taxation, activities of the 
Utah National Guard, incarceration or legal confinement, and 
natural conditions of state lands. 
416. See Utah Code Anna § 63-30-34 (Supp. 1965). This section 
limits recovery to the minimum amounts set by§ 29 or the 
amount of insurance procured by the entity, whichever is 
larger. Section 29 limits recovery for personal injury to 
$100,000 per person· and $300,000 per accident. Property 
damages are limited to $50,000 per accident. 
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definltion or explanation as to what constitutes a "governmental" 
or "proprietary" function is given in the statutes. This statu-
tory treatment in effect constitutes a general delegation to the 
courts of the power to delineate in case by case decision-making 
exactly what activities and functions of government are "govern-
mental" and what activities are "proprietary". This approach has 
been criticized because it leads ~o unpredictability since the 
courts are continually expanding liability by interpreting "gov-
ernmental" activities as constituting "proprietary" activities 
for which the public entities are not imrnune.417 
This creates a serious problem because there is no cer-
tainty regarding immunities and liabilities and fr9m the time a 
new liability is created by court decision until this area of 
liability can be covered by the purchase of liability insurance 
there is no insurance coverage or protection. Lack of coverage 
during this interim period poses a serious threat to many enti-
ties~ Unanticipated liabilities involving large verdicts are not 
taken into account in this approach to the problem. The approach 
leaves in the hands of the judiciary the responsibility for bal-
ancing policy considerations and striking a practical solution to 
issues which are essentially political in nature and thus partic-
ularly within the competence and experience of legislators. 
For the above reasons, it has been suggested that the Utah 
Immunity Act be amended to specifically provide for coverage of 
proprietary functions and that the governmental-proprietary dis-
tinction be abolished by the legislature.418 
6. Enact legislation which waives the immunity of certain enti-
ties, retaining immunity for the remainder. 
This is essentially the approach taken by the state of Il-
linois in response to the Molitor case in which governmental immun-
ity of local public bodies was judicially abolished.419_ Subsequent 
to the Molitor decision, the Illinois legislature passed several 
statutes which reestablished sovereign immunity.for various polit-
ical subdivision. For example, park districts were declared to be 
wholly immune from tort liability; others, such as school dis-
tricts, were only liable to a limited extent (up to $10,000); and 
counties were made liable only in specific circumstances~420 




Note, The Utah Governmental Immunity Act: 
Utah L. Rev. 127-132 (1967). 
An Analysis, 120 
Molitor v~ Kaneland Community School Dist. No. 302, 18 111. 
2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959}. 
See notes 330 to 333 and note 378, supra. 
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There appears to be a grave constitutional problem inherent 
in this type of legislation since it could very well be held to be 
"special" legislation., There appears to be no logical basis for 
distinguishing between governmental entities, "either from the 
perspective of the injured party, or from the point of view of 
ability to insure against liability. 11 421 
The constitutional objections to this approach were borne 
out in several recent decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court in 
which it has held several of these immunity statutes to be uncon-
stitutional as special legislation. The latest case was Hutchings 
v. Kraject,422 in which a statute declaring counties to be immune 
was declared unconstitutional as violating the prohibition against 
special legislation. 
7. roach wherein the s ecific liabilities and immun-
governmental entities are set out int e statute. 
California was the first state to adopt comprehensive leg-
islation in response to judicial abrogation of the sovereign im-
munity doctrine by the Muskopf case.423 This approach seeks to 
ensure legislative control of the future development of the rules 
of liability and immunity.424 As a general rule it is declared 
that public entities are liable in tort only to the extent de-
clared by statute~ The statute then proceeds to spell out in de-
tail the circumstances in which liability will be recognized, not 
by reference to the "governmental" or "proprietary" nature of the 
particular activity, but by practical criteria.425 
There are two very important considerations, one legal and 
one financial, which speak very strongly in favor of the Califor-
421. Van Alstyne, op. cit. note 407, at 34. 
4220 34 Illo 2d 379, 215 N.E.2d 274 (1966). See notes 330 to 333 
and note 378, supra. 
423. Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, 359 P.2d 
457 (1961). 
424. It is suggested that in California governmental immunity is 
entirely statutory. Van Alstyne, California Government Tort 
Liability§· 5.6 (1964). 
425. Claims and Actions Against Public Entities and Public Em-
ployees (California Tort Claims Act), Cal. Gov't Code§§ 
810-99606. This Act was enacted after a two-year moratorium 
on the effect of the Muskopf case, during which time a study 
was made on the ne~d for sovereign immunity: 5 Cal. Law Re-
vision Comm'n, Reports, Recommendations and Studies (1963). 
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nia approach. First, in terms of legal draftsmanship, it is far 
more difficult to clearly define the exceptions to the general 
rule of liability than it is to retain, or where judicially abol-
ished, to re-establish immunity and then set forth exceptions 
according to which public entities are liable. Second, the fi-
nancial consideration is found in the task of obtaining insurance 
against governmental liability. Experience in other states has 
shown that insurance coverage is more expensive to obtain where 
liability is the general rule and immunity the exception. In 
situations, such as in the California statute, where immunity is 
the general rule and the areas of liability are set forth by way 
of exceptions, the risk to which the entities are exposed are · 
more clearly defined and this lends itself to a more accurate 
ascertainment as to what the risks actually are. This should re-
sult in lower premiums paid for the coverage had. 
rhe approach taken by California is thought to be more 
readily adapt.able to the realities of public administration be-
cause it focuses attention on the facts rather than abstract 
ideas. It thus seeks to postulate statutory policy upon experi-
ence rather than theory alone, and hence should be more readily 
capable of alteration where need exists without damage to the 
underlying basic policy. Should experience prove that a change 
or amendment would be necessary or advantageous, based upon ap-
plicable policy considerations which are made by the legislature, 
the legislature can make that change by statutory enactment. The 
advantage of this approach is that it is susceptible to changa or 
amendment whenever that is found to be necessary. Another ad-
vantage of this approach is that it should avoid uncertainties as 
to iegal rights and duties. Because of the comprehensiveness and 
detail inherent in this approach it is thought that unnecessary 
litigation will be reduced~426 
The approach taken by .California has been criticized be-
cause it is thought that the complexity of the statutory pattern 
which has been developed along pragmatic lines will tend to en-
courage litigation rather than out of court settlements. It is 
also criticized because the comprehensiveness of the statute re-
duces flexibility by.narrowing the range of judicial alternatives 
available under the statute, as compared with the common law.427 
This very idea is also used in support of this approach. Indeed, 
this approach takes away from the courts any chance to make a pol-
icy determination in this area. One of the main reasons for the 
adoption of this statutory approach in California was to take 
away from the courts the policy determination power it had there-
426. 
427. 
Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, A Study Relationg to Sovereign Im-
munity, p. 271 (1963). 
Van Alstyne, 0po cit. note 407, at 35. 
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tofore exercised when deciding whether a particular activity was 
"governmental" or "proprietary". This decision is now in the 
hands of the California Legislature. 
Summary. For a legislature faced with the task of formu-
lating legislation with respect to the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity, there are several alternatives open to it in considering 
a solution to the problem. The legislature may choose to adopt 
any one of the following courses of action: (1) take no legis-
lative action; (2) make the state entirely immune; (3) make the 
state entirely liable; (4) make the state either entirely immune 
or entirely liable, with some exceptions to the general rule; (5) 
waive immunity up to a certain amount; (6) waive immunity of only 
a limited number of jurisdictions; or (7) attempt to spell out in 
detail both the liability and immunity of public entities. 
The legislative solution appropriate for one state may not 
be desirable for another. There are many factors that must be 
taken into consideration in determining what the policy should be 
in a particular state. In short, the extent to which liability 
should be accepted or refused depends upon a careful and consci-
entious evaluation of competing policy considerations in light of 
the special circumstances which may be relevant in each state. 
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COMMITTEE PROCEDURE AND ACTION 
Introduction 
Previous attempts at adopting legislation in the area of 
sovereign immunity in Colorado in an effort to abolish or modify 
the doctrine have not been successful, except for the adoption of 
a law in 1949 making the state and other governmental units liable 
for injury caused by the operation of government owned motor ve-
hicles, and several other statutes which impose liability on pub-
lic entities. However, as was shown earlier in this report, 
numerous other jurisdictions have recently changed the doctrine, 
either by judicial decision or by legislative action, and there 
now appears to be a trend toward modifying or abolishing it. In 
addition, much criticism has been leveled at the doctrine by legal 
writers .and scholars. 
In the light of this trend and criticism, Colorado legis-
lators and various interest groups have considered the problems 
attendant to governmental immunity to be of serious and immediate 
concerno This concern was expressed in the Forty-sixth General 
Assembly by the introduction of House Joint Resolution No. 1023 
which directed the Legislative Council to make "a study of the 
problem of governmental civil immunity with a view toward devel-
oping comprehensive legislation to define and limit the areas of 
immunity and to provide procedures for compensation to those af-
fected and to balance the public and private interest involved." 
The content of that study resolution was adopted ·by the General 
Assembly in Senate Joint Resolution No~ 42. In conformity with 
the provisions of S.J.R. No. 42 the Committee on Sovereign Immun-
ity was appointed by the Legislative Council to conduct such 
study. 
Statement of the problem. The problSM·in~olved in relation 
to legislative consideration of the rule of governmental immunity 
lies in weighing the need for compensation for individual injury 
against the necessity of preserving public funds for general use. 
Basic philosophical considerations as to the nature and purpose 
of government, its relationship to the individual citizen and the 
spreading of the risk of governmental activities are involved. 
Arguments for immunity. In the earlies~ expression of the 
sovereign immunity rule an unincorporated county was·relieved of 
liability for damages on the grounds that (1) the community was 
unincorporated and thus did not have funds to pay damages, and (2) 
that it is better that an individual should sustain an injury than 
that the public should suffer an inconvenience. In further jus-
tification of the rule it has been stated that (1) the doctrine 
rests on public policy, (2) it is absurd to speak of a wrong com-
mitted by an entire people, (3) whatever the state does must be 
lawful, {4) an agent of the state is always outside of the scope 
of his authority and employment when he commits any wrongful act. 
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(5) public funds should not be diverted to compensate for private 
injuries, (6) inconveniences and embarrassment would descend upon 
the government if it should be subject to liability, (7) there is 
a lack of precedent (8) there will be an infinity of actions and 
spurious claims, (9f a municipality derives no profit from the ex-
ercise of governmental functions, which are solely for the public 
benefit and thus there is no fund from which to compensate for 
private injuries, (10) in the performance of duties public offi-
cers are agents of the state and not of the corporation, so that 
the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply, and (11) cit-
ies and counties cannot carry on their government if money for 
public use is diverted to making good the torts of employees. 
Arguments against immunitya Critics of the doctrine point 
to the injustice of making a private individual suffer for wrongs 
inflicted, in effect, by the people as a whole through the gov-
ernment as their agent. They argue that the state is morally ob-
ligated, as a simple act of justice, to compensate persons who 
have suffered at its hands~ Although a state cannot be sued with-
out consent, it should not act with impunity~ for a rule of law 
which denies all relief for negligent or arbitrary action implic-
itly sanctions it. In addition, these critics insist the burden 
should be distributed amongst all the members of society by forc-
ing the government to make compensation for its wrongs and if nec-
essary, providing sources of revenue to finance such compensation. 
The current of criticism has been that the torts of public employ-
ees are properly to be regarded as a cost of the administration of 
government, which should be distributed by taxes to the general 
public, and that the purchase of liability insurance adequately 
serves to provide compensation for the injured who fall within its 
protection. 
In theory then, the controversy is as to whether the burden 
of injuries inflicted by government should be borne by the injured 
individual or by society as a whole. If it is determined that the 
interests of justice are best served by spreading the burden to 
the whole of society by removing or modifying the immunity of gov-
ernment, the practical questions then arise of how best to admin-
ister and finance such a policy and at the same time preserve the 
fiscal integrity of individual governmental entities so that they 
can carry on the business of government. The crucial question 
seems to be whether or not the immunity of governments should be 
waived in particular instances or abolished altogether and, if the 
doctrine is abolished or limited, how a citizen's claim should be 
adjudicated with the least inconvenience and the greatest equity, 
both to the citizen and to the publico 
Purpose of sovereign immunity study~ The purpose of the 
study on sovereign immunity then is to explore the implications of 
possible alternative methods of providing governmental tort lia-
bility or immunity in the light of existing statutory provisions 
and of related case law developments both in Colorado and other 
states in an attempt to identify and suggest appropriate applica-
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tions of policy considerations deemed pertinent to the solution 
of the problem posed for the legislature. 
To accomplish the purposes set forth in the study resolu-
tion (Senate Joint Resolution Noo 42, Forty-sixth General Assem-
bly, 1967), the Legislative Council Committee on Sovereign Im-
munity held thirteen meetings from June 9, 1967 to September 19, 
1968. Tp aid the committee in its deliberations, representatives 
of vario~s departments of state government (Colorado Department 
of Highw~ys, Insurance Department, Attorney General's Office, Di-
vision of\Local Government), representatives of various local gov-
ernmental entities~ and representatives of the insurance industry, 
were consulted by the committee. In addition, two questionnaires 
were used by the committee to obtain comments and suggestions from 
interested persons on the proposals the committee had under con-
sideration. 
Early in its deliberations, the committee determined that 
any approach which attempts to comprehensively deal with the sub-
ject of sovereign immunity should be ba5i~d upon fundamental policy 
considerations designed to accomplish two objects or to solve two 
problems: (1) to clearly set forth the relevant substantive lia-
bility problems, and to delineate the kinds of acts or omissions 
for which public entities are or are not to be immune; and (2) to 
clearly set forth the policy considerations relevant to the finan-
cial administration of government tort liability and the proce-
dural handling of governmental tort liability claims. If the· 
public entities are to be held responsible for some or all of its 
acts of omissions, the approach must provide some judicial or ad-
ministrative means for determining and enforcing that liability. 
Policy Considerations Relevant to Legislative Approach to Sovereign 
Immunity 
As indicated earlier in this report, there are seven alter-
native legislative approaches available to the legislature: (1) 
take no legislative action; (2) make the state entirely immune; 
(3) make the state entirely liable; (4) make the state either en-
tirely immune or liable, with some exceptions to the general rule; 
(5) waive immunity up to a certain amount; (6) waive immunity for 
particular jurisdictions and maintain immunity for the remainder; 
or (7) attempt to spell out in detail both the liability and im-
munity of public entities. The advantages and disadvantages of 
each approach and the experience in the various states which have 
adopted one of the particular approaches were explored earlier in 
this report.428 Each of these alternatives was considered by the 
428. See pages 108 to 125. 
-128-
committee at some point during the study, as will be discussed 
below.429 
Need for legislative actidn. At its first meeting, the 
committee heard from Associate Justice Edward E. Pringle of the 
Colorado Supreme Court. Justice Pringle explained that, to date, 
the majority of the court feels that any change, modification, or 
abolition of the doctrine of sovereign immunity should come from 
the legislature. Since the General Assembly has acquiesced in 
the doctrine for so many years, it should be the responsibility 
of the legislature, not the court, to decide whether to modify or 
abolish the doctrine. Justice Pringle explained that a minority 
of the court believes that the court should abolish the doctrine, 
since it came into existence through judicial, not legislative, 
action. The main debate is not over whether the doctrine should 
be abolished, but over the question of whether it should be abol-
ished by the court or the legislature. 
The disadvantages of taking no legislative action were 
discussed earlier in this report.430 It was there indicated that 
there was general agreement that adequate reformation of the doc-
trine can be achieved only by legislation. Yet in the face of 
continued legislative neglect or inaction, several state courts 
have abolished the doctrine. This abolishment has, in almost 
every instance, led to the subsequent enactment of legislation to 
adequately deal with the problems of sovereign immunity. Whether 
or not the Supreme Court of Colorado will refute, change or other-
wise modify the rule is, of course, not known. A change in the 
thinking of the court as a result of decisions in other states, a 
change in the composition of the court itself, or impatience by 
the court for action by the legislature, could result in a change 
of position by the court. 
The committee determined that to take no legislative action 
and to wait for abolishment of the doctrine by the Supreme Court 
would not be wise, just or practicable. The committee decided 
that a statutory solution to the problem was needed to give direc-
tion and bring some degree of consistency and uniformity to the 
applicable statutory and common law principles. To take no leg-
islative action would simply leave in the courts the power through 
judicial decision to modify or abolish the. doctrine as it saw fit. 
The failure of the General Assembly to take action, in other words, 
would constitute a decision to permit the future evolution of the 
doctrine to be guided by judicial conceptions of sound public 
policy on a case-by-case approach. Because of the uncertainty 
that would result from this approach, and because the determina-
429. See Minutes of Meeting, pp. 2 to 6, August 17, 1967. 
430. See notes 371 to 393, supra, and related discussion in text. 
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tion of public policy is particularly the prerogative of the leg-
islature, the committee concluded that to take no action at all 
would be unwise and this alternative was rejected. The committee 
thus recommended that a legislative proposal be adopted by the 
committee. . 
0 en end closed end le islative a roach. The problem 
faced by the comm ttee wast us a quest on of ow and when, not 
whether, the doctrine should be changed or abdlished. The prob-
lem was one of determining the sphere within which government is 
immune and need not answer for the consequences of its action and 
.the sphere within which it is liable. The committee determined 
that there are two general approaches that may be employed in . 
drafting legislation -- the open end and the closed end approaches. 
Open end refers to bills that would abolish or retain immunity 
across the board, comprehensively. Closed end refers to legisla-
tion that would abolish immunity, subject to certain exceptions 
and limitations. This method can involve either totally estab-
lishing governmental liability and then listing e.xceptions to it, 
or totally establishing governmental immunity· (reaffirming sover-
eign immunity) and then listing exceptions to that.431 
Open end -- retain immunity. With respect to the first 
approach, that of retaining the present law of immunity, the com-
mittee felt that such an approach was undesirable. Under the 
present system the courts are continually expanding governmental 
liability by interpreting governmental activities as constituting 
proprietary functions for which the entities are not immune. This 
creates a serious problem because there is no certainty regarding 
immunities and liabilities and from the time a new liability is 
created by the courts until this area of liability can be covered 
by the purchase of liability insurance there is no insurance 
coverage or protection. Lack of coverage during this interim 
period poses a serious threat to many entities. It was agreed 
that if legislation with respect to sovereign immunity is not en-
acted, the courts will continue to chip away at the doctrine or 
abolish it entirely. For these reasons, the committee .agreed that 
to retain the present rule of immunity would be undesirable.432 
Ofien end -- blanket waiver of immunity. The committee ob-
served tat the federal government and several states have by 
statute or court decision declared that government is not immune 
from liability for its torts and that the liability is to be de-
termined as if the government were a private person. The diffi-
culty with this approach is that government is fundamentally 
different from private persons. In most jurisdictions where there 
has been a blanket waiver of immunity, the courts have recognized 
431. Minutes of Meeting, Nov. 15, 1967, p. I. 
432. Minutes of Meeting, Aug. 17, 1967, pp. 3, 4. 
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that the liability of government cannot be unlimited and they have 
worked out limits of liability on a case by case basis over ape-
riod of years8 If no limits on governmental liability are speci-
fied, the courts will have to define the limits of such liability. 
This, in effect, is an abdication of legislative responsibility. 
Under this process, the extent of governmental liability 
cannot be determined with certainty. Many cases must be tried 
and processed through the courts, many of which may result in the 
government defendant not being held liable. The financial sta-
bility of many public entities may also be left unprotected be-
cause of the unavailability of insurance at rates that they can 
afford to pay, resulting from the unknown potential liability. 
Few persons would contend that government should be an in-
surer of all injuries sustained by private persons as a result of 
governmental activity, even though such a policy would spread the 
losses occasioned thereby over the largest possible base. The 
committee believes that the basic problem is to determine how far 
it is desirable and socially expedient to permit the loss-distri-
buting function of tort law to apply to public entities, without 
thereby unduly interfering with the effective functioning of such 
entities for their own publicly approved ends. The blanket waiver 
of immunity approach tends to resolve this problem by ignoring it. 
For these reasons, the committee rejected this approach as being 
undesirable. 
Closed end approaches. With the rejection of the two open 
end approaches discussed above, the committee determined that it 
could adopt either a statute in which liability was the general 
rule, with exceptions, or a statute in which immunity was the gen-
eral rule, with exceptions. In considering which of these two 
approaches would be more readily adaptable to Colorado law and 
which would be the best approach, the committee directed its at-
tention to the following areas: (1) the approach that would be 
the easiest to draft; (2) the effect each approach would have on 
the availability of insurance and the cost thereof; (3) the pos-
sible effect each approach would have on the performance of duties 
by public officials and employees; and (4) the approach which 
would allow the most flexibility for future change. 
In terms of legal draftsmanship, the committee felt that 
it would be far more difficult to clearly define the exceptions 
to liability than it would be to retain immunity and then set 
forth exceptions according to which public entities can be sued. 
Thus the committee concluded that it would be easier to draft a 
bill in which immunity is the general rule, with exceptions for 
those areas wherein liability should attach to public entities. 
With respect to the financial consideration pertaining to 
the availability and cost of insurance, the committee-found that 
experience in other states has shown that coverage is more expen-
sive to obtain where liability is made the principle and immunity 
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the exceptionn In situations where immunity becomes the princi-
ple and the areas of liability are set for~h by way of exceptions, 
the risk is more clearly defined and lends itself to mdre accurate 
assessment, which should result in lower premiums for the coverage 
had. If the limits of potential liability are known, public en-
tities may plan accordingly, may budget for their potential lia-
bilities, and may obtain realistically priced insurance. 
A statute imposing liability with specific exceptions for 
immunity would provide the public entities with little basis upon 
which to budget for the payment of claims and judgments for dam-
-ages, for they would be faced with a vast area of unforeseen sit-
uations, any of which could result in costly litigation and a 
possible damage judgment. Such a statute could greatly·expand 
the amount of litigation and the attendant expense. Moreover, 
the cost of insurance under such a statute would .probably be 
greater.than under a statute which provides for immunity except 
to the extent provided by law, since an insurance company would 
demand a premium designed to protect against the indefinite-area 
of liability that would exist under a statute imposing liability 
with specified exceptions. 
Accordingly, the committee decided to adopt a statute which 
provides that public entities are immune from liability unless 
they are declared to be liable by other statutory provision. The 
committee felt that this approach would provide a better basis 
upon which the financial burden of liability may be calculated, 
since each enactment imposing liability can be evaluated in terms 
of the potential cost of such liability. 
It is thought by some that a legislative approach in which 
liability is determined to be the general rule will dampen the 
zeal, interest and enthusiasm of public officials and employees 
in the performance of their duties and functionsn This arises 
from the desire to protect themselves from possible suit, when 
the law is not specific as to their liability or immunity forcer-
tain acts. With liability the general rule, their exposure to 
suits is greatly increased. The result of this may be a lack of 
morale and enthusiasm among public employees. On the other hand, 
if immunity is the general rule, a problem could arise out of the 
proper performance of duty for it is possible that a misguided 
public official could abuse his office. If immunity were complete 
an official could injure individuals by his actions under the pro-
tection of the law. However, this problem seems to be more theo-
retical than actual and the committee thought the best approach 
would be for immunity to be the general rule. 
The committee concluded that making immunity the general 
rule will provide the needed flexibility in the statute. The com-
mittee recognizes that the.subject of sovereign immunity is so 
vast that it is nearly impossible to spell out in detail all areas 
of activity in which either immunity or liability of public enti-
ties and its employees is to be applied. Many areas of activity 
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will require attention in future years and it can be anticipated 
that recommendations may be submitted to subsequent legislative 
sessions to deal with these remaining problems. Therefore the 
committee felt it necessary that a statute be drafted which will 
allow for the addition of new areas of immunity or liability as 
experience proves desirable. By providing that liability is an 
exception to the general rule of immunity, additional liability 
may be imposed by the legislature within carefully drafted limits, 
should further study or experience in future years demonstrate 
that such liability is justified. 
Other approaches. The committee considered and rejected 
the approach whereby each type of governmental unit is or may be 
treated separately. The committee agreed that all units of gov-
ernment should be treated similarly, as long as there is provi-
sion for insurance or arrangements based on ability to pay. for 
it makes little difference to an injured person what type of gov-
ernmental unit caused the injury~ It appears to be unfair to 
make an individual's right· to recover damages for injury depend-
ent on whether it was the state or some other political subdivi-
sion or governmental unit which was responsible.433 
The approaches which involve the authorization to purchase 
insurance and provisions for the waiver of immunity up to the 
limits of insurance coverage and/or statutory limits on the amount 
of recovery that may be had against a public entity, are consid-
ered under a later sub-heading in this report. 
Utah sovereign immunity bill. The committee, at its first 
meeting, decided that it should start with a particular philoso-
phy or proposal on sovereign immunity so that the comments re-
ceived from those concerned would be focused on a single proposal 
rather than directed to the whole problem in general terms. The 
committee agreed to begin by considering the recently enacted 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, which is contained herein as Ap-
pendix A, since the act spelled out a number of provisions and 
exceptions which the committee wished to thoroughly explore.434 
Without committee endorsement or approval, this bill was sent to 
several interested persons and groups in an attempt to solicit 
comments and suggestions. 
The Utah bill served as a starting point for discussion of 
what ought and what ought not to be included in any sovereign im-
munity bill the committee might eventually wish to propose or en-
dorse. Most of those who responded to the request for comments 
433. Minutes of Meeting, June 9, 1967, pp. 1, 2. 
434. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act is discussed earlier in 
this report. See notes 414 to 416, supra, and related dis-
cussion. 
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and suggestions on the Utah bill also appeared be.fore the commit-
tee at its second meeting on July 28, 1967.435 Various sections 
of the Utah bill were discussed in detail and there were many sug-
gestions for improvement and suggestions on how the bill could be 
adapted to Colorado's situation. 
Committee discussion on the Utah bill pointed out one of 
the most basic decisions that had to be made by the committee in 
its consideration of sovereign immunity legislation. That deci-
sion involved a determination as to whether the c'our-ts should de-
cide the immunities and liabilities of governmental entities or 
whether that decision should be made by the legislature. In ei-
ther case, the committee agreed that it must be careful to form-
ulate language which differentiates between the two approaches .. 
The committee found that the Utah bill mal.ntains the dis-
tinctio.n between governmental and proprietary functions and vests 
in the courts a determination whether a particular activity is 
governmental or proprietary. The Utah bill provides for this 
distinction in Section 3. Sovereign immunity is reaffirmed with 
respect to governmental functionsJ while entities are not immune 
with respect to proprietary functions. There is no exact defini-
tion or clear-cut distinction between governmental and proprie-
tary and, under the Utah bill, the determination is ·made on the 
basis of the facts in a specific case. The New York legislation, 
although taking a different philosophical approach 1 also main-
tains this distinctiono Under this type of statute~ the deter-
mination and application of sovereign immunity i$ left in the 
hands of the court.436 . . 
The committee found that the California legislation, un-
like the New York and Utah approach, seeks to ke~p control of the 
problem in the hands·of the legislatureo Although the New York 
legislation has made governmental entities liable to the same ex-
tent as private individuals, there are certain areas of govern-
mental activities which bear no resemblance to the activities of 
a private person and in which the government entities may remain 
immune. Under the New York law the recognition of these areas 
that should remain immune has been left in the hands of the court. 
Under the Utah bill, the courts are left to determine whether an 
activity is governmental or proprietary. On the other hand, in 
California, the decision as to what areas of governmental activity 
should be immune or liable remains in the legislature and not in 
the courts.437 
435. See Minutes of Meeting, July 28, 1967, for comments on the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Acte 
436. Minutes of Meeting_, August 17, 1967, p .. 4., 
437. Ibid. 
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The committee was ,in general agreement that it should 
attempt to avoid the use of the hard-to-define terms, "proprie-
tary" and "governmental", and that the distinction be abolished 
in any legislation the committee might propose. Little will be 
accomplished in a statute without abolishing the governmental-
proprietary distinction. The areas of liability should be set 
forth in the statute. such as was done in the California statute_ 
Immunity should be preserved as to all other functions so that 
there are no unknown areas of liability. The advantages of this 
approach, as already indicated, are that new areas of liability 
can be added to the list as experience indicates, and insurance 
companies would know with some degree of certainty the areas of 
liability.438 
California statute. In view of the consensus of the com-
mittee that (1) some legislation is needed with respect to the 
sovereign immunity doctrine, and (2) the liabilities and immuni-
ties of governmental units under the doctrine should be made a 
matter of statutory determination, the committee decided that the 
California statutory approach should be followed.439 Therefore, 
the committee directed that a Colorado draft of the California 
statute be prepared for committee consideration.440 The next two 
meetings of the committee were devoted to a consideration and dis-
cussion of the specific provisions of the California statute.441 
In light of the committee discussion of the provisions of 
the California statute, the committee concluded that its complex-
ity and comprehensiveness made its adaption to Colorado law an 
extremely difficult and cumbersome process. In addition, the form 
of the California statute had been almost entirely abandonedo The 
committee was in agreement, however, that certain substantive pro-
visions and concepts of the California statute should be retained. 
The committee therefore concluded that a simpler form of statute, 
embodying several of the principles of the Utah and California 
statutes, but adapted more to Colorado's needs, would be easier to 
understand. With this in mind, the committee decided to draft its 
own bill in light of the committee discussion concerning various 
policy considerations relevant to the proper legislative approach, 
policy considerations relevant to the substantive aspects of lia-
bility and immunity in specific tort situations, policy consider-
438. Minutes of _Meeting, July 28, 1967, p. SD 
439. The California Governmental Immunity Act. See notes to 
,.supra, and related discussion in text. 
440. Minutes of Meeting, September 21, 1967, p. 6. 
441. Minutes of Meeting~ October 20, 1967, and Minutes of Meeting, 




ations relevant to the financial administration of government tort 
liabi~ity, and policy considerations relevant to the proc~dural 
handling of government tort liability claims~442 
Policy Considerations Relevant to the Substantive Law of Immunity 
or Liability 
The committee felt that· it was necessari t6 agree upon the 
policies it wished to express in a, statute regarding specific tort 
situations before considering a draft bill. The committee thus 
·attempted to determine what act$ of negligence it wanted to cover, 
or what types of claims it wanted to include. for ·which there would 
be a waiver of immunity. With this policy determination, it was 
felt that a consideration of the draft bill would be more meaning-
ful because the committee would have an idea of what it wanted and 
what to look for, based upon the agreed specific policy considera-
tions to be expressed in the bill. · Therefore, the committee exam-
ined areas of possible tort liability and suggested avenues for 
appropriate legislative action consistent with the relevant policy 
considerations. 
Scope of immunity and liability. The committee agreed that 
it should be the policy of the statute not to narrow th~ present 
common law on liability nor to expand the present common law on 
immunity. It should be the intent of the statute not· to undo the 
present law, unless otherwise specifically .so stated in the act. 
The statute should assure that the doctrine is not imposed in 
those cases where it did ·not exist before, unless the statute spe-
cifically so provides. The statute should be designed to narrow 
the application of the doctrine and not to permit the.expansion of 
the doctrine.443 . 
Automobile accidents. The committee·agreed that, with re-
spect to injuries arising from automobile accidents caused by the 
negligent operation of government-owned motor vehicles, the de-
fense of sovereign immunity should not be available to a public 
entity. The committee agreed that there should be an exception 
for emergency vehicles. Thus, if an injury_ is caused by the oper-
ation of an emergency vehicle and its operation do~s not fall 
within the provisions of the exception ~s expressed in 13-5-4 (2) 
and (3), C.R.S. 1963, the defense of sovereign immunity should not 
apply. If, however, the operation of the emergency vehicle is 
within the provisions of the exception, sovereign immunity will 
apply.444 
442. Minutes of Meeting, November 15, 1967, P- 6. 
443. Minutes of Meeting,. November 15, 1967, p. 2. 
444. Ibid. 
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The committee also felt that there may be circumstances 
wherein the operator may sometimes be individually liable, i.e., 
sovereign immunity would not be available to him personally. This 
would occur when the negligence is outside of the scope of his em-
ploymente In other words, if the operator's actions constitute 
gross negligence, they are outside of the scope of employment and 
the exception for the operation of emergency vehicles does not 
apply. On the other hand, if the operator's actions do not con-
stitute gross negligence, they are within the scope of employment 
and the exception. Under these circumstances, sovereign immunity 
would apply. 
Hospitals and jails.' The committee agreed that sovereign 
immunity should not be available as a defense to injuries arising 
from the negligent operation of a hospital or the negligent per-
formance of hospital activities. The committee also agreed that 
this policy should be applied to the operation of jails.445 
Public buildings. The committee agreed that public enti-
ties should be liable to the same extent as private persons for in-
juries caused by the dangerous conditions of public buildings.446 
Roads and highwayse With respect to liability or immunity 
for injuries caused by the negligent construction, operation, or 
maintenance of public roads, or by road defects which constitute 
a dangerous condition, the committee found that the present law 
is in conflict. A county is presently immune from liability. - On 
the other hand, a city is presently liable for injuries caused by 
defective streets within the city limits, if it had proper and 
sufficient notice of the defect and failed to correct it. 
The committee agreed that the liability of the municipali-
ties should be expanded to include the counties and the state on 
a logical basis. However, the committee encountered much diffi-
culty in determining the extent to which this expansion should 
take place, since it is recognized that there are certain types 
of roads or conditions of roads which probably ought not to cause 
the imposition of the rule of liability on the public entity. 
The committee first thought that perhaps a distinction 
could be drawn between injuries caused by road defects that were 
latent and road defects that were patent~ In the case of patent 
defects, or defects which are plainly visible or which can be dis-
covered by such an inspection as would be made in the exercise of 
ordinary care and prudence, the entity should be liable for in-
juries resulting therefrom. It is to be presumed that the entity 
has notice of the patent defecto Failure to act when presumptive 
445. Ibid. 
446. Id, at p. 4. 
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notice exists will result in liability for injuries. caused there-
by. In the case of latent or hidden defects, one which could not 
be discovered by a reasonably ca~eful inspection using ordinary 
care, the entity will be immune, unless it had actual notice of 
the defect in which case it will"be held liable. · · 
The committee agreed that.where a patent dangerous road· 
condition exists and the entity has notice of it or should have_ 
notice of it, the condition should be properly marked or the pub-
lic properly warned of the condition. If the condition is- not 
properly marked to warn the public, the entity will be liable for 
injuries resulting therefrom.· Of course, in the case of latent 
defects if the entity does·not have notice, either actual or pre-
sumptive, it will not be liable. 
The committee, however, felt that it. is arguable whether 
the state or county should be required to repair defects or to 
provide proper markings or warnihgs of their existence-in order 
to avoid liability. The vast riumber of miles of state.highways 
and roads would i'mpose a tremendous obligation on the state if it 
were to meet this requirement. • In other words, it is arguable 
whether liability should be the rule with respect to all state 
roads, since there are some state roads where liability should 
not be the rule. The problem faced by the committee was one of 
classifying and defining those highways and roads where immunity 
applies and where it does ·not apply. The committee felt that · 
this classification, once agreed upon, would serye to impose vary-
ing degrees of liability depending_ upon the ~lassification· of the 
road. _ - · 
The committee made several suggestions with respect to an 
appropriate classification. It was first suggested that perhaps 
the state roads could be classified ~nd a d~stinctibn.m~de between 
paved and unpaved state highways and roads. - On paved roads, when 
the state has notice of a defect and fails t~ act as required to 
avoid liability, the state would be liable for injuries caused by 
dangerous conditions and defects. On unpaved roads th~ st~te 
would not be so liable. It was also suggested that a distinction 
might be made by the U$e of traffic count or·use, with a different 
rule of liability attaching to each kind of classification. -It 
was suggested that all backroads and jeep-roads be excluded from . 
that classification which would impose liability, bu,t that not all 
non-surf ace roads would necessarily have to be t~eated the same·. 
Another suggested approach was to waive immunity as to all 
roads and highways and to devise some method of protecting the 
state and other public entities from liability in on.usual situa-
tions. It was suggested that perhaps the dep~rtment of highways 
or other responsible public entity should be ~equired to post 
warning signs when there are unusual or dangerous conditions on 
the particular highways. Persons who have notice of the dangerous 
condition and yet proceed to travel on the highway woul.d bf: con-
sidered to have assumed the risk of any injury that may occur to 
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them as a result of the dangerous condition warned against. 
Another suggestion was that the construction standards used to 
classify the primary and secondary roads of the federal interstate 
highway system and the standards used to classify state highways 
and roads in Colorado could be used to classify roads for the pur-
poses of sovereign immunity. 
The committee agreed that there must be a reasonable basis 
upon which to make such a classification and that the classifica-
tion system must be based on standards which are related to the 
waiver of sovereign immunityo The system cannot be a completely 
arbitrary classification, because such a classification might be 
open to constitutional attack on the ground that it is in viola-
tion of the equal protection clause of the constitution. The 
committee agreed that any attempt to classify by enumeration would 
have to be supported by good and substantial reasons due to the 
Colorado Supreme Court decisions concerning classifications. 
To aid the committee in its attempt to arrive at a reason-
able classification system~ the Colorado Department of Highways 
was consulted for its recommendations. Mr. Joseph Montano, Chief 
Highway Counsel~ reported that the state highways are classified 
as follows: (11 Interstate System; (2) Federal Primary System; 
(3) Federal Secondary System; (4) Highways that are state high-
ways but are not on either the Interstate, Primary or Secondary 
systems; and (5) Urban extensions of the Federal Primary System. 
Mro Montano reported that the Interstate, Primary and Urban Exten-
sions are all paved; portions of the Secondary System are paved, 
others are not; portions of the system which are neither a part of 
the Interstate, Primary or Secondary are paved, others are not 
paved. 
Mro Montano reported that as of the year 1967, 64.33 per-
cent of the annual vehicle miles traveled on all public streets, 
roads, and highways were traveled on the state system. Of this 
figure the breakdown of the percentage of vehicle miles traveled 
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In light of this information, it was suggested that perhaps 
the defense of immunity could be waived with respect to injuries 
occurring on the Interstate, Federal Primary, and Urban Extension 
systems, since these are all paved highways. With respect to the 
Federal Secondary system, the committee attempted to develop some 
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classification system. It was first suggested that counties could 
be classified for the purpose of waiving immunity, i.e., the de-
fense of immunity would be waived for damages for injuries sus-
tained on the Fed9ral Secondary highways in particular classes of 
counties. 
The Department of Highways reported that there appeared to 
be no realistic way to sub-classify secondary and other sta~e 
highways which would provide a meaningful distinction for the com-
mittee's purposes. It was reported that any attempt to classify 
the state highways on a car count basis would not be very practical 
because the conditions of the various highwars do not vary to any 
great extent. In addition, there is no real stic manner in which 
to categorize the highways by maintenance standards since the de-
partment is charged with the duty of maintaining all highways. 
Consequently, the department instructs its maintenance personnel 
to maintain all highways in the best manner possible. 
The most important consideration in determining which state 
highways should not be included in the sovereign immunity waiver 
is the fact that the Department of Highways must devote a majority 
of its time to design, constructionr maintenance, and supervision 
of those highways which carry the vast majority of the traveling 
public. With this in mind, the committee concluded that the best 
way to classify the highways is by the use of the various con-
struction standards~ i.e., Federal Primary, Interstate, ·etc. With 
respect to the Federal Secondary and other state high~ay systems, 
the committee determined that immunity should be waived only for 
the paved highways which are a part thereof. Therefore, all paved 
roads should come under the waiver of immunity provisions. 
Public parks, recreational facilities, etc. With respect 
to the liability of public entities for injuries caused by danger-
ous conditions in parks, recreational facilities, etc., the com-
mittee originally considered and then rejected the idea that a 
distinction be made between parks within the corporate limits of a 
city and parks outside the corporate limits, with liability at-
tached to the former but not the latter. The committee agreed that 
in this area, with certain exceptions, there should be no immunity. 
The committee concluded that a distinction should be made 
between (1) injuries caused by negligence in the construction, 
maintenance, failure to maintaint etc. of artificial, ·man-made ob-
jects (swing sets, buildings, etc.) and (2) injuries caused by the 
natural conditions of a park (the Flat Irons in Boulder _or the Red 
Rocks west of Denver). In other words, ordinary negligence is 
sifficient to impose liability for injuries caused by the danger-
ous condition of artificial objectso For injuries caused by nat-
ural dangerous conditions, immunity should be retained. 
If a facility is constructed or built, it must be maintained 
at the risk of being liable for a failure to do so. If there is 
property which was not constructed, but is natural and unimproved, 
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a public entity is not required to maintain it and cannot be held 
liable for failure to maintain it. In this case, sovereign immun-
ity is applicable. In short, this means that sovereign immunity 
does not apply with respect to man-made objects and does apply to 
natural objects. 
Water, sewer, trash, and other proprietary activities. The 
committee determined that the doctrine of immunity should not apply 
to those activities which are determined to be proprietary in na-
ture and that the liability of an entity when engaged in these 
functions should be determined as if it were a private corporation 
or individual. These functions include but are not limited to the 
following: water, sewer, trash and waste disposal, electric and 
gas utilities, swimming pools, etc. 
Liability and immunity of public employees. The committee 
agreed to include in the statute the concept of respondeat superi-
or wherein the entity is liable when the employee is liable, and 
the entity is not liable when the employee is not liable. Thus 
vicarious liability is imposed on the public entity for the tor-
tious acts and omissions of its employees. In the absence of a 
statute, a public entity should not be held liable for an employ-
ee's negligence where the employee himself would be immunee In 
order to impose liability on the entity it is necessary to show 
that the employee's negligence was committed in the scope of pis 
employment under circumstances where he would be personally lia-
ble. 
The committee recognized that there may be atts of employ-
ees where the employee should be liable without also imposing 
liability on the entity~ This would be an exception to the gen-
eral rule of respondeat superior. These excepti~ns may include 
such acts as intentional torts, gross negligence, fraud, malice, 
and false arrest. These acts could be considered to be outside of 
the employee's scope of authority, and thus the employee would be 
personally liable without liability being imposed on the entity. 
All acts of employees, unless excepted or otherwise enumerated, 
should be considered to be within the scope of authority. 
It was also recognized by the committee that there may be 
certain acts of employees that should remain immune from the im-
position of liability. These acts may include the adoption or 
failure to adopt or enforce a law; the issuance, denial, suspen-
sion or revocation of a permit, license, etc.; inspection of 
property; the institution or prosecution of judicial or adminis-
trative proceedings; and other types of discretionary actions 
which public officials are called upon to perform. 
Defense of public employee. The committee agreed that a 
public entity should be required to assume the defense costs of 
its employees, whether such defense is assumed by the public en-
tity or not, when they were acting within the scope of their em-
ployment and a claim is pressed against them for alleged injuries. 
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The public entity should also be required to pay all judgments or 
settlements of claims against its public employees in circum-
stances where the defense of sovereign immunity is waived as to 
the public entlty. The public entity, however, -should not be li-
able where it is not mad~ a party defendant in .an action and is 
not notified of the existence of the action within a specified 
time after the commencement of the action. 
The committee concluded that the public entity should have 
discretion as to whether or not it will assume the defense of its 
public employee. This is necessary in order to avoid a conflict 
of interest situation" The public entity should be required, 
where it is made a co-defendant with its public employee, to no-
tify such employee whether or not it will assume his defenses 
Where the entity is not made a co-defendant but is notified of 
the existence of the action within a specified time, it should 
also notify the employee whether or not it will assume his de-
fense. 
If the public entity decides to defend the employee and it 
is determined that the employee was acting within the scope of his 
authority and employment, the entity will be .liable for the judg-
ment. If it is determined by the court that the employee was act-
ing outside of the scope of his employment, the employee, subject 
to an agreement with the entity 9 should be required to reimburse 
the entity for reasonable attorney's fees~ In addition, the en-
tity should not compromise or settle claims against its employees 
until it is established that sovereign immunity has ~een waived. 
The committee also concluded that when the entity fails or 
refuses to defend one of its employees, it will be liable to said 
employee for reasonable defense costs and/or the settlement or 
judgment costs if it is subsequently determined respectively that 
the employee was acting within the scope of his employment and 
the claim arose out of circumstances wherein the defense of sov-
ereign immunity has been waived as to the public entity. If the 
~ourt determines that the employee was not within the scop~ of 
his employment then the entity is neither liable for costs of de-
fense nor costs of the judgment or settlement. 
The above approach was favored by the com~ittee although it 
considered an alternative approach. The alternative to the above 
policy is the approach wherein there is no requirement that the 
entity defend its employees from claims arising out of acts or 
omissions within the scope of employmentft Under the alternative 
approach, the entity could refuse to defend and even though a 
court subsequently establishes that the employee was within the 
scope of authority the entity would still not be liable for the 
defense cost. The arguments in favor of not, requiring the enti-
ties to defend are that (1) it would. probably not encourage as many 
law suits, (2) it would probably cost less money, and (3} it would 
encourage responsibility on the part of public employees. The 
argument in favor of requiring the public entities to defend their 
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employees is that the problems created by the case of Liber v. 
Flor would not arise again. 
The committee emphasized that any provision in the statute 
which requires the public entity to defend should not be construed 
to be a waiver of immunity in situations wher,~ the sovereign im-
munity rule would otherwise be applicableo The provision should 
not be interpreted as requiring the entity to pay all claims 
whether or not sovereign immunity exists. 
Defenses. The general rule of any statute should be that 
sovereign immunity is retained, except as waived by the statute 
or other provision of law. Thus, if sovereign immunity.is not 
waived by statutory provision, sovereign immunity shall be avail-
able to a public entity as a defense to an action for injuries. 
Where sovereign immunity is abrogated as a defense, the liability 
of the public entity should be determined in the same manner as 
if the public entity were a private person. All defenses avail-
able to private persons are also available to public entities. 
Policy Considerations Relevant to Financial Administration of 
Governmental Tort Liability 
The committee felt that the practical fiscal consequences 
which might foreseeably flow from any enlargement of tort respon-
sibility deserved to be analyzed for at·least two reasons9 In 
the first place, the interests of justice demand that provision 
be made for something more than a mere theoretical liability which 
an injured plaintiff is authorized to assert. Assurance should be 
furnished that meritorious tort claims, when proven, will actually 
be paid. A second basis for concern relates to the potential re-
percussions upon the financial health of the public entity found 
to be liable. The public interest demands assurance that prospec-
tive, as well as actual, tort liabilities will not disrupt the 
orderly administration of public finances nor interfere with the 
diligent performance of public functions. 
Insurance -- waiver to extent of coverage. The committee 
agreed that one of the specific policy considerations should be 
that sovereign immunity is waived to the extent of insurance cov-
erage obtained by a public entity. This should be so regardless 
of whether the entity would otherwise be liable or immune. Thus, 
if a public entity obtains insurance to protect against liability 
for injury, then such public entity should be deemed to have 
waived the defense of sovereign immunity as to the particular in-
jury or injuries insured against and to the extent of the amount 
of insurance provided for the particular injury or injuries. If 
the defense of sovereign immunity would otherwise be applicable 
to the entity, then the amount of recovery should be limited to 
the amount of recovery against the insurer. The com~ittee felt 
that by providing that recovery be limited to what is recoverable 
against the insurer, the situation could be avoided where the en-
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tity would have to pay an amount to make up the difference be-
tween th~ amount of insurance coverage and the ambunt the insurer 
actually pays. 
Insurance to cover liabilities created under statute. One 
of the major concerns of the committee was whether any risks or 
liabilities were being created by waiving sovereign immunity which 
could not be adequately insured against* The question was whether 
or not the state and political subdivisions could purchase liabil-
ity insurance at reasonable rates to cover any new exposures 
created by any sovereign immunity legislation. 
In this regard, the September 21, 1967, meeting was devot-
ed to a discussion of the insurance aspects of sovereign immunity 
legislation. The committee consulted with Mr. Richard Barnes, 
Commissioner of Insurance, who had contacted the insurance people 
in New York, Utah and California to determine what problems had 
been encountered in those states with respect to the purchase of 
insurance to cover their risks. In addition, the committee con-
sulted with Mr. Cecil Munson, Assistant Vice President of Pacific 
Indemnity Group, who was responsible for drafting the insurance 
policies his company uses for governmental liability coverage in 
California. Mr. Munson's jurisdiction also includes Illinois, 
Minnesota, and Utah, all of which have statutes on governmental . 
immunity and liability. 
Mr. Barnes reported that he had contacted the Commissioner 
of Insurance in Utah and had solicited his comments on the expe-
rience in that -state subsequent to the enactment of the Utah bill. 
Mr. Barnes said that in Utah various companies are competing for 
bids for insurance coverage by the local governments. On the 
state level, onlr the Highway Department is insured. Mr. Barnes 
stated that in h s opinion insurance could be obtained in Colo-
rado for any of the risks created by the Utah bill. 
Mr. Munson stated that the insurance companies have been 
able to provide the coverage desired by the public entities in 
California. He felt there would be no serious problems involved 
in providing adequate insurance coverage in Colorado if the state 
chooses to follow the California approach. In California, premi-
ums are kept down considerably because of the specification of 
liabilities and immunities. Mr. Muhson stated that the more lia-
bility the statute imposes, the higher the cost for ~he coverage. 
In explaining what the insurance companies would look for 
in establishing rates, Mr. Munson stated that insurance could be 
obtained from several companies which are competitive in the 
field and they would look at the total exposure of the entity in 
establishing the insurance rates. The company looks at the loss 
rates for each entity in determining the insurance rate. The 
company also looks at the areas of liability and immunity when 
writing a policy. 
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Mr. Munson estimated that a policy in California of $50,000 
per person and $100,000 per occurrence for bodily injury and 
$10,000 to $25,000 for property damage would cost between $8,000 
and $9,000 per year, excluding automobile coverage. It was noted 
that this is approximately the amount the entities in Colorado 
are paying now with the immunity rule in effect. Asked what the 
premiums would be assuming the immunity rule were repealed alto-
gether, Mr. Munson replied that the cost would be approximately 
25 percent more~ 
Mr. Munson said that the approach in Utah of limiting the 
amount of insurance that may be purchased and limiting any judg-
ment to that amount was a good approach to follow& Mr. Munson 
also stated that providing for a standard policy which would be 
required to cover everything under the statute was a good idea 
because it would avoid many loopholes, would benefit the buyers, 
and many good insurance companies will write standard policies. 
He also commented that there does not appear to be any great prob-
lems in getting a policy without too many riders in it. 
As to whether there would be any substantial savings in 
cost if limitations on the amount of damages which could be re-
covered were written into the statute and assuming these limita-
tions were fairly high, Mr. Munson stated that there would be a 
savings, but added that there are almost always limits on liabil-
ity. If there were no limits in the statute and the statute com-
pletely waived sovereign immunity, no insurance company would· 
cover this kind of risk. 
Limitation on maximum amount of recovery. The committee 
agreed that a limitation on the amount of recovery when there is 
liability should be set forth in the statute. Thus, the state or 
other public entity would be liable up to the statutory maximum. 
The committee originally agreed that the limits should be set at 
$100,000 per person, and $1,000,000 per occurrence. Although the 
$1,000,000 may seem high, some entities are presently liable in. 
areas where there is no limitation at all. When viewed from this 
perspective, the $1,000,000 limitation is really reducing the po-
tential liability of a public entity. The policy behind the 
limitations is to give some degree of protection to the entity, 
even though basically waiving immunity and allowing more people 
to sue for injuries caused by governmental negligence. 
At the August 15, 1968 meeting, the committee consulted 
with representatives of the D~partment of Insurance. The committee 
determined, upon information furnished by the department, that the 
difference in the cost of purchasing insurance with limits set at 
$100,000 - $1,000,000, and with limits set at $100,000 - $3,000,000, 
was not great enough to make a substantial difference. There being 
no substantial reason for not increasing the limit to $3,000,000 
per occurrence, the committee decided to establish the limits at 
$100,000 per person and $3,000,000 per occurrence. 
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Authority to obtain insurance. The committee concluded 
that all types of public entities should be expressly authorized 
to insure themselves against liability~ It is desirable to make 
clear that a public entity's authority to insure is as broad as 
its potential liability~ Likewise, all public entities should be 
expressly authorized to purchase insurance to cover the liability 
of their officers, agents, and employees for torts committed in 
the scope of their public employment. Not only should public en-
tities be authorized to insure against any liability, but they 
also should be authorized to insure against the expense of defend-
ing claims, whether or not liability exists on such c.laims. 
The committee determined that public entities should be ex-
pressly authorized to insure either by" purchasing commercial lia-
bility insurance or by adopting a program of self-insurance 
through the establishment of financial reserves, or by any combi-
nation of the two methods. Full insurance coverage from a com-
mercial insurer may be deemed practically indispensable by many 
entitiese Others, however, may determine that adequate protection 
at the lowest possible cost can be provided through a program of 
self-insurance, or a combination of self-insurance plus an excess 
coverage policy purchased from a commercial carrier. 
The committee concluded that public entities should be au-
thorized to purchase insurance only from an insurer authorized to 
do business in this state and deemed by the state purchasing agent, 
or the appropriate governing body of the public entity, to be•re-
sponsible and financially sound considering the extent of the cov-
erage required. 
The committee does not recommend at this time that all pub-
lic entities, other than the state, be required to provide insur-
ance covering their liability or the liability of their officers, 
agents, and employees. The state, however, should be required to 
provide insurance. 
Paament of judgments. To ensure that public entities have 
both theuty and capacity to pay tort judgments for which they 
are liable and, at the same time, to protect them against the dis-
ruptive financial consequences of large tort judgments. the com-
mittee concluded that all public entities should have a statutory 
dutr t6 pay tort judgments for which they are liable. Judgments 
aga nst public entities, unlike those against private persons, 
ordinarily cannot be satisfied by execution or other legal pro-
cess against the assets of the judgment debtor, for public prop-
erty and funds are generally exempt from execution. However, when 
a statutory duty is imposed to pay tort judgments~ it will be 
clear not only that such entities have authority to pay such judg-
ments, but also that the judgment creditor may bring an action 
pursuant to Rule 106 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure to 
compel the public entity to pay the judgment. 
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Accordingly, a public entity should be required to pay any 
judgment to the extent funds are available in the fiscal year in 
which the judgment is final. The judgment may be paid out of any 
funds that are available to the entity from (1) a self-insurance 
reserve fundl (2) funds that are unappropriated for any other pur-
pose, and (3J funds appropriated for the current fiscal year for 
the payment of such judgments and not previously encumbered. 
If the judgment cannot be paid in full in the fiscal year 
in which it becomes final, the public entity should be required 
to pay the balance of the judgment in the ensuing fiscal year by 
levying a tax sufficient to discharge the judgment. The committee 
determined that in no event should be levy exceed ten mills, ex-
clusive of existing mill levies. The public entity should con-
tinue to levy such tax, not to exceed ten mills, but in no event 
less than ten mills if such judgment will not be discharged by a 
lesser levy, until the judgment is discharged. 
Policy Considerations Relevant to Procedural Handling of Govern-
mental Tort Liability Claims 
Notice -- filing of claim. The committee determined that 
any person claiming to have suffered an injury by a public entity 
or an employee thereof should be required to file a written no-
tice with the entity within six months after the d~te"the irijury 
is known or should have been knowr. by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence. The committee decided that a claim for injury should 
be considered to accrue on the date the injury is known or should 
have been known by the exercise of reasonable diligence. The 
committee considered and rejected a suggestion that the claim be 
considered to accrue from the time the injury is sustained. The 
committee also considered and rejected a suggestion that the 
claimant be required to file a written notice within three months. 
The notice should be presented to the attorney general when 
the claim is against the state or an employee thereof. When the 
claim is against any other public entity or an employee thereof, 
the notice should be presented to the governing body of the public 
entity or the attorney representing the public entity. 
Statute of limitations. The committee concluded that there 
should be a two year statute of limitations with respect to tort 
actions. An action based on tort should be commenced within two 
years after the accrual of such action, or be forever barred. 
Compromise and settlement. The committee decided to vest 
in the administrative officers of a public entity the discretion-
ary authority to compromise or settle claims. 
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Colorado Governmental Immunity Act 
The committee drafted a bill embodying the policy consider-
ations discussed above. This bill, without committee endorsement 
or approval, was sent to all municipalities, counties, and school 
districts in an attempt to solicit comments and suggestions. The 
committee devoted four meetings to a consideration of the draft 
bill in light of the various policy considerations and the sugges-




UTAH GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY ACT 
63-30-1. Short title. --This act shall be known ·and may be cited as the "Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. 11 
An Act relating to the immunity of the state, its agencies and political sub-
division from actions at law; providing for exemption thereto, for the purchase of 
liability insurance, and for the payment of claims and judgments. 
63-30-2. Definitions. --As used in this act: 
(1) The word "state" shall mean the state of Utah or·any office, department, 
agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, university 
or other instrumentality thereof; 
(2) The words "political subdivision" shall mean any county, city, town, school 
district, special improvement or taxing district, or any other political subdivision 
or public corporation; 
(3) The words "governmental entity1' shall mean and include the state and its 
political subdivisions as defined herein; 
(4) The word "employee" shall mean and include any officer, employee or servant 
of a governmental entity; 
(5) The word "claim" shall mean any claim brought against a governmental entity 
or its employee as permitted by this act; 
(6) The word 11 injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of 
property, or any ot_her injury that a person may suffer to his person, or estate, 
that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent. 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit. --Except as may be ot4erwise 
provided in this act, all governmental entities shall be immune from suit for any 
injury which may result from the activities of said entities wherein said entity 
is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a governmental function. 
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability - Effect 
of waiver of immunity. --Nothing contained in this act, unless specifically provided, 
is to be construed as an admission or denial of liability·or responsibility in so far 
as governmental entities are concerned. Wherein immunity from suit is waived by this 
act, consent to be sued is granted and liability of the entity shall be determined 
as if the entity were a private person. 
63-30-5. Waiver of immunity as to contractual obligation. --Immunity from suit of 
all governmental entities is waived as to any contractual obligation. 
63-30-6. Waiver of immunity as to actions involving property. --Immunity from suit 
of all governmental entities is waived for the recovery of any property real or personal 
or for the possession thereof or to quiet title thereto, or to for~close mortgages 
or other liens thereon or to determine any adverse claim thereon, or secure any 
adjudication touching any mortgage or other lien said entity may have or claim on 
the property involved. 
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63-30-7. Waiver of innnunity for injury from negligent operation of motor vehicles--
Exception. --·Immunity fr,.:im suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
resulting from the negligent operation by any employee of a motor vehicle or other 
equipment while in the scope of his employment; provided, however, that this section 
shall not apply to the operation of emergency vehicles as defined by law and while 
being. driven in accordance with the requirements of section 41-6-14·, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, ;.,.s amended by chapter 86, Laws of Utah, 1961. 
63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defective, unsafe, or dangerous 
condition of highways, bridge£, or other structures. --Immunity from suit of all 
governmental enti.ties is waived for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dan-
gerous condition of any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, 
tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other structure located thereon. 
63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or defective public building, 
structure, or other public improvement - Exception. --Immunity f!om suit of all 
governmental entities is waived for any injury caused from a dangerous or defective 
condition of any public building, structure, dam, reservoir or other public improvement. 
Immunity is not waived for latent defective conditions. 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omission of 
employee - Exceptions. --Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived 
for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or o~ission of an employee committed 
within the scope of his employment except if the injury: 
(1) :arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused,. or 
(2) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious 
prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, 
interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, invasion 
of rights of privacy, or civil rights, or 
(3) arises out of the :f.ssuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by 
the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke, any permit, license, 
certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization, or 
(4) arises out of a failure to make an inspection, or by reason of making 
an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property, or 
(5) arises out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administra-
tive proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause, or 
(6) arises out of a misrepresentation by said employee whether or not such 
is -negligent or intentional, or 
(7) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstra-
tions, mob violence and civil disturbanc~s, or 
(8) arises out of or in connection with the collection of an assessment of 
taxes, or 
(9) arises out of the activities of the Utah National Guard, or 
(10) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county 
or city jail or other place of legal confinement, or 
(11) arises from any natural condition on state lands or the result of any 
activity authorized by the state land board. 
63-30-11. Claim for injury - Claimant's petition for relief. --Any person having a 
claim for injury to person or property against a governmental entity or its employee 
may petition said entity for any appropriate relief including the award of money 
damages. 
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63-30-12. Claim against state or agency - Notice to attorney g~neral and agency -
Time for filing. --A claim against the state or any agency thereof as defined herein 
shall be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed with the attorney general of 
the state of Utah and the agency concerned within one year after the cause of action 
arises. 
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision - Time for filing notice - Claim against 
city or town for injury on highways, bridges, or ·other structures. --A claim against 
a political subdivision shall be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed within 
ninety days after the cause of action arises; provided, however, that any claim 
filed against a city or incorporated town under section 63-30-8 shall be governed 
by the provisions of section 10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
63-30-14. Claim for injury - Approval or denial by governmental entity or insurance 
carrier within ninety days. --Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the 
governmental entity or its insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the 
claimant in writing of its approval or denial. A claim shall be deeme~ to have 
been denied if at the end of the ninety-day period the governmental entity or its 
insurance carrier has failed to approve or deny the claim. 
63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury - Authority and time for filing action against 
governmental entity. --If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action 
in the district court against the governmental entity in those circumstances where 
immunity from suit has been waived as in this act provided. Said action must be 
commenced within one year after denial or the denial period as specified herein. 
63-30-16. Jurisdiction of district courts over actions - Application of Rules of 
Civil Procedure. --The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdi~tion 
over any action brought under this act and such actions shall be governed by the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in so far as they are consistent with this act. 
63-30-17. Venue of actions. --Actions against the state may be brought in the 
county in which the cause of action arose or in Salt Lake County. Actions against 
a county may be brought in the county in which the cause of action arose, or in the 
defendant county, or, upon leave granted by a district court judge of the defendant 
county, in any county contiguous to the defendant county. Said leave may be granted 
ex parte. Actions against all other political subdivisions including cities and towns, 
shall be brought in the county in which said political subdivision is located or 
in the county in which the cause of action arose. 
63-30-18. Compromise and settlement of actions. ~-The governmental entity, after 
conferring with its legal officer or other legal counsel if it has no such officer, 
may compromise and settle any action as to the darnages·or other relief sought. 
63-30-19. Undertaking required of plaintiff in action. --At the time of filing 
the action the plaintiff shall file an undertaking in a sum fixed by the court, 
but in no case less than the sum of $300, conditioned upon payment by the plaintiff 
of taxable costs incurred by the governmental entity in the action if the plaintiff 
fails to prosecute the action or fails to recover judgment. 
63-30-20. Judgment against governmental entity bars action against employee. 
--Judgment against a governmental entity in an action brought under this act shall 
constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same 
subject matter, against the employee whose act or omission gave rise ~o the claim. 
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63-30-21. Claims by other governmental entities prohibited. --Notwithstanding 
any other provision of this act, no claim hereunder shall be brought by the United 
States or by any other state, territory, nation or governmental entity. 
63-30-22. Exemplary or punitive damages prohibited - Governmental entity exempt 
from execution, attachment or garnishment. --No judgment shall be rendered ·against 
the governmental ent'ity for exemplary or punit.ive damages; nor shall execution, 
attachment or garnishment issue against the governmental entity. 
63-30-23. Payment of claim or judgment against state - Presentment for payment. 
--Any claim approved by the state as defined herein or any final judgment obtained 
against the state shall be presented to the office, agency, institution or other 
instrumentality involved for payment if payment by said instrumentality· is otherwise 
permitted by law. If such payment is not authorized by law then said judgment or 
claim shall be presented to the board of examiners and the board shall proceed as 
provided in section 63-6-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
63-30-24. Payment of claim or judgment against political subdivision - Procedure 
by governing body. --Any claim approved by a political subdivision or any final 
judgment obtained against a political subdivision shall be submitted to the governing 
body thereof to be paid forthwith from the general funds of said political subdivi-
sion unless said funds-are appropriated to some other use or restricted by law or 
contract for other purposes. 
63-30-25. Payment of claim or judgment against political subdivision - Installment 
payments. --If the subdivision is unable to pay the claim or award during the current 
fiscal year it may pay the claim or award in not more than ten ensuing annual install-
ments of equal size or in such other installments as are agreeable to the claimant. 
63-30-26. Reserve funds· for payment of claims or purchase of insurance created by 
political subdivisions. --Any political subdivision may create and maintain a reserve 
fund or may jointly with one or more other political subdivisions make contributions 
to a joint reserve fund, for the purpose of making payment of claims against the 
co-operating subdivisions when they become payable pursuant to this act, or for the 
purpose of purchasing liability insurance to protect the co-operating subdivisions 
from any or all risks created by this act. 
63-30-27. Tax levy by political subdivisions for payment of claims or judgments 
or insurance premiums. --Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary all 
political subdivisions shall have authority to levy an annual P!Operty tax in the 
amount necessary to pay any claims, settlements, or judgments secured pursuant to 
the provisions hereof, or to pay the costs to defend against same, or for the purpose 
of establishing and maintaining a reserve fund for the payment of such claims, settle-
ments or judgments as may be reasonably anticipated, or to pay the premium for such 
insurance as herein authorized, even though as a result ·of such levy the maximum 
levy as otherwise restricted by law is exceeded thereby; provided, that in no event 
shall such levy exceed one-half mill nor shall the revenues derived therefrom be 
used for any other purpose than those stipulated herein. 
63-30-28. Liability insurance - Purchase by governmental entity authorized. --Any 
governmental entity within th~ state of Utah may purchase insurance against any risk 
which may arise as a result of the application of this act. 
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63-30-29. Liability insurance - Required policy provisions. --Every policy or 
contract of insurance purchased by a governmental entity as permitted under the 
provisions of this chapter shall provide: 
(a) In respect to bodily injury liability that the insurance carrier shall pay on 
behalf of the insured governmental entity all sums which the insured would in the 
absence of the defense of governmental immunity be legally obligated to pay as 
damages because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting 
therefrom, sustained by any person, caused by accident, and arising out of the owner-
ship, maintenance and use of automobiles, or arising out of the ownership, maintenance 
or use of premises, and all operations necessary or incidental thereto, or in respect 
to other operations and caused by accident subject to a limit, exclusive of interest 
and costs, of not less than $100,000 because of bodily injury to or death of one 
person in any one accident and, subject to said limit for one person, to a limit of 
not less than $300,000 because of bodily injury or death of two or more persons 
in any one accident. 
(b) In respect to property damage liability that the insurance carrier shall pay 
on behalf of the insured governmental entity all sums which the insured would in 
the absence of the defense of governmental immunity be legally obligated to pay as 
damages because of injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of use 
thereof, caused by accident, and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use 
of premises, and all operations necessary or incidental thereto, or in respect to 
other operations and caused by accident to a limit of not less than $50,000 because 
of injury to or destruction of property others in any one accident. 
63-30-30. Liability Insurance - Provision for waiver of sovereign immunity d~fense 
and for payment by insurer required in policy. --Every contract or policy of insurance 
purchased under the terms of this act for any or all risks created by this act shall 
include a provision .or endorsement by which the insurer agrees not to assert the 
defense of sovereign immunity, and to pay all sums for which it would otherwise be 
liable under its contract or policy of insurance. 
63-30-31. Liability insurance - Construction of policy not in compliance with act. 
--Any insurance policy, rider or endorsement hereafter issued and purchased to insure 
against any risk which may arise as a result of the application of this act, which 
contains any condition or provision not in compliance with the requirements of the 
act, shall not be rendered invalid thereby, but shall be construed and applied in 
accordance with such conditions and provisions as would have applied had such policy, 
rider or endorsement been in full compliance with this act, provided the policy is 
otherwise valid. 
63-30-32. Liability insurance - Purchase of policy from lowest and best bidder 
required. --No contract or policy of insurance may be purchased under this chapter 
or renewed under this act except upon public bid to be let to the lowest and best 
bidder. 
63-30-33. Liability insurance - Insurance for employees authorized. --A governmental 
entity may insure any or all of its employees against all or any part of his liability 
for injury or damage resulting from a negligent act or omission in the scope of his 
employment regardless of whether or not said entity is immune from suit for said 
act or omission, and any expenditure for such insurance is herewith declared to be 
for a public purpose. 
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63-30-34. Liability insurance - Judgment or award over limits of insurance policy 
reduced. --If any judgment or award against a governmental entity under sections 
63-30-7, 63-30-8, 63-30-9, and 63-30-10 exceeds the minimum amounts for bodily 
injury and property damage liability specified in section 63-30-29, the court shall 
reduce the amount of said judgment or award to a sum equal to said minimum require-
ments unless the governmental entity has secured insurance coverage in excess of 
said minimum requirements in which event the court shall reduce the amount of said 
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Mr. Lyle C. Kyle, Director 
Colorado Legislative Counsel 
Room 341, State Capitol 
Denver., Colorado 80203 
TEl.EPHONE 222 ·4?2!5 
AREA CODE 303 
RE: Proposed Sovereign Immunity 
Legislation 
Dear Lyle: 
I have now reviewed with the American Insurance Association the rough 
draft of the c~ptioned legislation dated August 12, 1968. On the whole., we 
believe that this draft is quite good. 
However, we continue to be concerned with Section 9 (5) dealing with the 
accrual of the cause of action. As that section now stands, we believe it 
to be obscure as to precise meaning and that, if enacted as it stands, would 
be a potential source of considerable litigation. Conceivably, as the section 
is now drafted, an injury could remain undiscovered for six years, a claim-
ant then discover or claim to have discovered the injury thus making the 
cause of action accrue a month or so short of six years, and the claimant 
would then have an additional two years to commence litigation. This would 
certainly seem to controvert the present six year statute of limitations for 
personal injury or property damage now existing in the State of Colorado. 
It would almost seem that it would be less costly to the state and other 
governmental entities involved to leave out the proposed Section 9 (5) al-
together. 
We also note that Section 15 (2) (c) and Section 16 (2) (c) contain provisions 
leaving the determination as to the responsibility of an insurance company 
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to the State Purchasing Agent or appropriate governing body of the govern-
mental subdivision. We could easily see where such a provision could 
lead to favoritism and pressure in the purchase of insurance coverage. 
We would believe that the insurance should be obtainable from any duly 
authorized insurance company wh~ch meets the requirements of the Colorado 
Insurance Commissioner. 
MJA/bd 
Yours very truly, 
Martin J. Andrew, ·Legisl ive Representative 
American Insurance Asso ation· 
cc: Senators Hahn, Chairman, Saunders and 
Representatives Braden., Cole; Edmonds, Grimshaw, Lamb., 
Sack and Safran 
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